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FOREWORD
Although cooperative union-management programs are not new to the
American scene, their increasingly widespread use during the past decade
suggests a need for systematic study and evaluation of these efforts and
their outcomes. This study by Schuster demonstrates the application of a
theory-based approach to the examination of such programs.
Using a combination of empirical and case study procedures, the author
examines the structure of six different forms of cooperative experiments,
analyzes their implementation process, and assesses their impact. His fin
dings identify a number of factors and conditions associated with suc
cessful cooperation and document a significant potential for improve
ment in company performance and overall labor-management relations.
The study is unique because of (1) its large sample size; (2) its use of ac
tual performance measures to assess program outcomes; and (3) its
longitudinal design to measure impacts over time.
Facts and observations expressed in this study are the sole responsibility
of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily represent positions of
the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Robert G. Spiegelman
Director
September 1984
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PREFACE
I first became interested in studying union-management cooperation
after reading James Healy's book, Creative Collective Bargaining. A
model of organizational change in the context of union-management
relations developed by Thomas Kochan and Lee Dyer (1976) fortified my
interest in the subject matter and stimulated me to further pursue this
area of inquiry. The project began in November 1977 as my doctoral
dissertation. I am very grateful to Professors Donald DeSalvia, R.J.
Chesser, and Susan Rhodes for their support, encouragement, and ideas
in the initial phases of this project.
In addition to the sponsorship provided by the W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research, earlier portions of the research were sup
ported by grants from the United States Department of Labor (Grant
No. 91-36-79-10) and the National Science Foundation (DAR 80-11866).
I am very grateful to the funding organizations for their support. As
always, the views expressed in this book do not necessarily represent the
official opinion or policy of these agencies. I am solely responsible for
the content of this book.
The book attempts to meet the needs of a diverse audience. I hope that
students, practitioners, policymakers, and academicians in personnel
and industrial relations will find this book beneficial. In many respects,
the book may also be appealing to individuals interested in organiza
tional change, since very few studies in this area have examined change
and cooperation in unionized plants. Although cooperative unionmanagement programs are not new to the American scene, their increas
ingly widespread use requires that they be more systematically studied.
Hopefully, the findings of this research will influence the practice of in
dustrial relations and future studies of cooperative strategies.
In a large scale research project, the dedicated contributions of a host of
individuals are required. Christopher Miller conducted many of the site
visits, assisted in the data analysis, drafted portions of chapters, and
vn

competently handled numerous tasks related to the management of the
project. I am indebted to him for his loyalty to this effort. Robert Ahern,
executive director of the Buffalo-Erie County Labor-Management Coun
cil, provided the wise guidance of an experienced practitioner of
cooperative strategies, as well as assisting in the acquisition of three
research sites and commenting on two chapters of the book. I am
grateful to Professor Richard McCleary for his willingness to answer my
questions on time-series analysis and to Heather Tully for her efforts in
keeping the many data sets in good and logical order.
Mary Jo Chase typed endless letters to the research sites requesting an
additional data set or data in a different form. Her interest and dedica
tion in her work are most noteworthy. Cindy Clark typed the manuscript
and its many revisions.
Most important, this project would not have been possible without the
cooperation and patience of union and company personnel at the 38
research sites studied. Their candor in responding to our numerous ques
tions and their willingness to provide as much information as possible
has been the key element in the success of this project. Because each
research site was guaranteed complete confidentiality, I can only extend
an anonymous "thank you" to each person who took time from his/her
busy schedule to assist us. Finally, no project of this size could be under
taken without the support and encouragement of one's family. Their
understanding on the many occasions when travel took me away from
home made the conduct of this project much easier.
Michael H. Schuster
November 1983
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is a long history of union-management cooperation
in the United States. Although the resolution of important
workplace issues continues to be most commonly addressed
within the traditional system of collective bargaining, there is
increasing evidence of a wide array of cooperative efforts
taking place. These efforts are occurring within the im
mediate workplace as well as at company, industry, and na
tional levels. 1
Union-management cooperation can be classified into
eight categories. At the macro level these have been:
(1) presidential labor-management committees which were
assembled during the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and
Carter presidencies. These committees differed in the scope
of the agendas and in their prestige, but generally made
recommendations on economic, industrial relations, and
manpower issues (Maye 1980); (2) industry level labormanagement policy committees (Driscoll 1980), for example
the steel industry's human relations committee (Healy 1965)
and those in retail food (Ray 1982) and health care (Corbett
1982); and (3) joint industry or company-wide committees to
develop responses to technological change (Brooks 1968;
Healy 1965; Horvitz 1968; Shiron 1968).
At an intermediate level, (4) areawide labor-management
committees developed during the 1970s (Ahern 1979; Leone,
Eleey, Watkins, & Gershenfeld 1982; Popular 1980). Area
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labor-management committees are composed of the com
munity's key union leaders and chief operating managers.
Most area committees employ a professional staff to direct
their activities. Area committees sponsor social and educa
tional events to increase communication and understanding
between labor and management and to demonstrate the
mutual benefits of cooperation, act as informal neutrals in
difficult collective bargaining negotiations, and serve as an
integral part of the area's economic development activities.
The most important work of the area committees is in
stimulating and facilitating the creation of in-plant labormanagement committees to improve labor relations within
establishments and, collectively, for the entire community.
At the plant level, four distinct efforts have appeared.
Although several have overlapping goals, their structure and
process are sufficiently distinct to require differential con
sideration. The four are: (5) safety committees (Beaumont &
Deaton 1981; Kochan, Dyer & Lipsky 1977); (6) in-plant
labor-management committees and programs to improve
union-management relations, which have applied a variety
of organizational development and other process change ac
tivities to reduce animosity and improve attitudes between
unions and companies and to address problems normally
outside the scope of traditional collective bargaining (Ahern
1978; Healy 1965; Mayer 1980). One such program was the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service's Relationshipsby-objectives program (Gray, Sinicropi, & Hughes 1982);
(7) productivity committees, gainsharing or productivity
plans, and quality circles (Dale 1949; Dewar 1980; Dubin
1949; Fein 1981; Frost, Wakeley, & Ruh 1974; Lesieur 1958;
Mohrman 1982; Moore & Goodman 1973; Moore & Ross
1978; Schuster 1983 a&b & 1984); and (8) efforts to improve
the quality of worklife (Drexler & Lawler 1977; Goodman
1979; Macy 1979).
This book presents the findings of a five-year study of the
structure, process, and impact of joint union-management
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programs to improve productivity. The focus of this research
is on productivity-sharing plans2 (PSPs) such as Scanlon,
Rucker, and Improshare Plans, in-plant Labor-Management
Committees (L-MCs), Quality Circles (QCs), and Quality of
Worklife (QWL) projects. 3 All of the programs have a com
mon basis, that is, they are structural interventions which at
tempt to generate greater worker interest, involvement and
effort toward achieving important organization goals.
In spite of the long history of union-management coopera
tion, there has been very little scientific analysis of the struc
ture, process, and impact of cooperative programs. The
dominant form of research in the field has been case
analysis. Empirical studies have tended to be mostly attitudinal. This research breaks new ground in three areas.
First, it is a large sample (38 sites) of firms with cooperative
union-management programs. Second, the research utilized
actual performance measures, for example, of productivity.
And finally, the research employed a longitudinal research
design along with sophisticated analytical methods. Thus
this research offers both substantive findings on the struc
ture, process, and impact of union-management cooperation
(chapters 4, 5, 6) as well as addressing and developing
methodological techniques for evaluating cooperative pro
grams (chapter 3).
This introductory chapter is divided into three sections. At
the outset a section underscoring the growth and importance
of union-management cooperation is presented. This is
followed by a discussion of union and management attitudes
toward cooperation. The third section is a brief description
of the structure of the book.

Importance of Union-Management Cooperation
It is unlikely that change in the American industrial rela
tions system would have occurred in the absence of sweeping
environmental influences. Since the early 1970s, foreign
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competition, the increased cost advantages and more
modern equipment of the nonunion sector of the economy,
and a change in the values, attitudes, and work behaviors of
much of the labor force have increasingly shaken the fouridations of the traditional system of collective bargaining. In
more recent years, harsh economic difficulties have ac
celerated the process of change and accommodation.
Whether, and to what degree, the increased levels of
cooperation will continue once economic conditions stabilize
is very much an open question. At the present time, however,
companies have had to increase their efficiency in order to
remain viable, and one strategy for doing so has been to ex
pand the level of employee and union involvement in decisionmaking affecting the workplace. Many of these efforts
were stimulated and publicized by the now defunct National
Center for Productivity and the Quality of Working Life
(NCPQWL).
Although there is no way of knowing precisely how much
cooperation is occurring in the United States, there is
evidence which suggests that there has been a marked in
crease in cooperative activities. This evidence comes from a
variety of governmental, academic, and journalistic sources.
In 1977 and 1978, the NCPQWL published directories listing
companies and unions with ongoing cooperative activities.
In each case, approximately 100 experiments were listed. The
publication of the directory was suspended until the 1982
edition, published by the U.S. Department of Labor, which
contains a listing of 700 experiments.
Additional evidence of the upswing in cooperative labormanagement activity may be found in the increase in safety
committees. The Bureau of National Affairs has reported
that in its 1979 survey of collective bargaining agreements,
43 percent contained provisions calling for safety commit
tees. This was an increase in the number of contracts with
such provisions over the 1970 and 1975 surveys which
reported 31 percent and 39 percent, respectively.
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In a recent study of 26 sites with labor-management com
mittees in Illinois, Derber and Flanigan (1980) found that the
majority had been established in the 1970s. Moreover, five
were found to be revitalized efforts of earlier years.
During the 1970s, the number of area labor-management
committees increased to just over 20. Although several com
munities Toledo, Ohio (1945) and Louisville, Ken
tucky already had such committees, it was the success of
the Jamestown, New York committee (1972) which drew
significant attention. The increasing use of areawide labormanagement committees represents the development of an
important new institutional arrangement in industrial rela
tions.
There is no precise way of knowing how many Scanlon,
Rucker, and Improshare Plans, profit-sharing plans, quality
circles, or quality of worklife programs have been instituted.
However, a 1982 survey by the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) highlights the growth of workplace changes. The
NYSE (1982) study was based on a sample of 49,000 cor
porations with one hundred or more employees. The study
reported the "most rapidly growing human resource ac
tivities over the past two years" (p. 26). Over the two-year
reporting period, the following efforts were initiated: 74 per
cent added quality circles, 36 percent job design/redesign, 30
percent group incentive plans, and 29 percent production
teams. There is other qualitative evidence which strongly
suggests increasingly widespread use of these cooperative
strategies. First, there has been overwhelming attention in
the popular press to companies with quality circles, gainsharing programs and quality of worklife efforts. Business Week
titled its special report on these efforts "The New Industrial
Relations." Second, there is evidence that the use of these
strategies has spread from the traditional manufacturing sec
tor into the service and public sectors. Finally, there have
been several important national bargaining agreements (for
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example in auto, steel, and communications) which encom
pass one or more cooperative strategies.
These efforts have taken on a new sense of urgency and
importance as demonstrated by the recently enacted LaborManagement Cooperation Act (LMCA) of 1978 [29 U.S.C.
1975(a)]. The LMCA is designed to encourage plant, area,
and industrywide cooperative union-management efforts to:
(1) improve communication between represen
tatives of labor and management;
(2) provide workers and employers with oppor
tunities to study and explore new and in
novative joint approaches to achieving
organizational effectiveness;
(3) assist workers and employers in solving prob
lems of mutual concern not susceptible to
resolution within the collective bargaining pro
cess;
(4) study and explore ways of eliminating poten
tial problems which reduce the competitiveness
and inhibit the economic development of the
plant, area, or industry;
(5) enhance the involvement of workers in making
decisions that affect their working lives;
(6) expand and improve working relationships
between workers and managers; and
(7) encourage free collective bargaining by
establishing continuing mechanisms for com
munication between employers and their
employees through Federal assistance to the
formation and operation of labormanagement committees.
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)
has been empowered to provide financial and technical
assistance to aid companies and unions in this process.
Limited amounts of funds have been allocated by the FMCS,
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most of it going to support area labor-management commit
tees.
Three studies by the United States General Accounting Of
fice (GAO) also underscore the potential importance of this
subject. The first GAO (1980a) study criticized the now
defunct Council on Wage and Price Stability for its failure to
promulgate an exemption to its compensation standards for
pay increases associated with productivity-sharing plans such
as Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare.
The second study (GAO 1980b) criticized the United States
Department of Labor for not having expended resources or
provided sufficient leadership to encourage improvements in
workers' productivity in the private sector. The GAO recom
mended that the Department of Labor develop programs
and encourage human resource efforts to improve produc
tivity. Finally, the third study (GAO 1981) of productivitysharing plans found that they had had a positive impact on
organizational productivity as well as improving labormanagement relations, reducing absenteeism, turnover, and
grievances.
In September 1982, the U.S. Department of Labor, in a
departure from past policy, announced the formation of a
new division, the Cooperative Labor-Management Programs
Division, to encourage shop floor cooperation. The initial
mission of the Division will be limited to the gathering and
dissemination of information. Yet, this represents a first step
in federal recognition and support for change at the
workplace.
It is somewhat paradoxical that the increase in cooperative
activity in the United States comes at a time when relations
between the labor movement and employers at the national
level have been strained. Increased employer aggressiveness
in political activity and at the workplace, as well as an antiunion administration in Washington, have caused this rift.
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In the political arena, employer lobbying resulted in the
defeat of Common Situs Picketing and Labor Law Reform
legislation. Both of these bills were actively sought by the
labor movement. At the workplace there has been increased
management opposition to union efforts to organize non
union operations, as well as increased efforts to decertify ex
isting unions. In collective bargaining, management
demands for concessions on wages and work rules have been
widespread.
The apparent dichotomy between conflict at the national
level and cooperation at the plant level can be explained by
the strong stimulus for change being created by the harsh
economic environment faced by many firms, thus providing
the requisite stimuli to shape local collective bargaining rela
tions, national activity notwithstanding.
Union and Management Attitudes Toward Cooperation
Large scale studies of union and management attitudes
toward cooperation have not been undertaken. Two studies,
however, one by Kochan, Lipsky, & Dyer (1974) and another
commissioned by Business Week ("Concessionary Bargain
ing" June 14, 1982) and conducted by Louis Harris &
Associates do provide some evidence of attitudes toward
cooperation. The Kochan, Lipsky & Dyer study surveyed a
sample of local and district level union leaders as well as
stewards and committee members. Their results are sum
marized in table 1-1.
Union activists were found to support cooperative
strategies on some workplace issues. The respondents were
questioned as to their rating of the effectiveness of collective
bargaining in handling 13 work-related issues. The majority
of the respondents indicated that collective bargaining was
"somewhat helpful" or "very helpful" in resolving issues
related to fringe benefits (91 percent); earnings (90 percent);
job security (80 percent); grievance procedures (76 percent);

Table 1-1
Union Attitudes Toward Cooperation
Respondents' ratings of effectiveness
of collective bargaining

Issue
Interesting work
Supervisors
Control of work
Productivity
Better job
Adequate resources
Work load
Hours
Safety
Grievance procedures
Job security
Earnings
Fringe benefits

Respondents' opinions about "best way"
to deal with issues

Not very helpful/
not helpful at all

Somewhat helpful/
very helpful

Set up a joint
program with
management

Seek improvements
through
formal bargaining

Should not
get involved

74.5
68.9
67.3
61.7
63.0
57.7
54.5
41.8
35.1
24.1
20.2
10.4
9.5

25.5
31.1
32.7
38.2
37.0
42.3
45.5
58.3
64.9
75.8
79.8
89.6
90.5

67.8
65.6
53.8
51.2
38.4
60.6
43.8
31.1
41.1
32.7
12.2
5.6
4.2

16.3
19.3
26.9
25.1
43.6
21.2
42.3
65.6
56.5
67.3
85.9
93.9
95.5

15.9
15.1
19.3
23.7
18.0
17.8
13.9
3.3
2.4
0.0
1.9
0.5
0.5

Adapted from Kochan, Lipsky & Dyer (1974).
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safety (65 percent); and hours (58 percent). At the same time
collective bargaining was found to be "not very helpful" or
"not helpful at all" in addressing interesting work (76 per
cent); supervisors (68 percent); control of work (67 percent);
productivity (62 percent); better job (63 percent); adequate
resources (58 percent); and work load (55 percent).
The respondents were then asked what the "best way" was
to deal with the issues. More than half the respondents
would "seek improvements through formal collective
bargaining" for issues of fringe benefits (96 percent), earn
ings (94 percent), job security (86 percent), hours (66 per
cent), grievance procedures (67 percent), and safety (57 per
cent). However, there was a distinct preference for setting up
"a joint program with management outside collective
bargaining" for interesting work (68 percent), supervisors
(66 percent), adequate resources (61 percent), control of
work (54 percent), and productivity (51 percent). Only on the
issue of work load did the respondents split (44 percent for
joint program, 42 percent through collective bargaining).
These results were replicated by Ponak and Fraser (1979) on
a sample of Canadian trade unionists with similar results.
According to the union activists, collective bargaining was
viewed as effective in resolving more traditional
issues wages, fringe benefits, and grievances. Thus, there
was less preference for collaboration with management. Col
lective bargaining was viewed as less effective in resolving
issues related to productivity and the quality of worklife and
there was greater interest expressed in pursuing joint pro
grams. Although clear policy preferences emerge from this
study, it is difficult to ascertain whether these differences are
translated into practice.
At the national level, union officials have spoken out on
the issue of cooperation with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
Glenn Watts, president of the Communications Workers
Union of America is a proponent of cooperation. He states:
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Labor is concerned with the development of
democracy in Industry. The collective bargaining
process will always be the foundation of industrial
democracy; but QWL gives us the tools to build
higher than we ever have before.
For our Members, QWL has provided one of the
most important benefits of all the chance to be
treated with dignity and have a voice on the job.
. . . through QWL, we are extending our in
fluence into the murky territory of 'management
prerogatives,' helping to shape management prac
tices and policies while they are being formed
rather than after the fact. (Watts 1982)
Thus, consistent with the views of local activists, Watts sees
cooperative strategies as supplementing union efforts
through collective bargaining and being primarily responsive
to nontraditional issues such as the nature of the work and
the relationship between supervision and workers.
A different view of QWL programs was recently taken by
George J. Poulin, general vice-president of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Poulin
1982). An extensive portion of his statement is reproduced
here because it reflects a view of cooperation that has not
received sufficient attention.
If the shop floor people are so vital in achieving
management's goals in providing the benefits just
listed [improved worker job satisfaction, improved
product quality, reduced unit labor costs by in
creasing productivity] then why in the hell hasn't
management recognized our vitality, until now?
All of a sudden, why is it that we start sharing in
decisions?

12
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Our quick answer is that management has often
made such a mess of things, they want to share the
blame. They come to us, after they've screwed up.
A second answer is that management wants to
make a change in production planning or process,
or it wants to introduce some new
technology either or both of which will shove
some of us out the door onto the unemployment
line and it wants to con us into helping get the job
done.
A third answer is management simply wants
more production more work from the same or
fewer workers. In other words, a speed up.
But a fourth answer is more likely the real
answer: To undercut the union; to use up its duties
and powers and responsibilities; to make it seem
unnecessary and ultimately put it out of business;
to take control of workers away from the bargain
ing agent and put in the grip of management itself.
Poulin argues that the goals of QWL programs can be ac
complished through the existing collective agreements.
It is too early to determine whether the Watts or Poulin
view best describes the eventual outcome of cooperation. It
will take more time, experience with cooperation, and
evaluation research to determine whether meaningful change
has come about from cooperation and whether cooperative
strategies have enabled unions to better represent their
members. For the time being, however, cooperative
strategies continue to increase, but the future will be largely
determined by the manner in which the parties manage the
current level of cooperation.
Management attitudes toward cooperation were assessed
in a survey of more than 400 "high-level executives" of large
companies reported by Business Week ("Concessionary
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Bargaining" 1982). Executives were asked whether they
would like to see a return to traditional bargaining once the
economy became healthy or whether they would prefer giv
ing unions and workers more say in company operations if
employee compensation were tied to company performance.
Overall, 50 percent of the executives would opt for greater
union and employee involvement. The complete results of
the survey, along with a breakdown by the extent of
unionization and industry, are presented in table 1-2.
Heavily unionized companies were more likely to favor
employee participation than firms which have experienced
unionization to a lesser degree. The number favoring par
ticipation increased from 42 percent to 58 percent as the
degree of unionization in the company increased from 40
percent or fewer to more than 70 percent of employees.
There were also differences among various industry groups
with utilities (87 percent) and electrical (73 percent) most
heavily favoring cooperation and natural resources (27 per
cent) and retail (25 percent) least likely to prefer coopera
tion.
Although not a pure indication of management
preference, the data still suggest a change in traditional
management attitudes. When combined with the growing
emphasis on employee involvement strategies discussed in
the previous section, it must be concluded that a significant
shift has occurred in management's approach to workplace
collaboration.

Structure of the Book
The main body of this monograph is organized into six
chapters. Chapter 2 presents an overview of theories and
models of cooperation and change in unionized settings. The
overview is followed by the models employed to guide this
research, the specific research issues treated, and the
justification for each aspect of the study. Chapter 3 provides
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a detailed presentation of the research design, measures of
study variables, and analytical techniques employed, as well
as a summary of the characteristics of the research sites and
methodological findings. Chapters 4-6 present the findings
from this research. Chapters 4 and 5 are, of necessity, more
qualitative and descriptive, while chapter 6 includes both
quantitative and case study evidence. Chapter 4 describes the
structural characteristics of the six types of interventions
studied. This includes not only the findings from the im
mediate work, but also draws from the literature to provide a
more thorough overview. Chapter 5 deals with the results of
the process leading to cooperation and some of the condi
tions necessary to implement and maintain a cooperative
program.
In chapter 6, the results of the analysis of performance at
the research sites are presented. Although the type and dura
tion of the data on each site varies, there is a substantial
amount of data on productivity and employment and lesser
amounts on quality, turnover, absenteeism, and grievances.
Some of the time-series data sets on these variables are as
long as eight years, making this the first truly longitudinal
study on this subject matter. Chapter 6 also includes 11 case
studies which serve to highlight significant issues involved in
the practice of cooperative union-management relations. In
chapter 7, a summary of the research methodology and the
findings is offered, along with a future research agenda.

NOTES
1. One of the most comprehensive works on cooperation and change is
by Irving H. Siegel and Edgar Weinberg, Labor-Management Coopera
tion: The American Experience. Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Upjohn In
stitute for Employment Research, 1982.
2. In recent years, productivity-sharing plans have oftentimes been refer
red to as gainsharing plans. The terms are used synonymously.
3. Most readers will be familiar with these six types of interventions.
Those readers wishing more information on the types of programs
studied should refer to chapter 4.

Chapter 2
Models of Change and Cooperation
in Unionized Settings
The outcomes of collective bargaining are generally con
sidered to form a web of rules to govern the workplace
(Dunlop 1958). The interaction of labor and management in
traditional conflict-based bargaining is the mechanism which
drives the system of industrial relations. In this system,
bargaining power, defined as "the ability to secure another's
agreement on one's own terms" (Chamberlain & Kuhn 1965,
p. 170) is paramount. Each side considers the costs of agree
ing and disagreeing with its opponent and develops a strategy
for rendering economic harm and defending against
economic attack. Strikes, picketing, boycotts, stockpiling,
strike funds, etc. are the gears of the collective bargaining
system.
Other forms and processes of bargaining have been iden
tified and categorized within the traditional process by
Walton and McKersie (1965). Thus integrative or problemsolving bargaining, attitudinal structuring or the relationship
between the employer and the labor organization, as well as
the relationship between the key union and management ac
tors, and intraorganizational bargaining or the relationships
and internal political considerations within each organiza
tion, serve to underscore the complexity of the traditional
process.
17
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It is within this framework that cooperation and change
must occur. Through the years, the occasional necessity to
cooperate rather than confront has forced labor and
management to approach their relationship in a different
way. The difficult economic times since the early 1970s and
changing work attitudes and behaviors on the part of the
workforce have stimulated the need for change. As
demonstrated in the previous chapter, union leaders and
managers now show increased support for cooperative pro
grams to resolve issues of productivity and improve the
quality of worklife (Dyer, Lipsky & Kochan 1977; Kochan,
Lipsky & Dyer 1974; Ponak & Fraser 1979).

Models of Change and Cooperation
Although not all of the propositions have been identified
and ordered, five models of change and cooperation in
unionized settings have been developed. Kochan and Dyer's
(1976) model integrates the organizational change and in
dustrial relations literature into a general three-stage
(stimulus for change, initial commitment, and institutionalization of the change) model for change. Lawler and
Drexler (1978) have analyzed the dynamics of establishing
cooperative union-management quality of worklife projects
and identified the factors operating in favor of, and against
such efforts. Three other models have addressed the
variables necessary to operationally succeed in implementing
cooperative programs. Nadler, Hanlon, and Lawler (1980)
have identified the factors influencing the success of labormanagement quality of worklife projects. Goodman (1973)
has proposed an expectancy model to explain Scanlon Plan
performance, which probably has applicability to all gainsharing programs. Finally, a model of labor-management
productivity program effectiveness (Schuster 1980) was
developed to guide this research. The Schuster model is
broadly based and was designed to be useful in studying all
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forms of cooperative programs having a goal of improved
productivity and increased organizational effectiveness. This
would include gainsharing, as well as quality circles, labormanagement committees and quality of worklife projects.
All of these models are complementary. The first four will
be discussed in this section since they provided useful
guidance to the study of cooperation and many variables and
issues suggested by their developers were examined as part of
this research. The effectiveness model will be presented in
the next section which outlines the hypotheses investigated in
this study.
Figure 2-1 outlines the stages of the cooperative process by
modifying the Kochan-Dyer model to encompass a fourth
stage (third in time), program operational success. This per
mits a visual integration of all the models.
Figure 2-1
Stages in the Cooperative Process: A Modification
of the Kochan-Dyer Model
One

Two

Stimuli

Initial
Decision

Three
Program Opera
tional Success

Kochan-Dyer Model; Goodman Model;
Lawler-Drexler Model; Nadler, Hanlon,
Lawler Model;
Schuster Model;

Four
Institutionalization
into the ongoing L-M
Kochan-Dyer Model

Lawler-Drexler Model
Lawler and Drexler enumerated the factors working for
and against joint union-management quality of worklife pro
jects. Table 2-1 summarizes their work.

Table 2-1
Summary of Factors Working For and Against
Joint Union-Management QWL Projects
Union-Management QWL Projects
Factors working in favor
Factors working against
1. QWL project would be more effective if coopera
tively directed
2. Reduces resistance to change
3. Change will be more sustainable
4. Avoid legislation imposing collaboration
5. Union can achieve noneconomic benefits for
members
6. Reduces adversary nature of relationship

1. Goal conflict
a) Union employment security, higher wages and
benefits, job rights
b) Management profit, productivity,
organizational effectiveness
2. Lack of a model to structure projects
3. Lack of knowledge about organizational change,
development, and psychology; job redesign
4. Long-standing adversary relationship
5. Potential loss of power for managers and union
leaders
6. Impact on collective bargaining agreement; modifi
cation of traditional clauses
7. Time involved for planning and implementation
8. Differing expectations of project outcomes
9. Obtaining qualified consultants

SOURCE: Lawler & Drexler (1978).
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The Lawler-Drexler model accurately lists the reasons why
union-management collaboration is not only desirable, but
necessary. It would seem inconceivable that major organiza
tional change could be effectively implemented in a unioniz
ed setting without union involvement or tacit approval.
However, there are still instances where management at
tempts to bring about change without consultation or ap
proval of the union which represents its employees. Union
involvement not only reduces resistance to change, but pro
vides greater acceptance of it, and can stimulate further
change.
Some unions have come to view cooperative strategies as a
complementary, rather than competing avenue for improv
ing the welfare of their members. According to Glenn Watts,
president of the Communications Workers of America,
quality of worklife programs lead to:
. . . lasting improvements in job satisfaction
among union members. And I believe if we respond
to the challenge posed by QWL, it offers us in the
Labor Movement the opportunity to deal with
many issues which have been beyond the reach of
traditional collective agreement. (Watts 1982)
Many Americans will no doubt question the suggestion
that voluntary joint QWL programs will avoid legislation
imposing collaboration. But just such a legislative scheme is
under discussion in the European Parliament: the draft Fifth
Directive and Vredeling draft Directive would impose forms
of employee participation, information sharing, and con
sultation in the member countries of the European Economic
Community. Although similar provisions would not seem on
the horizon in the United States, successful voluntary efforts
would continue to reduce the likelihood of imposed col
laboration.
The factors working against joint involvement are more in
the nature of obstacles to be overcome. Readers should con-
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sider the items in this listing since many of the interventions
reported in this research were less effective or not effective at
all because of the failure to agree on goals, differing expecta
tions, lack of qualified consultants, and failure to reduce the
adversary nature of the parties' relationship.

Kochan-Dyer Model
Kochan-Dyer's model was the first effort to conceptualize
the change and cooperative process in union-management
settings. In contrast to the Lawler-Drexler work, the
Kochan-Dyer integration of the organizational change and
industrial relations literature is conceptualized into a series
of testable hypotheses. As will be discussed further in the
next section, one aspect of this research was to collect data to
explore the validity of the Kochan-Dyer model. In chapter 5,
some preliminary data on this model are presented.
Underlying the Kochan-Dyer model are three assump
tions. First, that there are sets of interests (individuals,
employer, and union) created as a result of the unionmanagement relationship which are accepted as legitimate by
the others. These interests are interdependent and each party
pursues its own goals through a series of interactions within
the context of this interdependent relationship. Second,
because of the protections afforded unions in the society,
competing organizations must share power. Third, since
their respective goals are somewhat incompatible, this in
evitably results in structurally-based conflict. The KochanDyer model is summarized in table 2-2.
In the first stage of their model, Kochan and Dyer
hypothesize that the parties will consider a joint venture only
when there is strong internal or external stimulus for change.
An internal stimulus is an outgrowth of the parties' previous
interaction or a current workplace problem. Some examples
of an internal stimulus include a bitter strike, distressed
grievance procedure, high accident rates or a series of ac-

Table 2-2
Summary of the Kochan-Dyer Model of Organizational Change
in the Context of Union-Management Relations
Factor
Greater internal pressure
Greater external pressure
Less effective formal bargaining process

Outcome
Consider joint venture

(d)
(e)
(0

Perceive change as being instrumental
Parties negotiate/compromise over goals
No attempt to block program by coalitions or individual
power holders

Embark on specific change
program

(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(1)
(m)

Valued goals achieved in initial phase
High probability valued goals achieved in future
Initial goals not displaced by goals of higher priority
Program stimulus remains strong
Equitable distribution of benefits
Union perceived as instrumental in attaining program benefits
Program not infringing on traditional collective bargaining
issues
Program doesn't threaten management prerogatives
Program not overlapping jurisdiction of grievance procedure
Union leaders not viewed as being co-opted
Program protected from use of bargaining tactics and
maneuvers
Union leaders continue to pursue member goals on distributive

Mutual commitment to maintain
program

Stage
One
Stimuli
Two
Initial decision to participate

Three
Maintain commitment
over time

(a)
(b)
(c)

(n)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)
SOURCE: Kochan & Dyer (1976).
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cidents, technological change, low productivity, and prob
lems of absenteeism, alcoholism, and substance abuse. Ex
ternal stimuli develop outside the realm of the parties' in
teraction. Some examples of external stimuli include federal
legislation governing occupational safety and health, equal
employment opportunity, and pension reform, as well as
foreign and domestic competition. A strong stimulus can
reduce goal conflict as the parties may come to view coopera
tion as increasing their ability to maximize their joint out
comes. In other words, environmental factors may force the
parties to cooperate in order to avoid the difficulties that
-would occur if they did not cooperate.
Because of traditional hostility toward joint unionmanagement programs, the parties will first look to the
traditional collective bargaining process for relief, regardless
of whether the stimulus is internal or external. This is ap
propriate in view of the fact that most union leaders and
members of labor unions tend to view collective bargaining
as the primary mechanism for resolving problems. Managers
also tend to avoid many cooperative strategies for fear that
collaboration might reduce management prerogatives. It is
presumed that if the traditional process is capable of dealing
adequately with the issues raised by the stimulus, there will
be no need for organizational change.
Stage Two of the model addresses the factors which move
the parties from an initial decision to participate in the
change program to a commitment to embark upon a specific
change effort. The program must be viewed as being in
strumental, agreed-upon goals must be established, and
there must be no attempt by coalitions to block the program.
Stage Three concerns program maintenance. Mutual com
mitment to maintain the program over time (Stage Three) is
said to occur when valued goals are achieved in the initial
phase of the effort; there is a high probability of valued goals
being achieved in the future; initial goals are not displaced by
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goals of a higher priority; the program stimulus remains
strong; there is equitable distribution of the benefits; the
union is seen as being instrumental in attaining program
benefits; the program does not infringe on traditional collec
tive bargaining issues or overlap the grievance procedure; the
program doesn't threaten management prerogatives and the
union leadership is not viewed as being co-opted; and the
program is protected from the use of bargaining tactics or
maneuvers, while the union leadership continues to pursue
member goals on distributive issues.

Nadler, Hanlon, and Lawler Model
Nadler, Hanlon, and Lawler's model combines two fac
tors (ownership of the project and goals) associated with the
Lawler-Drexler and Kochan-Dyer models. However, it also
breaks new ground by adding four operational and contex
tual variables including consultant effectiveness, labormanagement committee functioning, organizational climate,
and organizational financial viability. Figure 2-2 outlines
their model and the correlation coefficients between these
variables and project effectiveness.
The data to test this model were collected at a conference
of union, management, and rank-and-file workers involved
in ongoing QWL projects. Project effectiveness was defined
as improvements in quality of work, organizational func
tioning and a global success measure. Self-report measures
were used to assess all the measures. In spite of this limita
tion and a relatively small sample (N = 64), this study
presents useful data on cooperative program effectiveness.
It is interesting to note that a good labor-management
relationship within the organization and on the labormanagement steering committee were related to QWL pro
ject effectiveness. Later on it will be suggested that a good
labor-management relationship may be a precondition to
change. The importance of employing an effective consul-

Figure 2-2
Nadler, Hanlon & Lawler Model of Factors Influencing the Success
of Labor-Management QWL Projects
Ownership of Project
Management
Union
Rank & File
Overall

Consultant Effectiveness
Improve Communication
Work with L-M Comm.
Resolve Conflicts
Help Work Groups
Make Things Happen
Overall

o

.20
.14
.23

.55**
.42**
.43**
.44**
.54**
.55**

Labor-Management Committee
Role Clarity
.54**
Group Process
.49**
Trust
.59**
Openness
.31**
Address Critical Issues
.50**
Overall
.68**

*p<.05, **p<.01
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tant is also underscored. Financial viability was hypothesized
to be related to project effectiveness since financial resources
are required to make QWL programs successful. These in
clude monies for staff, consultants, time off for committee
meetings, travel to conferences, etc. Yet financial viability
was shown to be negatively related to the success of the pro
ject. Nadler, Hanlon & Lawler (1980) suggest that there may
be a curvilinear relationship, that is, where there are
resources available for experimentation and where coopera
tion is needed to insure survival.

Goodman's Model ofScanlon Plan Effectiveness
Goodman has offered an expectancy model to predict
Scanlon Plan success. Figure 2-3 outlines his model, which
would also seem applicable to other forms of gainsharing.
Figure 2-3
Goodman's Model of Scanlon Plan Effectiveness
(Reprinted with permission)
Introduction
Strategy,

Beliefs

Process
^Variables
i*

Organizational
Characteristics

Attractiveness
of Outcome

Scanlon Plan
Scanlon Plan
- Behavior ——'^~ Outcomes
(suggestion
(bonuses)
making)

The expectancy component of Goodman's model con
siders the effect of individual differences in the attractiveness
of Scanlon outcomes (bonuses) and individual beliefs on in
creased efforts (harder work, suggestion-making) that will
lead to those desired outcomes. These are enclosed in the box
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in figure 2-3. Process variables, such as the reinforcement ef
fect from the bonus or social reinforcement, are seen as in
fluencing beliefs about the plan. Finally, the structural and
environmental characteristics of the organization such as the
task structure, superior-subordinate relationships, work
group structure, labor-management relations, and financial
condition are suggested to influence the process variables. It
is noteworthy that Goodman treats the Scanlon Plan out
come as the bonus. This is certainly a significant part of the
Scanlon Plan. However, it could also be argued that the
change in management style, the opportunity to become in
volved in workplace decisions, and changes in subordinatesupervisory relations also constitute employee outcomes.
Therefore, it may be that the expectancy model is even more
appropriate to the other gainsharing plans (Rucker and Improshare) where there is greater emphasis on financial
rewards than to the Scanlon Plan.

Research Objectives
This research investigated the structure, process, and im
pact of joint union-management programs. This section con
tains the research issues and hypotheses which served to
focus the research. Many aspects of the study were ap
proached as research issues rather than as testable
hypotheses for two reasons. First, the strategy appeared to
be consistent with the case study approach and would permit
an in-depth descriptive analysis. Second, although the sam
ple of firms was large in relation to previous studies on this
topic, it was not believed to be sufficiently large to permit
testing of all the hypotheses. Thus in the structural (chapter
4) and process (chapter 5) portions of the study an attempt
was made to measure the presence of many characteristics
identified in the change models. Chapter 6, the impact por
tion, includes both quantitative and case study analyses.
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Program Structure Research Issues
The program structure segment analyses the case study in
formation as well as reviewing the literature on each pro
gram. This portion of the study represents an attempt to
engage in a comparative analysis of six widely used unionmanagement interventions—Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare Plans, Quality Circles, Labor-Management Com
mittees, and Quality of Worklife Projects. The following
aspects of program structure are considered.
(1) program philosophy/theory
(2) primary goals of the program
(3) subsidiary goals of the program
(4) structure for worker participation
(5) mechanism for employee suggestion-making
(6) role of supervision
(7) role of management
(8) productivity-sharing formulas
(9) frequency of payout
(10) role of union
(11) impact on management style
One of the overall findings of this research was that all the
programs can be successful in some settings and ineffective
in others. Moreover, in practice the "standard design" for
each program became diluted and modified due to local
necessity or preferences. The chapter on structure, which is
entirely descriptive, should be very useful to students,
managers, union leaders, and policymakers in comparing the
merits and utility of each program.

Cooperative Process Research Issues
The segment on the cooperative process involved the col
lection of data on the process of change and perceptions of
cooperation. The Kochan-Dyer model provided the direction
for most of this part of the research. Data were collected
which permitted an assessment of the propensity of each fac-
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tor in their change model to occur in actual experience. Ad
ditional process data predominantly related to other change
models were also collected. Thus, the report contains infor
mation on:
(1) the stimulus for change
(2) the process of change
(a) the efforts made to resolve stimulus issues in
traditional bargaining
(b) the incidence of opposition coalitions to block
the change effort
(c) the use and role of neutrals or consultants
(d) the expected utility of the program to address the
stimulus issues
(3) the operational issues in the design of change pro
grams
(a) the overlap, if any, with the grievance procedure
and the collective bargaining process
(b) the presence of job security guarantees
(c) opportunities for employee participation
(d) training for supervisors to implement the pro
gram
(e) changes in skills-based training programs
(f) bonus sharing procedures
(4) union-management perceptions of the impact of
change on
(a) overall union-management relations
(b) union-management relations on productivity
issues
(c) the union's role in productivity improvement
(d) management's commitment to productivity im
provement
The data were compiled from questionnaires completed by
management representatives and local union presidents. Ad
ditional qualitative data were derived from open-ended inter
view questions and internal documents.
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A Model of Labor-Management
Productivity Program Effectiveness
A model of labor-management productivity program ef
fectiveness was developed from the investigation of the first
10 research sites (Schuster 1980). The driving variable in this
model is employee commitment. According to Steers (1977),
commitment is operationalized as:
(1) A strong belief in, and acceptance of, the organiza
tion's goals and values;
(2) A willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of
the organization;
(3) A strong desire to maintain membership in the
organization.
Steers' model is presented in figure 2-4.
Figure 2-4
Steers Model of Commitment
Antecedents
Personal
1. Age
2. Education
3. Need for Achievement
Job Characteristics
1. Task Identity
2. Optimal Interaction
3. Feedback
Work Experience
1. Group Attitudes
2. Organizational Depend
ability (carries out
commitments to employees)
3. Expectations Met
4. Personal Importance

Outcomes
Job Performance
1. Quantity
2. Quality
Attendance
Retention
Desire to Remain
Intent to Remain

Reprinted from "Antecedents and Outcomes of Organizational Commitment by Richard
M. Steers in Administrative Science Quarterly, 22(1) by permission of Administrative
Science Quarterly.
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As noted in the introduction, all six cooperative unionmanagement programs are structural interventions which at
tempt to generate greater worker interest, involvement and
effort toward achieving important organization goals. Thus
the conceptualization of commitment is congruent with the
underlying theory of each intervention. In addition, the out
comes/results of the employee commitment model reflect the
goals of the interventions. The interventions are designed to
have a positive impact on job performance and to improve
work attitudes and behavior. Finally, the antecedents of
commitment, particularly the need for achievement, task
identity, optimal interaction, feedback, group attitudes,
organizational dependability, and personal importance are
many of the conditions the union-management programs at
tempt to establish and enhance.
Although there was no previous empirical evidence to sug
gest that Steer's commitment model, Kochan-Dyer's model
of change, Goodman's expectancy model, or some other
construct explained the success or failure of the interven
tions, these were believed to provide a solid foundation upon
which to base this investigation. 1 The model developed to
guide this research, presented in figure 2-5, accepts the
Kochan-Dyer logic that cooperation is based upon a stimulus
for change. Thereafter, union and company commitment
will occur if the traditional collective bargaining process is
ineffective at addressing the stimulus issues, change is
perceived as being instrumental to resolution of the stimulus
issues, the parties are able to agree on program goals, and
there is no attempt to block the cooperative effort by coali
tions or individual power holders. The nature of the stimulus
can influence organizational commitment. For example,
severe economic difficulties were more likely to bring about
commitment to change than simply a desire to change the
payment system.
Organizational values are thought to influence or
moderate the manner in which the parties interpret the

Figure 2-5
A Model of Labor-Management Productivity Program Effectiveness
(Schuster 1980)
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stimulus variables. When faced with a difficult economic
situation, some companies will take an extremely hard-line
position, while others ask for help from the union and are
willing to accommodate many union concerns.
Values are also important in determining the ap
propriateness and degree of employee involvement. Ruh,
Wallace and Frost (1973) have shown that management sup
port for employee involvement was a key factor in retention
of the Scanlon Plan. Conversely, Gilson and Lefcowitz
(1957) demonstrated that a plantwide bonus program could
fail because of a lack of employee interest in participative
decisionmaking.
Organizational commitment is thought to lead to
employee commitment and supervisory support for the
cooperative effort. Employee commitment (discussed above)
is a belief in the organization's goals and objectives, a will
ingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the
organization and a desire to remain with the organization.
Supervisory support is critical because supervisory
resistance to organizational change as well as opposition to
union and employee involvement have been welldocumented (see, for example, Schlesinger 1982). Super
visory resistance is suggested to occur because (1) super
visors do not want to give up power and control; (2) super
visors do not believe workers are concerned about organiza
tional performance needs; (3) supervisors do not believe that
participation is an effective way to supervise; (4) supervisors
do not trust the union not to take unfair advantage;
(5) supervisors do not know how to manage under a new
system and are not given adequate training; and (6) super
visors do not trust upper management's sincerity and sup
port (Bushe 1983).
The transition from organizational commitment to
employee commitment and supervisory support can be in
fluenced by the strategy used to introduce the program and
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the effectiveness of future communications concerning the
effort. This has been labeled the "acceptance strategy."
Employee commitment is influenced by the program's
operational components. These are the availability of oppor
tunities to participate in workplace decisions, guarantees of
employment security, and an equitable and periodic distribu
tion of benefits from the program. The operational com
ponents influence the perceived political security and
member support felt by the union's leadership. Political
security and member support moderate the relationship be
tween union commitment and rank-and-file commitment.
Where the union is seen as being instrumental to attaining
program benefits (e.g., a bonus), and union leaders are not
perceived as being co-opted, there will be higher levels of
member support. The seriousness of the stimulus may also
strengthen the political security of union leaders and provide
more leverage and influence with members.
The model contains four general areas of program effec
tiveness. Program effectiveness is operationalized as improv
ed productivity, stabilized or increased employment, an im
proved labor-management climate, and improvements in
general organizational effectiveness criteria. The technology
of the firm is believed to influence or moderate the degree to
which employees can effect these performance indicators.

Research Hypotheses
Not all of the elements in this model could be empirically
tested. Research design considerations, sample size, partici
pant cooperation, and the resources available to the project
made testing of the full model unfeasible. Some issues were
examined with a high degree of qualitative rigor, while three
(organizational values, employee commitment and super
visory support) were not directly considered. They did,
however, receive considerable support in many of the inter
views that were conducted.
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The Impact of Union-Management Cooperation
Union-management programs were initially assessed along
seven dimensions. 2 These were: (1) improved productivity;
(2) stabilized employment; and (3) improved product quali
ty. Reductions in (4) absenteeism, (5) turnover, (6) tar
diness, and (7) grievance rates were also expected. This sec
tion outlines the hypotheses associated with this portion of
the research along with a brief rationale. It should be noted
that the study was longitudinal and all of the hypotheses
were tested with at least 24 monthly observations prior to the
program and 24 months following program inception. In
fact, most of the time frames were considerably longer.
Hyp. (1) Firms with cooperative union-management pro
grams will be significantly more productive dur
ing the 24-month period following the inception
of the program as compared to the 24-month
period prior to inception.
Kochan and Dyer (1976) have hypothesized that the
development of union-management cooperation is con
tingent upon the presence of a strong stimulus for change.
The academic and popular literature has highlighted the
declining growth of productivity in the United States. Many
of the firms studied in this research stated that productivity
improvement was necessary for either immediate survival or
to remain competitive. Most of the union leaders interviewed
in this research also recognized the need to strengthen the
economic effectiveness of their employers.
Previous research into the utilization and operation of
numerous forms of union-management productivity pro
grams has indicated that improvements in productivity are
generally realized (Puckett 1958; Moore 1975). However
nearly all the research in this area has been severely criticized
due to defects in research design (Cummings and Molloy
1977; Heneman 1979), limited methods of analysis
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(Heneman 1979; White 1979) and researcher bias (White
1979). Most of the reported studies have been case studies
(Davenport 1950; Lesieur 1951; Tait 1952) using anecdotal
evidence of program effectiveness. This research took a
significant step forward in utilizing a time-series research
design, unobtrusive measures of effectiveness, and more
sophisticated analytical techniques. The primary productivi
ty measure, output per hour, was considered a significant
improvement over previous studies.
Hyp. (2) Firms with cooperative union-management pro
grams will have a stable or improved employ
ment experience during the period following the
inception of the program when compared to the
24-month period prior to inception.
Employment or control over jobs for its members is a
critical union goal (Perlman 1949; Thrasher 1976). It is no
less important a concern for individual employees (Kochan,
Lipsky & Dyer 1974). The economic survival of the firm and
continuation of employment opportunities has traditionally
been among the most common stimuli for unionmanagement cooperation.
Improving the employment situation for its members is the
critical outcome variable for the union. This is the case even
when, as with gainsharing plans, there is the possibility of
significantly increased earnings. A stable or improved
employment experience is operationally defined as one in
which the level of employment within the firm increases or
remains the same over time.
Hyp. (3) Firms with cooperative union-management pro
grams will improve the quality of their produc
tion during the 24-month period following the in
ception of the program as compared to the
24-month period prior to inception.
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Hyp. (4) Firms with cooperative union-management pro
grams will have lower rates of absenteeism dur
ing the 24-month period following the inception
of the program as compared to the 24-month
period prior to inception.
Hyp. (5) Firms with cooperative union-management pro
grams will have lower turnover rates during the
24-month period following the inception of the
program as compared to the 24-month period
prior to inception.
Hyp. (6) Firms with cooperative union-management pro
grams will have lower tardiness rates during the
24-month period following the inception of the
program as compared to the 24-month period
prior to inception.
Hyp. (7) Firms with cooperative union-management pro
grams will have lower grievance rates during the
24-month period following inception of the pro
gram as compared to the 24-month period prior
to inception.
It was noted earlier that cooperative union-management
productivity programs are designed as structural and
behavioral interventions. All forms of productivity pro
grams in some manner change organizational structure in
order to produce greater worker interest and involvement in
the operation of the firm. Frost (1978) and Frost, Wakeley
and Ruh (1974), and Katz and Kahn (1966) assert that
Scanlon Plans result in a new form of organizational
climate. Others have sought to describe the effects of these
changes for Scanlon Plans (Shultz 1951; White 1979) and
plans of a similar nature (Fein 1976) in terms of the in
dividual employee's desire and ability to contribute to the
organization. Steers (1977) and Steers and Porter (1979) have
conceptualized this behavior as organizational commitment.
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In addition, Macy and Mirvis (1976) include these variables
in their proposed methodology for assessing the economic
and behavioral effectiveness of innovative workplace pro
grams.
Research conducted by Steers (1977) has found a relation
ship between organizational commitment and a series of
employee work attitudes and behaviors. These included
desire and intent to remain with the organization, atten
dance, quality of work and promotion readiness. Although
the more macro nature of this research did not permit
measurement of employee commitment, it did assess the im
pact of these change programs on the hypothesized measures
of effectiveness. In some cases, since the hypothesized
changes did occur, this now provides a further justification
for research which would attempt to explain the causal pro
cess at an individual level of analysis similar to that con
ducted by Steers.
Finally, although it might be concluded that improved
productivity and quality are conflicting goals, this is not the
case even with the gainsharing programs. All of the gainsharing programs only reward employees for acceptable produc
tion, and because the costs of corrective actions are included
in bonus calculations, there is an additional incentive to pro
duce a quality product.
Factors Influencing Cooperative Union-Management
Program Success
There are five variables included in this investigation as
determinants of union-management productivity program
effectiveness. Each of these determinants was identified
from the research literature and was supported by qualitative
evidence from an earlier phase of the study. These are
guarantees of employment security; a structure for employee
participation; the method, frequency, and amount of com
pensation provided by the program; an effective acceptance
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strategy; and an appropriate workplace technology. Once
again, a limited justification for each is provided.
Hyp. (8) Firms with union-management programs that
provide guarantees of employment security to
the union and its members will be more effective
than those which do not.
(8) (a) The greater the degree of employment
security guaranteed, the greater the effec
tiveness of the program.
(8) (b) Cooperative programs which provide for
employment security for union members
will be more effective when the program and
the commitment to guarantee jobs is made
part of the collective bargaining agreement.
The expected outcome of a union-management productivi
ty program is improved productivity and stabilization of
employment within the firm. In spite of these desired out
comes, workers have historically been hesitant to participate
in joint efforts. One cause of this resistance has been a fear
on the part of workers that increased productivity will result
in higher production standards or a reduction in the firm's
labor force. In the other instances workers have simply not
responded to the program. There is evidence which
demonstrates the ability of workers to establish and enforce
production norms (Roy 1952). In these situations the pro
ductivity plans have tended to fail. Guarantees of employ
ment security also appear to significantly influence the suc
cess of Japanese management efforts to improve productivi
ty and increase organizational effectiveness.
In order to overcome worker opposition, employers have
agreed to employment security guarantees. These guarantees
have included provisions for attrition clauses and no-layoff
pledges, and have been effective in several instances (NCPQWL 1977). Because of the legal nature of the labormanagement arrangement in the United States, it is
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reasonable to assume that job security guarantees which
have been included in the collective bargaining agreement
will be more warmly received by union members than non
contractual guarantees.
Hyp. (9) Union-management programs that provide for
formal opportunities for employee participation
will be more effective than those which do not.
(9) (a) The greater the degree of employee par
ticipation, the more effective the productivi
ty program will be.
A number of different productivity programs contain
various formats for employee participation. The nature of
the structure for employee participation varies widely.
Scanlon Plans and Quality Circles provide for formal
systems of employee participation through an interlocking
system of labor-management departmental committees
(Frost, Wakeley & Ruh 1974). The responsibilities of these
committees are subject to wide variation. Some committees
attempt to generate suggestions from individual employees
and assist in explaining program operations. Oftentimes the
committees have the power to implement changes in their im
mediate jurisdiction (Cummings & Molloy 1977). These
systems, therefore, offer individual employees the oppor
tunity to exert considerably more influence and control over
their work environment than would exist in more conven
tional firms. Rosenberg and Rosenstein (1980) have provided
evidence that participation can positively influence produc
tivity.
At the opposite extreme are programs which merely seek
suggestions from individual employees which are then
reviewed by management representatives. Other programs
are nonparticipatory, that is, no direct effort is made to in
volve employees in the effort to improve productivity. These
programs may not realize the full potential of the workforce
or may be viewed as a gimmick by workers. This issue is an
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important one because there is some evidence that employee
participation may be related to job satisfaction and satisfac
tion to performance (Katzell & Yankelovich 1975).
Hyp. (10) Productivity programs which provide for
group incentives will be more effective than
those which reward the individual.
(10) (a) The greater the frequency of financial
payments to the employees, the more ef
fective the productivity program will be.
(10) (b) The larger the percentage financial
payments to the employees, over and
above regular earnings, the more effective
the productivity programs will be.
Another feature of some union-management productivity
programs is an incentive system based upon program ex
perience (Lesieur 1958). If the programs produce im
provements in productivity, a portion of the improvement in
productivity is distributed to the employees. Kochan and
Dyer (1976) have noted the importance of preserving
organizational equity. The amount distributed to the
employees varies according to the effectiveness of the pro
gram and the formula used to distribute the improvements
(Cummings & Molloy 1977).
Reinforcement theorists argue that individual incentives
are more effective than group incentives because they more
closely tie the reinforcement to the desired behavior (in this
case greater work effort) (Luthans & Kreitner 1975). At the
same time, proponents of Scanlon-type plans insist that
group incentives are more effective because of their ability to
foster greater worker cooperation and the lessening of intrafirm competition (Katz & Kahn 1966).
Reinforcement theorists contend that the more valued the
reinforcement (in this case the financial payout), the more
effective it will be in producing the desired result (Luthans &
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Kreitner 1975). It therefore follows that the amount of addi
tional financial benefit paid to the employees as a result of
the program should influence the level of employee interest,
cooperation, and effort. The larger the financial benefit
derived by the employees from the program, the more effec
tive the program should be. However, reinforcement
theorists also state that the more frequent the reinforcement,
the more effective it will be in producing the desired result
(Luthans & Kreitner 1975). There is a conflict. The more fre
quent the payout from the program, the smaller the amount
of money paid out each time. This research provided some
insights into that issue.
Hyp. (11) Union-management programs will be more ef
fective when the union and management
develop a successful acceptance strategy.
(11) (a) A successful acceptance strategy will in
clude an active program of training for
first level supervision and union stewards.
(11) (b) A successful acceptance strategy will in
clude the utilization of external con
sultants.
(11) (c) A successful acceptance strategy will in
clude an effective communications pro
gram to keep organization members in
formed about the cooperative program.
Cooperative union-management programs involve signifi
cant organizational changes. In order to insure that change is
successfully implemented, unions and management need to
develop effective implementation and acceptance strategies.
The failure to develop an effective strategy will prevent
rank-and-file and supervisory employees from becoming ful
ly informed of the program's goals, operations, and
benefits. Training for first level supervision and union
stewards is necessary due to the significant structural
changes which may take place at that level of the organiza-
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tion. When the program involves a bonus system, the use of
external consultants can insure that both actual and perceiv
ed equity are maintained. In addition, both employees and
supervisors will need to be kept informed of program
developments and changes.
Hyp. (12) Union-management programs will have a
greater impact on productivity where the
technology of the firm is more labor intensive
than where the technology is less labor inten
sive.
The technological process of the firm is seen as a critical
aspect of the productivity improvement process. Most of
labor-management productivity improvement programs are
designed as behaviorally oriented experiments to induce
greater work interest, cooperation, and effort. Successful
programs should demonstrate measurable changes in the
level of the firm's production. As indicated earlier, this has
generally been the result. However, since most of the
research in this area has not been comparative in nature, lit
tle is known of the compatability of particular productivity
programs to specific technologies.
Research conducted by organizational theorists has found
that successful firms in differing technologies have diverse
structural forms (Woodward 1965). Labor-management
change programs, and productivity programs in particular,
should be viewed as changes in organizational structure.
Therefore, following this theory that differing technologies
require different organizational structures, a unionmanagement productivity program should have an organiza
tional structure that is appropriate for the technology of the
firm.
A second factor is also relevant to this hypothesis. The
more capital intensive or mechanized the firm's production
process, the less impact increased worker efforts are likely to
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have. It is quite possible that where the level and method of
production is nearly entirely machine set and operated,
worker efforts will have little or no bearing upon produc
tion. In contrast, where the technology of the firm permits
wider latitude of worker imputs, expanded employee in
terest, cooperation, and effort are likely to have a greater im
pact on productivity.

NOTES
1. In this study it was not possible to collect individual attitudinal data to
fully explore these models. A subsequent phase of the research is seeking
to develop and test a conceptual model to explain the forces that in
fluence employee work attitudes and behavior.
2. Three other effectiveness variables were later added. These included
the frequency of productivity bonus payments, rater effectiveness, and
program survival after two and five years.

Chapter 3
A Research Design
for Evaluating Cooperative
Union-Management Programs
Since the 1970s there has been an endless stream of ar
ticles, books, and speeches by academicians and practi
tioners exalting the benefits of union-management coopera
tion, productivity and quality of worklife projects, and other
workplace innovations. With few exceptions (see for exam
ple Goodman 1979; Macy 1979) most of what has been said
and written about cooperative efforts was not based upon
empirical evaluations of these programs in the field. Instead,
the historical approach to research on cooperation, the case
study method, was maintained. In addition to suffering from
all of the traditional difficulties associated with the case
study method (see Campbell & Stanley 1963) the research
suffered further from an absence of appropriate measures of
effectiveness and analytical techniques, short time durations,
and researcher bias (Heneman 1979; White 1979).
White, in attempting to explain the absence of empirical
research on the Scanlon Plan, gave four explanations which
would also be applicable to studies of other forms of
cooperation. The low level of research activity, explained
White, was due to (1) the difficulty and expense of doing
research on organizations as the unit of analysis; (2) the in
ability to use sophisticated statistical techniques due to each
47
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organization being N = 1; (3) the inability to maintain strict
research designs; and (4) the failure of the academic evalua
tion process to reward this type of work. Kochan's (1980)
report to the Secretary of Labor earmarked change and
cooperation as a labor-management relations research
priority.
One objective of this research was to develop and refine
strategies and techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of
productivity and quality of worklife programs. This discus
sion will hopefully assist researchers and practitioners to
assess similar programs as well as to examine the impact of
other workplace interventions.
In this chapter, the research design employed in the pro
ject and some of the problems associated with it are discuss
ed. This is followed by an examination of the methods used
for selecting sites for participation in the study and the
research strategy. Next is a discussion of the methods used to
define and measure the key variables in the study, the tech
niques that were employed to analyze them, and the poten
tial limitations of the research. The chapter concludes with a
series of significant methodological findings.

Research Design
This research was conducted as a field study which utilized
a triangulation approach to assess the cooperative programs.
Triangulation is the combination of several methodologies to
study the same phenomenon (Jick 1979). Qualitative and
quantitative evaluation procedures were employed. Donald
Campbell (1979) has recently endorsed this approach to
evaluation research.
The qualitative procedures included extensive structured
and unstructured interviews with company and union per
sonnel, examination and analysis of archival records and
documents, and observations. The quantitative procedures
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included the measurement of plant performance (for exam
ple, productivity, employment, etc.); the scaling of the
operational components of the interventions (for example,
the structure for employee participation, the frequency of
bonus payments, etc.); and union and management percep
tions of the cooperative effort.

Qualitative Data
The qualitative data collection served two purposes. The
first was to permit a descriptive analysis of the interventions
at each research site to be conducted with an emphasis on
their structure and operation at the workplace. These data
were later used for the comparative analysis of the six in
terventions contained in chapter 4. The second use of the
qualitative data was to provide contextual meaning for the
quantitative assessments and to identify other possible
changes in organizational operations (for example, new
machinery or plant personnel) that might have had a major
impact on plant performance during the time period of this
investigation. That is, the qualitative data were used as a
check on the internal validity of the research design.
The questionnaires used in this research were adapted
from the instruments used by Kochan, Dyer, and Lipsky
(1977) in their study of safety committees. Other structured
and unstructured items were developed to assess the process
of union cooperation. Several models of organizational
change in unionized settings guided this portion of the in
vestigation. There were separate union and management
questionnaires, but the instruments had many common
items. Examples of the documents and records that were col
lected included the minutes of meetings, internal memoran
dum, suggestion logs, previous evaluations (internal or exter
nal), employee handbooks, and other materials associated
with the interventions.
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Time-Series Designs
The assessment of plant performance was made by utiliz
ing a stratified multiple-group-single-interventioninterrupted time-series design (Glass, Willson & Gottman
1975). An interrupted time-series design involves periodic
measurement of an outcome variable both before and after a
treatment effect or intervention is introduced. If the in
tervention has had an effect, it would be indicated by a
discontinuity in the pattern of the data in the time-series
(Campbell & Stanley 1963; Cook & Campbell 1976). Inter
rupted time-series designs are particularly appropriate for
situations where the "measurement is unobtrusive and the
respondents are not reacting to multiple testings" (Cook &
Campbell 1976, p. 274). This research involved the measure
ment of output per hour, level of employment, voluntary
turnover, etc., all of which are unobtrusive (Webb, Camp
bell, Schwartz, Sechrest & Grove 1981).
A stratified multiple-group-single-intervention time-series
design has all the attributes of the interrupted time-series
design. Its main difference lies in the use of multiple ex
perimental units which are distinguished by some feature in
those units. In this study the feature that distinguished the
nature of the experimental unit was the type of unionmanagement productivity program, that is, Scanlon,
Rucker, and Improshare Plans, Labor-Management Com
mittees, Quality Circles, and Quality of Worklife projects.
The strengths of a multiple-group-single-intervention
design are two-fold. The design permits an examination of
the pervasiveness of an intervention effect. In addition,
Glass, Willson & Gottman (1975) suggest that it can lead to
the development of a typology of units which react different
ly to an intervention. In this research the units remained
largely the same, but the type of intervention differed. Thus
the operation and effectiveness of six cooperative interven
tions could be assessed.
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In addition, the basic design was strengthened in several
significant ways. First, the measures (for example, output
per hour and level of employment) were subject to frequent
calibration into monthly intervals as opposed to quarterly or
yearly time frames. Second, qualitative data were collected
to determine whether other forces, outside of the interven
tion, influenced the impact of the cooperative program.
Finally, by examining at least a four- to five-year time frame,
cyclical variations could be taken into account.

Sources of Invalidity
in Time-Series Designs
There are several potential sources of invalidity in timeseries designs. The principal one being historical events.
History constitutes a potential threat when events that are
extraneous to the intervention occur during the time in which
the data are being observed, measured, and analyzed. These
events may produce a shift of the series which can be
mistaken as an intervention effect. In ex post facto timeseries designs of the type used in this research "the danger of
historical invalidity is usually quite high" (Glass, Willson &
Gottman 1975, p. 54). In the present study changes in the
economic environment were the principal historical events
which could have affected the key dependent
variables—productivity and employment. A comparison
group developed from national data on employment and
voluntary turnover (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1979) for
three- and four-digit SIC industries was used to control for
the influence of economic changes unrelated to the program.
No comparable productivity data were available.
Other potential sources of invalidity that might have in
fluenced the performance variables (productivity, employ
ment, quality, turnover, attendance, etc.) or the change pro
cess were also addressed. "Reactive" interventions can occur
when the system experiencing the intervention also
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undergoes other coincident changes. This is very likely to oc
cur in complex social and economic institutions such as those
under study here. Exhaustive historical analysis of possible
confounding factors using qualitative data was conducted as
part of table sites' case histories. Examples of systems
changes associated with this research that might have had a
greater impact on plant performance included:
(1) Substantial increases in capital investment;
(2) Shifts from production of goods with a higher labor
content to products with less labor content;
(3) Changes in attendance control policies;
(4) Changes in key management personnel;
(5) Turnover of union leadership;
(6) Collective bargaining disputes.
Multiple-intervention interference can occur when the im
pact assessment involves more than one intervention. Thus
one site which had labor-management committees later add
ed a second intervention—organizational behavior modifica
tion. In another instance, a site with Quality Circles was
scheduled to introduce a gainsharing mechanism. In these in
stances, the subsequent intervention must be considered part
of the labor-management effort. In addition, computer soft
ware has recently become available which permits the dual
effect to be modeled and each intervention component's im
pact can be assessed (Pack 1977).
Instrumentation constitutes a source of invalidity when
there is a change in the method of observing or measuring
the dependent variable during the time frame of the series. In
studies using archival data, this is a problem when there are
alterations in record-keeping procedures. Interview data
were used to guard against this possibility.
Construct validity problems can occur when the opera
tional definition of the causal agent in an experiment can be
subjected to differing interpretations, thereby confounding
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the strength of the investigator's conclusions (Cook &
Campbell 1979). In this research it was possible that im
provements in productivity were not the result of the labormanagement intervention but were simply the result of the
greater attention given to employees by management, that is,
a Hawthorne effect. This concern was minimized by the
duration (at least two years) of the post-intervention timeseries.
External validity can be threatened when there is doubt as
to whether the results of an experiment can be generalized to
other populations and settings beyond those involved in the
particular research (Campbell & Stanley 1963). This study
focused solely on manufacturing firms. However, it did
cover a wide region of the United States and examined varied
manufacturing settings. No effort is made to generalize the
findings beyond the manufacturing sector.
Of greater concern was the issue of self-selection by sites
participating in the research. Had only sites with successful
interventions agreed to participate in this research, the
generalizability of the study would have been suspect. It ap
pears, however, that a cross-section of successful and unsuc
cessful programs was investigated.

The Research Sites
Site Selection
The acquisition of field research sites is never an easy task
and this is particularly true in the labor-management setting.
When the study began in 1978, the first 10 research sites with
cooperative union-management productivity programs were
selected from lists compiled in the 1977 and 1978 Directories
of Labor-Management Committees published by the Na
tional Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life.
However, publication of the Directory ceased with the 1978
publication and did not resume until the Department of
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Labor began publishing a similar listing of companies and
unions in 1982.
As the number of research sites grew, several strategies
were employed to identify additional companies and unions.
First, lists of companies that had utilized consulting services
to develop cooperative union-management programs
(Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare) were acquired from the
initial research sites. Second, the Buffalo Area LaborManagement Committee was asked to assist the project by
providing the names and entry into three research sites.
Third, participants at existing research sites were asked if
they knew of other firms or unions engaged in cooperative
experiments since these firms are frequently visited by others
considering similar programs. Fourth, several unions with
staff who maintain experts in cooperative programs were
contacted. Finally, after the initial findings had been
disseminated, several organizations contacted the in
vestigator on their own initiative.

Description of the Research Sites
This section contains a summary description of the major
characteristics of the research sites. However, readers are
cautioned that each site was given assurances that complete
confidentiality would be maintained. The investigator has at
tempted to preserve the confidence entrusted to him by each
site.
A total of 38 sites were visited and at least some data col
lected. Five of these sites were nonunion. As shown in Table
3-1 there is a very even distribution of gainsharing plans and
Labor-Management Committees. Labor-Management Com
mittees are categorized as serviced by an Area LaborManagement Committee or not serviced (i.e., functioning in
dependently). There were two Quality Circles plans and one
Profit-Sharing firm studied.
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Table 3-1
Types of Interventions Studied
Number nonunion
Number of
____Type of program__________sites________sites____
Scanlon Plan
Rucker Plan
Improshare
Other gainsharing
Labor-Management Committees
serviced by A L-MC
Labor-Management Committees
not serviced by A L-MC
Quality Circles
Profit Sharing
Total

9
7
8
2*

2
1
2

5**
4
2
1
38

5

*One labor-management committee later added a gainsharing plan thus yielding an addi
tional "other gainsharing" program.
**One labor-management committee experimented with a series of quality of worklife pro
jects.

The study investigated organizations with eight interna
tional unions and one independent labor organization. Op
portunities to study varied programs have existed. These in
clude 9 Scanlon Plans, 7 Rucker Plans, 10 Improshare Plans,
9 Labor-Management Committees, 2 Quality Circles, and 1
profit-sharing plan. Table 3-1 summarizes the number and
type of programs studied.
Table 3-2 summarizes six selected characteristics of the
research sites including: product, SIC number, bargaining
unit size, age distribution and sexual composition of the
workforce, and the type of intervention.
All of the firms in the study are engaged in manufacturing,
with a broad range of industries represented. Plants engaged
in heavy industry from steel to tire production were studied
as well as light assembly operations. Bargaining unit size
ranges from 7-2300, with a mean of 620. There is also a wide

Table 3-2
Selected Characteristics of Research Sites

Site

Product

2.5

Type of
program
Labor-Management
Committee
Labor-Management
Committee
Labor-Management
Committee
Scanlon Plan
Rucker Plan
Scanlon Plan
Rucker Plan
Scanlon Plan
Scanlon Plan
Labor-Management
Committee

40

25

35

Automotive components

3694

500

10

70

20

20

Ball bearings

3562

699

10

40

50

22

Jet engine parts
Steel chain
Steel casters
Roller chain
Abrasive cutting wheels
Steel shelves
Wire

3722
3496
3429
3566
3291
2542
3496

890
450
129
241
160
150
250

10
15
40
20
17
47
45

70
70
40
40
68
35
47

20
15
20
40
20
23
8

16
44
44
44
17
0
1

3563
3563
3563
3494

250
95
20
23

NA
NA
NA

NA
60
NA
NA

NA
22
NA
NA

NA
8
NA
NA

Improshare
Improshare
Improshare
Improshare

3559
3674
3678
3671

105
15
2300
1000

30
40
50
36

60
60
27
42

10
0
23
22

0
75
35
42

Rucker Plan
Rucker Plan
Quality Circles
Quality Circles
w/behavior
modification

2
3

17
18
19

Percentage
female

1200

Fabricated steel

12
13
14
15
16

Age distribution (percent)
Bargaining
over 55
unit size under 30 30-55

331

1

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

SIC
number

Dropped from the study
Gas compressors
Air compressors
Small compressors
Valve & regulators
Paper & plastic converting
equipment
Solid-state DC drives
Electrical connectors
Color television tubes

18

o
tr

20
21

Dropped from the study
Food processing

22

Industrial plastics

23

2032

1000

25

60

15

35

282

1400

5

25

70

20

Rubber tires

3011

796

19

71

10

1

24

Heat exchanger filters

3443

85

25

40

35

0

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Plastic injection molds
Electric motors
Cold forgings
Automated assembly systems
Industrial fasteners
Nickel alloys
Sponge rubber
Heavy truck springs
Dropped from the study
Dropped from the study
Awaiting site visit
Lightbulb components*
Electric meter adaptors*
Portable car ramps*
Gray iron castings
Cement*
DC motors for material
handling
Dropped from the study
Dropped from the study
Industrial fasteners
Insulated wire and cable

3079
3621
3462
3549
3452
3349
3068
3799

160
200
123
370
154
1530
190
109

40
0
40
15
17
16
10
0

40
70
40
70
60
63
80
85

20
30
20
15
23
11
10
15

1
33
10
10
9
NA
50
0

Labor-Management
Committee (A L-MC)
Labor-Management
Committee (A L-MC)
Labor-Management
Committee (A L-MC)
Labor-Management
Committee (A L-MC)
Rucker Plan
Rucker Plan
Rucker Plan
Scanlon Plan
Scanlon Plan
Scanlon Plan
Scanlon Plan
Scanlon Plan

3696
3629
3549
3321
3297

174
37
27
240
7

2
48
85
70
29

75
50
10
29
71

23
2
5
1
0

50
51
40
15
0

Other Gamshanng
Improshare
Improshare
Improshare
Other Gamsharing

3620

170

10

30

60

31

Improshare

3452
3357

152
540

2
45

95
40

3
15

25
8

Profit-Sharing
Labor-Management
Committee

42
43
44
45

*Nonunion plant. Bargaining unit in nonunion plants refers to total number of production and maintenance employees.
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range in the composition of the labor force studied. Some
organizations have had no female workers, while several had
50 percent of their labor force being female.
Table 3-3 summarizes some additional characteristics of
the research sites in this study. These include the state, com
munity size, the type of ownership, and technology of the
research sites. The sites are located in 11 states, they are in
very small communities as well as in large metropolitan
areas. Over half the sample was composed of plants which
were subsidiaries of larger corporations (21), with the re
mainder about evenly divided between family-owned firms
(8), and corporations (9). The plants had varied technologies
ranging from fabrication of equipment in large stages to
mass production operations. Two firms were dropped from
the study when their level of involvement fell below a
previously agreed upon minimum.

Control/Comparison Group
One area where the project was not as successful as had
been expected was in obtaining the cooperation of control or
comparison firms. Sixty firms were matched to 20 of the ex
perimental firms (three per site) from the Dun and Bradstreet
directories based upon Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) numbers and firm size. These firms were contacted by
mail with postage-free reply opportunities included with the
letter of introduction. Over 80 percent of the firms did not
reply, and only one firm that did reply was willing to par
ticipate in the study.
An alternate strategy was to use national data on employ
ment and turnover from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
publication, Employment and Earnings. In many respects
this data provides a more accurate description of the
historical events (particularly national economic activity)
which the control group is designed to reflect. The issue of

Table 3-3
Additional Characteristics of Research Sites
Location
001
002
003
004
005
006
007
008
009
010
Oil
012
013
014
015
016
017
018
019
020
021
022
023
024

New York
New York
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Massachusetts
New York
Dropped from the study
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
Dropped from the study
New York
New York
New York
New York

Community1
population

Type of
ownership

170,000
35,000
16,000
53,000
152,000
4,000
162,000
143,000
63,000
19,000

Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Family
Subsidiary

Production of large
Mass production
Production of large
Mass production
Production of large
Production of large
Production of large
Production of large
Production of large
Production of large

13,000
13,000
13,000
13,000
13,000
13,000
5,000
7,000

Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Family
Family
Corporation
Subsidiary

Fabrication of large equipment in stages
Production of large batches
Production of large batches
Production of small batches
Simple units to customer's requirements

2,000
360,000
360,000
360,000

Corporation
Subsidiary
Family
Family

Technology
batches
batches
batches
batches
batches
batches
batches
batches

Production of small batches
Mass production

JO
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Mass production
Production of large batches
Production of large batches
Fabrication of large equipment in stages
(continued)
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Table 3-3 (continued)
Community 1
population

Location
025
026
027
028
029
030
031

Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Wisconsin
Illinois
West Virginia
West Virginia

032
033
034
035
036
037
038
039
040
041
042
043
044
045

Pennsylvania
Dropped from the
Dropped from the
Awaiting site visit
North Carolina
Michigan
Wisconsin
New York
Massachusetts
New York
Dropped from the
Dropped from the
Pennsylvania
New York

study
study

study
study

Type of
ownership

Technology

44,000
26,000
1,000
51,000
11,000
64,000
64,000

Family
Corporation
Subsidiary
Corporation
Corporation
Subsidiary
Family

12,000

Corporation

Fabrication of large equipment in stages
Production of small batches
Mass production
Simple units to customer's requirements
Production of small batches
Production of large batches
Simple units to customer's
requirements
Production of large batches

32,000
60,000
1,000
5,000
162,000
170,000

Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Family
Subsidiary
Corporation
Subsidiary

Production of small batches
Simple units to customer's requirements
Production of large batches
Production of small batches
Production of large batches
Production of small batches

10,000
44,000

Corporation
Corporation

Production of small batches
Production of large batches

1. 1980 United States Census of Population, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Vol. 1 (April 1982).
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control or comparison groups is discussed further in this
chapter in the section on methodological findings.
Research Strategy
In order to permit an intensive analysis of each organiza
tion, on-site visits were conducted. At each site, management
representatives were interviewed and company records and
documents gathered. At most of the sites, union represen
tatives were also interviewed. 1 In several instances the fact
that the site was nonunion was not apparent until the site was
actually visited. On-site follow-up visits and extensive
telephone conversations and mail correspondence were
utilized to complete the data collection process.
The research was divided into two parts. First was an ex
amination of the structure and process of change in union
ized settings. This included the investigation of variables
such as the stimulus for change, the internal political process
to establish change, negotiation of goals, the structure of the
intervention with particular emphasis on the role of
employee participation, the method, frequency, and amount
of employee compensation in the form of bonuses,
guarantees of employment security, and the nature of the
organization's acceptance strategy. These data were analyz
ed using descriptive statistics and correlational analysis.
The second part of the study was an analysis of the out
comes of union-management productivity programs. This
included an examination of the dependent variables: produc
tivity improvement, the level of employment, and the general
organizational effectiveness criteria. These were analyzed us
ing the interrupted time-series design.
An opportunity occurred during the course of the project
to investigate five nonunion firms with gainsharing pro
grams. By seizing this opportunity, it was possible to com
pare the unionized sector with the nonunion sector. These
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sites were approached in the same manner as the unionized
firms.
Methods of Measurement
This section describes the manner in which the critical
variables were measured. It begins with a brief listing of the
demographic variables and the method for their measure
ment. Following that are the measurements for the major
study variables—productivity; employment; quality;
absenteeism, turnover, tardiness, and grievances; employ
ment security guarantees; the structure for employee par
ticipation; the method, frequency and amount of compensa
tion; the acceptance strategy; and several additional struc
tural and process variables.

Demographic Variables
The demographic factors are noted as follows:
(1) The type of industry was classified by using three- and
four-digit numbers from the manual of Standard In
dustrial Classifications (SIC).
(2) Bargaining unit size was chosen over firm size as be
ing a measure more indicative of the audience the pro
grams were designed to reach.
(3) Program inception was measured from the date when
the program became operational.
(4) Technology was measured by using the scale
developed by Woodward (1965). The instrument
characterizes the system of production used by firms
on a 10-level scale according to the degree of integra
tion in the production process.
Study Variable: Productivity
The measurement of productivity required a flexible ap
proach. In this research several measures of productivity
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were utilized. The primary measure was employee output per
hour. Two elements, labor input and amount of output,
were necessary for the measurement of productivity
(Greenberg 1973; Bureau of Labor Statistics 1976). Labor in
put was measured by employee hours worked, while output
was measured by the quantity of units produced. Hence
employee output per hour was measured on a monthly basis
by
where I = employee output per hour
qi = quantity of output produced
1 j = employee hours
Each firm was asked for this data as the most desirable
method for measuring this variable. Approximately 60 per
cent of the sites were able to provide this information.
For a firm or plant with a diverse output, a meaningful
measure of employee output per hour required a weighted
hours index (Greenberg 1973). This is the most sophisticated
method of productivity measurement, but was only available
at one site. An alternative to this was to analyze separately
each product line using the output per hour formula above.
One of the most significant findings of this research was
the lack of sophistication by many firms in measuring pro
ductivity. In far too many cases, output per hour measures
were not part of the organization's record keeping system. In
several instances, this was due to the varied nature of the
production process. In others, however, it appeared to repre
sent a limited understanding of the concept of productivity.
In these instances one of several measures was used:
Deflated Sales/Production Value or Sales/Production Value
Actual Hours Worked
Labor Costs
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In the presentation of this data in chapter 6, the specific
measure of productivity at each site is stated.
Finally, in the gainsharing plans, the calculation of the
bonus represented another measure of productivity. This
measure is particularly appropriate in the Improshare Plans,
since the Improshare measurement utilizes some of the prin
ciples associated with the weighted hours index.

Study Variable: Employment
The level of employment was measured by the average
number of workers employed by the firm during the week of
the 12th day of the month. Because employment tends to be
influenced by prevailing economic conditions, the threat of
historical invalidity had to be addressed. A comparison
group of national employment data collected by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (1979) on an industrywide (matched at
four-digit SIC) basis was formulated. At several sites
employment was measured during the last week of the
month.
Study Variable: Quality
Quality was measured using the general formulas sug
gested by Macy and Mirvis (1976):
Units Rejected
Total Units Produced

or

Scrap Dollars
Production Value

In each instance this measure was adapted slightly to be con
sistent with the site's own measure of quality.

Study Variables: Unexcused Absenteeism,
Voluntary Turnover, Tardiness, and Grievances
Each of these variables was measured by the total number
of occurrences each month, divided by average workforce
size (Macy & Mirvis 1976). For example,
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I Turnover Incidents
Average Workforce Size

Since turnover is also sensitive to national economic condi
tions, a comparison with national data, similar to the
employment analysis, was conducted.

Study Variable: Employment Security
Employment security was defined as the amount of
assurance the firm has given to its workforce that no
employees or jobs would be forfeited as a result of the pro
ductivity program. A two-level scale was used with "no
assurances" and a "best efforts" contract clause at one ex
treme (low security) and a "contractual no loss of
employment/guarantee of hours" or attrition clause (high
security) at the other extreme. The collective bargaining
agreements negotiated at each site were evaluated against
criteria based upon contract clauses published in the BLS
(1971) 1425 series, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements:
Layoff, Recall, and Work-Sharing Procedures.
Study Variable: Employee Participation
Employee participation was measured according to the
structural mechanism provided for in the intervention for
participation. Responses were departmental committees,
plantwide committees, a plantwide suggestion system, and
no structure for participation. In addition, collection and
analysis of the minutes of meetings and suggestion logs pro
vided some insights into the actual participation that occur
red.
Study Variables: Compensation Measures
The method of bonus payment (if any) in the intervention
was categorized by individual, group, and plantwide
payments. The frequency of incentive payments was
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classified into weekly, monthly, quarterly or annual periods.
The size of the financial payout from the productivity pro
gram was classified either by the actual bonus paid or as a
percentage of the bargaining unit's average hourly wage per
employee. Another measure of compensation was the
percentage of possible periods in which a bonus was actually
paid. This measure was derived by the number of periods in
which a bonus was paid divided by the number of periods in
which it was calculated.

Study Variable: Acceptance Strategy
The acceptance strategy was defined as the scope of
techniques used to aid in implementation of the cooperative
program. These included the use of consultants, supervisory
and steward training, group process and skills-based train
ing, and organizational communications activities. These
variables were classified using a series of dichotomous ques
tions requiring a positive or negative response as to their in
clusion in the operation of the program. Open-ended ques
tions were also posed to permit more complete analysis of
these activities.
Additional Study Variables
The stimulus for, and process leading to, labormanagement cooperation and other variables associated with
the design of the programs were assessed by posing a com
bination of open-ended and forced-choice inquiries to
management representatives and union officials. A series of
questions developed for use in this study was based upon the
first, second, and third stages of the Kochan-Dyer (1976)
model of organizational change in the context of unionmanagement relations described in chapter 2. Other items
were adapted from the questionnaire used by Kochan, Dyer,
and Lipsky (1977) to assess the effectiveness of cooperative
safety programs and from other change models described in
chapter 2.
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Methods of Analysis

Productivity, Employment,
and Organizational Effectiveness
In this section, the manner in which the productivity,
employment, and organizational effectiveness data were
analyzed is briefly described. Readers interested in a detailed
account of the time-series techniques used in this research are
directed to Glass, Willson & Gottman (1975) and McCain
and McCleary (1979). A more fundamental description may
be found in Box and Jenkins (1970).
The interrupted time-series data were analyzed by fitting
regression lines before and after the invocation of the pro
grams (interventions) and then examining changes in the
parameters (slope and intercept). Unfortunately, time-series
data are not appropriate for ordinary least squares regres
sion analysis. This is because ordinary least squares analysis
requires the error terms to be independent. That is not the
case with serial data which tends to be correlated. 2 Any
observation in a time-series may be predicted to some degree
by observations immediately preceding it or from previous
random shocks (Glass, Willson & Gottman 1975). However,
there are methods of compensating for this problem which
eventually permit the data to be subjected to conventional
least squares analysis. Those methods have been developed
by Box and Jenkins (1970) and have been adapted for inter
rupted time-series analysis by Glass, Willson and Gottman.
Their methods and computer software were utilized in this
research.

The interpretation of the time-series data involved com
paring the actual time-series for the postintervention data to
what could have been expected or forecast from the
preintervention observations. Thus a change in level would
be interpreted as an immediate change in the performance in
dicator, while a drift change would be interpreted as a
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gradual shift in the time-series to a new level. Yet another
possible occurrence is an abrupt level change, followed by a
gradual decline in the drift. This indicates that the interven
tion had had an initial effect but was beginning to lose its
potency.
In order to increase the sensitivity of the test, two features
were stressed. These were the insistence that there be suffi
cient data points and that the data points be extended over a
reasonable time frame. In this research, the data were plot
ted on a monthly basis, thereby generating at least 48 data
points. This was considered to be within an acceptable range
(Glass, Willson & Gottman 1975). The use of at least a fouryear time frame—two years before and after program incep
tion—should have permitted all possible patterns of varia
tion to be accounted for. 3
The statistical tables in chapter 6 include the error variance
from the regression analysis and point estimates of the level
and drift of the series at time t = 0 with associated t-statistics.
The assessment of the impact of the interventions may be
found in the point estimates of the change in the level and
drift of the series following the intervention with appropriate
t-statistics. In order to assist readers, some of the more in
teresting data sets are shown visually using computer
graphics.

Analysis of Other Study Variables
The thirty-three unionized sites were combined with the
five nonunion sites to create a sample of 38. The relatively
small sample size only permitted the use of descriptive
statistics and correlational analysis. While the descriptive
statistics and correlational analysis did not permit causal in
ferences to be drawn or the determination of the relative con
tribution of each of the independent variables, it did permit
some tentative propositions to be drawn, as well as providing
guidance for future research.
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Methodological Findings
As noted in the outset of this chapter, most of the previous
research on union-management cooperation has been severe
ly criticized. These criticisms have been based upon the
almost exclusive use of case study methodologies, weak
research design, absence of performance measures of effec
tiveness, poor analytical techniques, the failure to report un
successful cases, and researcher bias. Only a handful of
studies have approached the subject matter in a scientific
manner (see for example Goodman 1979; Kochan, Dyer &
Lipsky 1977; Macy 1979; and White 1979).
One of the major goals of this study was to further
develop and refine strategies for studying cooperation and
change in unionized settings. The findings from this aspect
of the study are presented and briefly explained in the con
cluding portion of this chapter on methodology. These
observations are the result of the field work conducted dur
ing the study and ongoing monitoring of the cooperative
union-management and quality of worklife literature. For
additional discussion of these issues, readers are encouraged
to see Schuster (1982).

Finding: The Case Study
Approach Will Continue
In spite of White's observations, wholesale defections
from case study methodologies are not likely to occur. Quite
the contrary, the case study approach will remain a primary
approach to union-management cooperation research (see
for example Drexler and Lawler 1977; Goodman 1979; Macy
1979). With some specific methodological refinements to
enhance the scientific quality of this research, in-depth
assessments of cooperative programs can add to our
knowledge of the cooperative process.
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Finding: Industrial Relations Researchers
Can Learn from the Program Evaluators
The generic study of change and intervention has long
been a part of the discipline of program evaluation. Research
on major forms of cooperative union-management ef
forts—gainsharing, labor-management committees, and
QWL projects—could benefit from the research design and
data collection techniques of evaluation researchers (e.g.,
Cook and Campbell 1976; Cook and Reichardt 1979).
Finding: There is a Need
for Longitudinal Studies
An increasing number of recent studies have been
longitudinal, with time frames ranging from 6 months
(Kochan, Dyer & Lipsky 1977) to 6 years (Macy 1979;
Schuster 1984). This constitutes an improvement over
previous work in the field, as long time frames are needed to
assess cooperative experiments. Cook and Campbell (1976)
have shown that organizational interventions may have a
variety of different results over time.
In this study two plants utilizing Rucker Plans had abrupt
increases in productivity following introduction of the in
tervention. In one case, however, the increase was followed
by stabilization, while in the second case there was a signifi
cant decline. It was not until approximately 18 months into
the Plan that these findings began to appear.
There tends to be a "life cycle" of events in unionmanagement cooperation. Cooperation frequently begins as
a result of stimulus variables existing in the environment of
the relationship. It subsequently continues over time or dies
out based upon the achievement of the parties' goals. Studies
conducted over short time frames do not address the process
and outcomes of cooperation when the newness and excite
ment of the "experiment" have worn off. Thus they catch
only a small portion of the actual life cycle.
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Finding: Studies Should Utilize
Performance Measures
Researchers should focus on the more significant out
comes of the cooperative process. There has been too much
research on attitudes toward cooperation and the
cooperative process in comparison to that which has examin
ed performance. This is because many studies which attempt
to test these measures fail due to lack of cooperation by the
participants (Kochan, Dyer & Lipsky 1977; Schuster 1983).
The same problem occasionally occurred in this research.
Even when a research site is willing to cooperate and pro
vide data, the experience gained in this study indicates that
this is only the first step toward measuring performance.
One important finding of this research was the generally
poor state of performance reporting sytems within firms.
Many firms do not utilize an actual measure of productivity,
that is, output per hour, but instead rely on financial
measures which often tend to be very sensitive to inflation,
price changes, and the costs of goods sold. Many firms also
have inadequate measures of quality.
Personnel reporting systems appear to be in equally poor
condition. Whether the organization maintained records of
overall attendance, grievances, and related personnel records
appears to be a function of the commitment of the personnel
manager, or in large companies corporate policy. Even the
plants of Fortune 500 firms were not found to have con
sistently good measures of either productivity or personnel.
In several situations, the method of record-keeping chang
ed, making the data unusable for time-series analysis. There
were other instances where the firms provided data, but there
would be a year's data missing in the middle of the time
series. Once again, this made the data unusable.
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Finding: Studies Require
Pre-Cooperation Measurement
Only a small number of studies (e.g., Goodman 1979;
Schuster 1983), as well as this one, have examined "before
and after" features of cooperative union-management pro
grams. This procedure facilitates determination of whether
the cooperative endeavor was having an effect. For perfor
mance, but not for attitudinal variables, this determination
can be accomplished by using archival data.

Finding: There is a Need for
Control Group Research
One of the main ways of detecting threats to the internal
validity of any experimental design is to observe whether the
measured change of the experimental group may have also
occurred in groups which have not received the experimental
treatment. Thus, productivity may go up, accident rates
decline, or employee attitudes improve for reasons entirely
unrelated to the existence of the cooperative unionmanagement endeavor.
At the present time, only two studies have used control
groups (Driscoll 1982; Goodman 1979). This is probably due
to the great difficulty of obtaining control sites since these
locations have little to gain from their participation. It was a
major difficulty in this study that was never surmounted and
an alternate strategy was employed.

Finding: There is Difficulty in Obtaining
the Parties' Cooperation
Gaining initial entry poses problems due to the sensitivity
of the cooperative process and, often, the inherent distrust
of the investigator by both union and employer represen
tatives. The parties tend to fear that a university academic
(or his/her graduate students) will enter into the process and
somehow provide a destabilizing influence. There is a fear
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that the researcher will inadvertently disrupt the process.
This is compounded by the fact that, generally speaking, the
development of cooperative interaction is a slow, time con
suming, and frequently costly process. Hence, unions and
employers may not want to risk upsetting their developing
cooperative relationship to aid the researcher.

Finding: The Values of the Investigator
Must be Recognized
The personal values of the investigators involved in this
line of research pose additional problems. Rosenthal (1966)
has documented the importance of being cognizant of an ex
perimenter effect which could influence research findings.
White has catalogued the importance of research bias in
Scanlon Plan research and writing. There tends to be
presumption among researchers operating in this area that
improving union-management attitudes is a desirable goal
(Peterson and Tracy 1977). Another view, however, is that
cooperation has worked more to the benefit of the employer
and reduced union and employee effectiveness (Peterson,
Leitko& Miles 1981).

Finding: There is a Need
to Study Unsuccessful Cases
There are very few studies of failure in union-management
cooperation (e.g., Gilson and Lefcowitz 1957). This research
actively sought cooperative labor-management experiments
which did not succeed.
Little is known of the dynamics that result in failure. As
will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, significant data
can be generated from investigating situations in which the
cooperative process broke down. Unfortunately, in
vestigating union-management relationships in which the
cooperative process ended can frequently be more difficult
than successful cases.
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Unsuccessful cases are generally more difficult to locate. It
is also more difficult to get the participants to discuss an ex
perience that they often prefer be left to rest. There is no
evidence as to what happens following the failure of the
cooperative process. In addition, it would be important to
catalogue the issues the parties confront following
breakdown of the cooperative process.

NOTES
1. At several sites the management objected to our interviewing union
representatives. In several others, union representatives were willing to
be interviewed but did not want to respond to the structured question
naires.
2. The estimation of the parameters would not be adversely affected by
least squares regression, but the standard deviations of the estimates
would be. According to McCain and McCleary (1979), in social science
time-series the bias in the standard deviation tends to be downward.
Since the standard deviation is used in the denominator of the t-statistic
test used to test for significance, the t-statistic would be inflated thereby
increasing the likelihood of a Type I error (Cook and Campbell 1976).
3. Two of the sites had programs of longer duration and were evaluated
on the basis of their continued effectiveness. The effective date of the last
collective bargaining agreement was treated as the intervention point.
This was done because in both cases the parties reaffirmed their commit
ment to the productivity through the contractual agreement. Either labor
or management had an opportunity to end the program at that point. In
these cases an analysis of the data with a three-month lag would have
been logically unsound.

Chapter 4
A Comparative Analysis
of the Structure
of Cooperative
Union-Management Interventions
This chapter of the book is a comparative analysis of the
six union-management interventions—Scanlon Plans,
Rucker Plans, Improshare Plans, Labor-Management Com
mittees, Quality Circles, and Quality of Worklife Pro
grams—which were studied. 1 Although the focus of this
chapter is on change and interventions in unionized settings,
most of the discussion would apply to the application of
these interventions in nonunion situations. The chapter is
descriptive and utilizes the qualitative data collected as part
of the case analysis portion of the study, supplemented by
other literature on the subject. This is believed to be the first
time that all of these workplace programs have been com
paratively analyzed. The goal has been to provide a descrip
tive analysis of these interventions primarily for use by
policymakers and practitioners.
The chapter begins by briefly defining the scope of each
intervention. This is followed by 10 topical sections in which
the interventions are analyzed. Table 4-1 summarizes the
analysis and reflects the organization of this chapter, which
includes the following dimensions: (1) philosophy/theory of
the interventions; (2) primary goals of the program; (3) sub75

Table 44
Comparative Analysis of Six Work Place Interventions

Intervention
Gainsharing
Scanlon:

Philosophy/Theory

Primary
goals

Program Dimension
Subsidiary
Worker
goals
participation

ON

C/3

Suggestion
making

Org-single unit; share Productivity
improvements; people improvement
capable/willing to
make suggestions,
want to make ideas

Attitudes,
communication,
work behaviors,
quality, cost
reduction

Two levels of
committees:
screening (1)
production (many)

Formal system

Rucker:

Primarily economic
incentive; some
reliance on employee
participation

Productivity
improvement

Attitudes, com
munication, work
behaviors, quality,
cost reductions

screening (1)
production (1)
(sometimes)

Formal system

Improshare:

Economic incentives,
increase performance

Productivity
improvement

Attitudes, work
behaviors

Bonus committee

None

People capable/
willing to offer
ideas/make
suggestions

Cost reduction,
quality

Attitudes, com
munication, work
behaviors, quality,
productivity

screening (1)
circles (many)

Context of
committee

LaborManagement
Committees:

Improve attitudes;
trust

Improve labormanagement
relations,
communications

Work behaviors,
quality, productivity,
cost reduction

Visitor,
subcommittees
(many)

None,
informal

QWL Projects:

Improve working
environment
(physical, human,
systems aspects)

Improve psycho
logical well-being
at work, increase
job satisfaction

Attitudes, commu
nications, work
behaviors, quality,
quality, productiv
ity, cost reduction

Steering committees,
ad hoc, to work
on problem,
informal

Possibly informal,
depending on
project

No Gainsharing
Quality Circles:

Table 4-1 (continued)
Role of
supervision

Role of
management

Bonus
formulas

Frequency
of payout

Role of
union

Chair,
production
committee

Direct participa
tion in bonus
committee
assignments

Sales
payroll

Monthly

Negotiated
Substantial
provisions,
screening com
mittee membership

Rucker:

None

Idea coordinator,
evaluate sugges
tions, committee
assignments

Bargaining
unit payroll
Production value
(sales-materials,
supplies, services)

Monthly

Negotiated pro
visions, screening
committee
membership

Slight

Improshare:

None

None

Engineered
Weekly
Std. x BPF
Total hours worked

Negotiated
provisions

None

Circle
leaders

Facilitator,
evaluate pro
posed solutions

All savings/
improvements
retained by
company

Not
applicable

Tacit
approval

Somewhat

Labor-Management
Committees

None

Committee
members

All savings/
improvements
retained by
company

Not
applicable

Active
membership

Somewhat

QWL Projects:

No direct
role

Steering com
All savings/
mittee membership improvements
retained by
company

Not
applicable

Negotiated pro
visions, steering
committee
membership

Substantial

Intervention
Gainsharing
Scanlon:

No Gainsharing
Quality Circles:

Impact on
mgt. style
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o
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sidiary goals of the program; (4) structure for worker par
ticipation; (5) mechanism for employee suggestion-making;
(6) role of supervision; (7) role of middle and higher
management; (8) productivity-sharing formulas; (9) fre
quency of payout; (10) role of the union; and (11) impact on
management style.
Defining the Interventions
At the outset of this chapter it is important to define the
scope of the cooperative union-management interventions.
One caveat to this section is that in practice there is signifi
cant local variation in the design and implementation of each
program. The presentation in this section may be considered
the "generic" model. This discussion is preliminary to the
in-depth discussion which follows.
The productivity or gainsharing plans (the terms are used
synonymously) differ widely. Scanlon Plans involve an
employee suggestion program, committee system, and bonus
formula based upon the relationship between sales value and
labor costs. Rucker Plans also have a suggestion program
with a more limited committee system and a bonus formula
based upon "value added" (sales value - cost of goods sold).
Improshare Plans generally have no employee participation
and their bonus formula is based upon engineering standards
and total labor hours. It should be noted that Rucker and
Improshare Plans are copyrighted programs. In practice,
however, it is possible to copy the plans without the aid of
the consultants. There are instances of companies and
unions having done this, or where "locally developed" plans
have incorporated Rucker and Improshare principles to fit
particular circumstances.
The other three cooperative efforts, Labor-Management
Committees, Quality Circles, and Quality of Worklife pro
jects can be differentiated in several ways. LaborManagement Committees (L-MCs) are composed of the key
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management and union actors who meet periodically to
discuss noncontractual issues, that is, issues not specifically
addressed in the collective bargaining agreement. As these
committees mature and a sufficient level of trust and con
fidence is achieved, the L-MC's activities may be expanded to
include subcommittees involving rank-and-file members and
managers at lower levels in the organization. In addition, the
committees' agenda may be expanded to examine contrac
tual issues. Quality Circles (QCs) involve shop-level worker
committees that attempt to use statistical and problemsolving analysis to improve quality and productivity in their
work areas.
Quality of Worklife (QWL) projects are more amorphous
and varied and, therefore, more difficult to define. QWL in
terventions can range from cafeteria improvements and
work rules changes to flexible work hours, autonomous
work groups, and job redesign and restructuring. Some
might argue that all of the interventions discussed in this
chapter are QWL projects and that what is being labeled
QWL is simply a collection of less utilized and publicized ef
forts. In this research, only autonomous work groups were
actually investigated; the information on the other programs
comes from the literature. Normally, L-MCs, QCs and QWL
projects do not have gainsharing provisions, although there
were instances in this research where gainsharing was added.

Philosophy/Theory of the Interventions
In this section the terms philosophy/theory are used
somewhat loosely. What is intended is the reasoning underly
ing the goals and structure of the interventions. In some
cases, such as the Scanlon Plan, the philosophy/theory is
better developed than in others, for example the Rucker
Plans.
Of the three gainsharing plans, Scanlon Plans have receiv
ed the most attention in the popular and academic literature.
The philosophy of the Scanlon Plan is that the organization
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should function as a single unit, that workers are able and
willing to contribute ideas and suggestions, and that im
provement should be shared. The most well-developed
discussion in this area has been by Frost, Wakeley, and Ruh
(1974) who have stated that the Scanlon Plan is based upon
organizational identity, participation, and equity.
Misconceptions exist when a firm attempts to partially ap
ply Scanlon principles and structures. Several authors have
indicated that it is the adoption of the Scanlon philsophy
rather than a particular structure that is the crucial aspect of
the program (Lesieur & Puckett 1968; Shultz 1951).
Moreover, McGregor (1960) stated that the Plan was neither
a formula, a program, nor a set of procedures, but was a
"way of industrial life—a philosophy of manage
ment—which rests on theoretical assumptions entirely con
sistent with Theory Y." (p. 10) An organization's program is
only a Scanlon Plan when there is an integration of the
philosophy and structure into a package or system (Lesieur &
Puckett 1968; Slichter, Healy & Livernash 1960) and only
when the structure serves to implement the philosophy rather
than the inverse.
Improshare Plans appear to have an entirely different
philosophy. Although the originator of the Improshare Plan
seems to support "consultative" management practices
(Fein 1981), most of the Improshare Plans studied in this
research did not have any shop floor participation. Im
proshare in practice is more a traditional incentive program
organized on a plant or large group basis. Thus the
philosophy of the Plan appears to be to tie economic rewards
to performance, without any attempt at meaningful
employee participation at the workplace.
Rucker Plans might be viewed as falling somewhere be
tween the humanistic philosophy of Scanlon Plans and the
economically rewarded and driven worker under Im
proshare. Thus, as will be seen, Rucker Plans have most of
the same participatory elements of Scanlon, but in smaller
doses or degrees. Managers unsure of the desired level of
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employee participation appropriate in their organization
might select the Rucker philosophy as a midpoint.
The philosophy of Quality Circles closely resembles that
of the Scanlon Plan. The premise of the QCs is that worker
committees can solve production, cost, and quality problems
when given proper training and support. As with Scanlon
Plans, the QC approach is one of extensive employee in
volvement in order to produce commitment and identifica
tion with the organization. The major philosophical distinc
tion between the QCs and the Scanlon Plan is the absence of
a productivity gainsharing formula in the former. The QCs
omit money as a potential motivator and rely on
psychological rewards to drive the system.
The philosophy/theory of Labor-Management Commit
tees is to improve the working relationship between the com
pany and the union by focusing on attitudinal change. Once
this state has been achieved, other significant organizational
issues may be addressed and a meaningful discussion of
long-standing traditional collective bargaining issues may
occur.
The L-MC process is inherently slower than the process
employed in productivity-sharing plans, QCs and some
QWL projects. The latter three efforts accept the unionmanagement relationship as it is and seek to implement im
mediate workplace changes. In all three instances, improved
labor-management relations is an assumed by-product of
these efforts. Yet the cause of the demise of so many
productivity-sharing, QC, and QWL efforts is that they fail
to adequately prepare both parties for the major changes
that are about to be implemented. Frequently, adequate at
tention is not paid to improving the parties' relationship
once the effort has been made operational. Worse yet are
those instances in which management attempts to implement
one of the change programs without involving the union.
In contrast, the initial goals of L-MCs are to produce a
change in attitude between the union leadership and the
management and between the workers and the management.
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The focus is on problemsolving activities and building trust.
The L-MC process exposes the parties' entire relationship,
historical, present, and future, for review and analysis.
Problems can then be identified and jointly developed alter
native strategies considered. This process is the mechanism
for building trust and confidence. Thus successful L-MCs
permit the building of a solid foundation upon which further
cooperative endeavors such as productivity-sharing plans,
QCs, and QWL projects may be undertaken.
This is because of the central role that union-management
relations play in determining employee commitment to the
firm. For many years, it was believed that dual allegiance,
that is, employee loyalty to the union as well as the company
was feasible (Purcell 1954; Stagner 1954). However, recent
research by Fukami and Larson (1982) demonstrates that the
potential for dual allegiance is modified by employee percep
tions of union-management relations. Therefore, if an L-MC
is effective in improving union-management relations, it
should eliminate the obstacles to employee loyalty to the
firm, thereby paving the way for even greater levels of
change.
Quality of Worklife (QWL) programs are based on the
premise that improving the working environment will
heighten workers' state of "psychological well-being" at
work, and lead to increased job satisfaction. Increased job
satisfaction will then result in positive work attitudes and
behavior and increased performance. QWL projects can
focus on all elements of the work environment—physical,
human, and systems. Projects to improve the physical en
vironment might include upgrading and humanizing the
physical plant. The manner in which people are treated,
supervisory style changes, work rules revisions, and the
scheduling of work impact on the human aspects of the
workplace. Finally, the structure of jobs, and the organiza
tion and flow of work are examples of systems changes.
It has been stated many times in the popular press, for ex
ample Business Week ("The New Industrial Relations,"
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1981), that the management of the workplace is changing.
These six interventions represent a change of philosophy by
managers, union officials and employees. The six interven
tions converge on many key issues, for example, improving
the psychological well-being of employees, increasing
employee involvement, and sharing of organizational im
provements.

Primary Goals of the Program
Each of the interventions has a primary or overriding goal,
plus numerous subsidiary goals. The primary goal of the
three gainsharing plans is to improve the productivity of
hourly employees, thus reducing labor costs. In contrast, the
primary goals of Quality Circles are cost reduction and im
proved product quality. Labor-Management Committees
seek to improve communications and union-management
relations, while QWL projects seek to improve the
psychological well-being of workers and increase job
satisfaction.

Subsidiary Goals of the Program
Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare Plans share basically
the same subsidiary goals. All three seek to improve
employee attitudes and work behaviors (for example, atten
dance). The committee and suggestion systems of the
Scanlon and Rucker Plans also seek to improve communica
tions, achieve cost reductions, for example, in materials and
supplies, and to make quality improvements. The oppor
tunities for these latter improvements to occur under Im
proshare, absent the creation of similar structures for
employee participation, is very limited.
The subsidiary goals of Quality Circles and L-MCs are to
improve work behaviors, quality, and productivity. In addi
tion, QCs seek to improve attitudes and communication
which are higher priorities and more central to the

84

Structure

philosophy and goals of L-MCs. L-MCs seek to reduce costs
but, once again, this aspect of operation does not have the
same priority as with Quality Circles. There is a long list of
subsidiary goals for QWL projects including improved at
titudes, communication, work behaviors, quality, produc
tivity, and cost reduction. Additionally, and in varying
degrees, most of the interventions also seek to achieve decen
tralized, flat and more humanistic organizations.
Most of the primary and subsidiary goals of the six in
terventions overlap when they are combined. Yet, important
distinctions exist in focus and priorities. These differences
lead to differential outcomes. Hence companies and unions
seeking quick and sizable productivity increases would be
best advised to use a gainsharing strategy rather than Quality
Circles or a Labor-Management Committee. Conversely,
L-MCs would be far more appropriate for improving labormanagement relations than gainsharing, QCs, and QWL
projects. Quality Circles are better suited for cost reduction
efforts and are less likely to be successful in producing direct
labor savings.

Structure for Worker Participation
and Mechanism for Suggestion-Making
One of the most interesting and important workplace
developments of the 1970s was the increase in worker par
ticipation or involvement. With the exception of most Improshare Plans, the other five interventions in varying
degrees provide for employee participation. Extensive
employee participation is also possible with an Improshare
Plan, although it does not seem to occur very often.

Scanlon Plans
Scanlon Plans and Quality Circles provide for the most
elaborate employee participation. Scanlon Plans have a twotiered committee structure. Distributed throughout the
organization (including clerical and office positions) at the
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operative level are Production Committees whose jurisdic
tions generally correspond to departmental and shift respon
sibilities. The functions of the Production Committees are to
encourage idea development and to evaluate employee sug
gestions. Suggestions which are within a specified cost
($200-$500) can be implemented by the Production Commit
tee as long as they do not affect the operations of other Pro
duction Committees. The Production Committees normally
consist of two to five rank-and-file employees elected by
their peers, plus supervisory-level managers. In some
Scanlon Plans, Production Committee members can invite
other employees to attend committee meetings. The Produc
tion Committees meet monthly on company time. The super
visor retains the right to veto Production Committee deci
sions, subject to employee appeal to the higher level Screen
ing Committee.
The Screening Committee is composed of hourly represen
tatives, the union leadership, and key persons in the manage
ment hierarchy. The Screening Committee has five primary
responsibilities, including oversight of the operation of the
Production Committees in three ways. First, suggestions
which cross the boundaries of Production Committees or ex
ceed the cost guidelines of a Production Committee must be
approved by the Screening Committee. Second, as alluded to
above, suggestions rejected by the Production Committees
can be appealed to the Screening Committee. Third, it in
sures that issues or items raised by the Production or Screen
ing Committees coming within the scope of the collective
bargaining agreement, may not be discussed in those forums.
Fourth, the Screening Committee considers current and
future business problems, as well as other issues of organiza
tional concern (for example, production difficulties and
customer complaints). Fifth, the Screening Committee
reviews the monthly bonus calculations.

Quality Circles
Quality Circles normally consist of 5 to 12 employees from
the same department or work area. The circle members are

86

Structure

volunteers. The circle is coordinated by a leader, normally
the supervisor who has been trained in statistical analysis,
group dynamics, and problemsolving techniques. The circle
leader attempts to develop the same skills in the circle
members. Quality Circles meet periodically (weekly, bi
monthly, monthly) on company time.
The QC chooses projects they wish to work on. The circle
then investigates the causes of the problems it has chosen and
develops a solution to be presented and recommended to
higher management officials. If the management officials
approve the circle's recommendation, the circle implements
the change and monitors the results.
In addition to the circles, most QC programs also have a
Screening Committee to provide overall direction.
Comparing Scanlon Committees and Quality Circles. The
Scanlon Production Committees and Quality Circles con
stitute a significantly different form of organizational struc
ture from that of more conventional organizations. First, in
teraction patterns among workers and between supervisors
differ from conventional firms because the role of the
worker is expanded. Greater emphasis is placed upon his/her
ability to influence organization policy and improve
organizational effectiveness. At many of the research sites,
reports were given that "workers were listened to" for the
first time. Second, in both programs, but to a greater degree
in Scanlon Plans, authority to make decisions is brought
downward to the same level at which decisions will be im
plemented. This is because Scanlon committees can imple
ment their ideas up to a certain cost limit. On the other hand,
the QCs may get more management recognition because they
must present their recommendations to higher management
officials. When implementing ideas, the Scanlon committees
and QCs are equivalent.
Quality Circles tend to restrict workers to focusing only on
their immediate work area. In contrast, because of the
Scanlon suggestion system and more highly developed
Screening Committee, workers have an opportunity to in-
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fluence a larger spectrum of organizational issues. Addi
tionally, the use of a bonus formula, found in all Scanlon
Plans but rarely seen with Quality Circles, tends to provide a
greater focus on the total economic state of the firm. The
statistical and problemsolving training provided to QC
leaders and members is better developed than that found in
most Scanlon Plans and may aid in making them more effec
tive in determining the causes of organizational problems.
Here again, there is a convergence in approach as some com
panies provided their Scanlon committees with "quality
circles" training. At the same time, in many companies with
Quality Circles, supervisors have authority to spend money,
without further authorization, up to a specified limit
($200-$500), thus enabling ideas to be acted upon at that
level of the organization. In these situations, there is very lit
tle difference between the Scanlon committees and Quality
Circles.
Recently, several practitioners have suggested that
Scanlon Plans are "the equivalent of Quality Circles with a
bonus." This statement is only partially correct. From the
point of view of structure and decentralized decisionmaking,
the Scanlon Plan and "Quality Circles with a bonus" are
potentially the same. In both cases, there are shop floor com
mittees, a productivity-sharing bonus, and an effort to in
volve employees in decisions which affect them at the
workplace.
There are, however, several subtle but sharp differences
between the interventions. First, a Quality Circle tends to in
volve more employees (10-15) than do Scanlon Production
Committees (3-5). Second, as will be discussed more fully
below, the Scanlon bonus formula includes nearly all
employees—production, office, managerial and profes
sional. This is part of the Scanlon philosophy—the organiza
tion should function as a single unit. In practice, the Quality
Circles interventions that have added productivity-sharing
formulas have only applied them to the hourly or production
workforce. Here the similarity breaks down.
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In one Quality Circle's intervention, the circle's proposed
solution was processed through the individual suggestionaward program and if meritorious, a group award is made to
the circle members. This is very different from the Scanlon
philosophy in which all improvements are shared by the en
tire complement of employees. In addition when a nonfinancial measure of productivity is used, the kinds of informa
tion typically shared with employees in Scanlon Plan firms is
not made available.
Most important, organizations that have fully adopted the
Scanlon ideology seem to exhibit a different set of attitudes
and values from many of the firms with Quality Circles.
Although difficult to establish empirically, managers in
Quality Circles firms are more likely to maintain more tradi
tional, authoritarian views on employee participation and in
volvement.
Rucker Plans
Some Rucker plans have two committees, Production and
Screening, while others have only the Screening Committee.
In those instances where there are two committees, there is
one Production Committee consisting of 10-15 hourly
employees and an assortment of managers. The Production
Committee meets monthly on company time and reviews the
suggestion program and discusses production problems. The
Production Committees tend to be used more for com
munication rather than problemsolving.
The Rucker Screening Committee is composed of the
hourly representatives, the union leadership, and key
management personnel. The primary purpose of the commit
tee is to supervise the bonus program. In addition, produc
tion and long range economic issues may be discussed.
Improshare Plans
The Improshare Plans studied did not have formal systems
of employee participation. In some firms there is a Bonus
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Committee to review the previous month's bonus calcula
tions. Although the Improshare Plans that were studied had
no employee involvement similar to that of Scanlon or
Rucker Plans and Quality Circles, employee participation
would certainly be possible with an Improshare Plan. 2

Labor-Management Committees
Labor-Management Committees are composed of key
union and management officials who meet monthly to
discuss issues of mutual concern. The L-MCs may include
one to two rank-and-file employee members or may permit a
small number of employees to visit the committee and par
ticipate in its deliberation. The main body of the committee
tends to closely resemble the negotiating committees of the
employer and the union.
A mature L-MC program may be expanded to include a
series of subcommittees. In these instances, there will be a
greater level of employee participation. According to Robert
Ahern, executive director of the Buffalo-Erie County LaborManagement Council (Ahern 1978) the general objectives of
in-plant L-MCs are:
(1) to provide for regular broad ranging contact and
communications between the parties during contract
term;
(2) to focus that contact and communication on positive
problemsolving, achievement oriented activity;
(3) to build informal relationships, trust and understand
ing;
(4) to recognize the Union as a communication link with
employee/members.
The initial goals of L-MCs are to produce a change in at
titude between the union leadership and the management
and between the workers and the management. The focus is
on problemsolving activities and building trust. Thus the in
itial agenda items tend to be limited. A more mature L-MC
might be expanded to include the items listed below. The
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degree of cooperation, trust, confidence, and the nature of
organizational problems will define the actual agenda.
(1) Communication of business and operation progress
and problems
(2) Planning for the introduction of new machinery
(3) Defining and publicizing quality problems
(4) Improving quality of workmanship and reducing re
work
(5) Training for new hires
(6) Using production time and facilities most effectively
(7) Reducing equipment breakdown and delays in repair
(8) Skill training for employees and supervisors
(9) Organizing car pools
(10) Redesign of jobs in specific departments
(11) Definition and resolution of broad problems in con
tract administration
(12) Reducing absenteeism, tardiness and unnecessary idle
time
(13) Developing alcoholism and drug rehabilitation pro
grams
(14) Conserving energy and eliminating waste of
materials, supplies and equipment
(15) Reducing unnecessary overtime
(16) Government mandated programs (OSHA, Affir
mative Action)
(17) Improving cost performance
(18) Improving local health services
(19) Informing the community on company actions such
as pollution control
(20) Productivity-Job Security Programs
(21) Gainsharing programs
(22) Cost reduction programs
(23) Security, safety, fund raising
(24) Sales support required.
(Ahern 1978)
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Quality of Worklife Projects
In QWL projects the nature of employee participation will
vary according to the program. Some QWL projects will
have no participation, while others might have informal par
ticipation or ad hoc committees to work on a particular pro
ject. Many QWL programs also have a Steering Committee
to provide overall direction and policy. In the case of
autonomous work groups, there is a high level of employee
involvement because workers organize the manner in which
the work is to be done, and who is going to do it. In contrast,
flexible work hours and compressed work week programs
might have no participation.

Impact of an Existing
Individual Suggestion Plan
Many of the firms in the study had pre-existing individual
suggestion plans prior to the intervention. Under these plans,
an employee who made a suggestion would have it evaluated
by the appropriate manager(s). If the suggestion were ac
cepted, the employee would receive a percentage of the first
year's savings.
It is easy to see that programs such as this would conflict
with most of the interventions. That would be particularly
true of Scanlon Plans, Rucker Plans, and Quality Circles,
and less so for Labor-Management Committees, some Quali
ty of Worklife projects and nonparticipatory Improshare
Plans. In the case of the former group, the most common
solution was to terminate the individual suggestion plan.
Although some employees claimed that they would no longer
make suggestions, most employees did so in the belief that a
bonus (Scanlon/Rucker) would follow. Moreover, most sug
gestion plans had functioned so poorly in the past—taking so
long to respond to employees ideas, paying very small
bonuses to employees, often paying a bonus for bad ideas to
encourage continued employee interest, alienating some peo
ple whose ideas were rejected, and being very expensive to

92

Structure

operate—that few people either among labor or management
objected to the termination.
One Quality Circle program took an unusual approach. In
that case, ideas emanating from the circles were treated as
group suggestions, with the circle dividing the payout among
its members. While this initially appears to be a feasible idea,
not all employees who desired to be involved were in quality
circles. There was a waiting list. Thus the unintended conse
quence of this action was to produce two groups of
employees—circle members who were "haves," and noncircle members who were "have nots." In another instance, a
Rucker Plan firm with a suggestion program that had initial
ly been very active found it could, after two years, rejuvenate
its suggestion program by giving a small gift for the "Sugges
tion of the Month."
Role of Supervision
There is a dramatic change in the role of supervision with
the implementation of Scanlon Plans, Quality Circles and
some Quality of Worklife programs, for example,
autonomous work groups. Supervisors chair the meetings of
Scanlon Production Committees, serve in the role of circle
leaders in Quality Circles, and assume a significantly larger
managerial role in autonomous work groups (Goodman
1979). In contrast, supervision may have only a small role in
the Rucker Plan (for example, serving as committee
members and commenting on suggestions affecting their
area), and Labor-Management Committees (occasionally at
tending meetings as a visitor), while in Improshare Plans and
some Quality of Worklife projects, supervision has no direct
role.
The Scanlon Production Committees are the key operating
mechanism in the Plan and the supervisor's effectiveness is
central to the success of the Production Committees. As
chairperson of a Production Committee, the supervisor
coordinates employee participation through his/her conduct
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of meetings and processing of ideas. Much of the firm's ac
ceptance of the Scanlon philosophy and its attitude toward
employee involvement will be expressed through the super
visor in this role.
Under the Scanlon ground rules, the supervisor maintains
the discretion to veto ideas and suggestions emanating from
the employees in his/her department and from the employee
members of the Production Committees. Employees,
however, can appeal the supervisor's rejection of an idea to
the Screening Committee. This places the supervisor in a
potentially vulnerable position as higher levels of plant
management may overturn a supervisor's veto in Screening
Committee deliberations. This possibility, once again, gives
rise to a test of the firm's acceptance of the Plan's principles.
If supervisory vetoes are never overturned, it is probably an
indication that the Scanlon philosophy has not been fully ac
cepted and implemented.
A final point is that in contrast to the other gainsharing
plans, supervisors in the Scanlon Plan are direct participants
in the bonus formula. This is part of the Scanlon philosophy
that the organization works together as a single unit and
shares the benefits from doing so. In the other two forms of
gainsharing, Rucker and Improshare, supervisors are not
normally participants in the productivity-sharing, but may
receive bonuses through the employer's share of the
improvement-sharing formula.
Supervisors normally act as circle leaders in Quality Circle
programs. In this role, they organize the circles, train the
employees to be circle members, and coordinate the circle
meetings. Problems are selected, analyzed and recommenda
tions made to higher levels of management. In order for
supervisors to assume the role of circle leaders, they must be
trained in group problemsolving, communication, and
statistical analysis.
In autonomous work groups, workers take responsibility
for assigning tasks, frequently with the coordination of the
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supervisor. The supervisor plays a critical role in coor
dinating the functioning of the group. However, the direct
responsibility for supervising production is not present, as
this has become a worker responsibility. The supervisor is
responsible for planning operations and insuring that the
work group operates effectively.
Quality Circles, Scanlon Plans, and autonomous work
groups may be threatening to supervisors. First, the firm's
expectation that supervisors can direct these programs by
chairing Production Committees, through circle leadership,
and group coordination may expose fundamental
managerial incompetency at this level of the organization.
Interview data at many sites strongly indicates that company
criteria for supervisory selection and subsequent training and
development are very weak. Therefore, it should come as no
surprise when supervision does not successfully assume this
larger role.
Other factors may negatively impact on supervision. For
example, employee ideas and suggestions may expose super
visory inadequacies to higher levels of management
(Helfgott 1962; McGregor 1960). Workers often become
critical of management insisting that it become more effi
cient. In effectively operating programs, however, the super
visor's role can become more managerial. Rather than focus
ing on the control aspects of the position, the supervisor can
spend more time in the planning and coordination of tasks.
In the Rucker Plan, supervisors may serve as management
members of the Production Committee. Since this commit
tee is primarily a vehicle for communication, the supervisor's
role is very limited. In addition, employee suggestions which
are processed by the Idea Coordinator may be channeled to
an affected supervisor for comment.
In Labor-Management Committees, supervisors may be
asked to attend meetings as visitors in order to expose them
to the process and to keep them informed of deliberations.
Because L-MCs provide a direct line of communication from
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the union leadership and rank-and-file employees to the
chief operating officers of the plant or company, supervision
and portions of middle management may be bypassed in the
process. This also can be threatening to these groups as well.
When, however, the L-MCs add subcommittees, supervision
and middle management will likely become directly involved
as subcommittee members.
In Improshare Plans and other forms of Quality of
Worklife projects, supervision has no direct role in the
operation of the program.

The Role of Middle
and Higher Management
Middle level and higher level management play a key role
in all six interventions. These roles range from the monitor
ing of the bonus formulas, to committee members, and to
evaluating ideas. In this section, rather than focusing on the
interventions, the material is presented by managerial role.

Calculation of the Bonus
In the three gainsharing plans, one or more managers are
normally responsible for the assembly, preparation, and
computation of the data necessary to calculate the bonus.

Program Coordinator/Facilitator
In the gainsharing programs and QWL projects, one
manager normally assumes overall responsibility for coor
dinating the program. In Quality Circles, this role is known
as the facilitator. It is the responsibility of the QC facilitator
to train the circle leaders and review the operation of the
Quality Circles. In the gainsharing plans, this person nor
mally attempts to maintain high levels of employee participa
tion and involvement, along with responding to employee
questions and concerns about the bonus formula.
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Committee Membership
Managers serve on the Screening Committees of Scanlon
and Rucker Plans, Quality Circles, and Quality of Worklife
projects as well as on the Improshare Incentive Bonus Com
mittees. The role of managers is to give direction to the in
tervention and stimulate further efforts. In addition, the
potential for employee communication is very great and
many of the managers who were interviewed indicated that
they used the Screening Committees as much as possible for
this purpose.
Perhaps the most significant role for managers is in the
Labor-Management Committee process. Here the full scope
of the parties' relationship comes under scrutiny. The suc
cess of the L-MC process can be largely determined by the
willingness of managers (as well as union leaders) to openly
and candidly explore heretofore difficult issues. Through
this format, companies and unions may address the need to
change aspects of their contractual systems.

Evaluation of Ideas
In the Rucker Plan, one manager acts as the idea coor
dinator for the processing of all suggestions. The idea coor
dinator directs suggestions to the appropriate managers for
review and follows the idea through investigation to provide
feedback to the employees.
In Quality Circles, employees formally present their ideas
to higher levels of management for review and approval.
This is designed to give the employees recognition for their
efforts.
In the Scanlon Screening Committees, middle and upper
level managers evaluate suggestions only when they exceed
cost limitations, overlap the jurisdiction of several Produc
tion Committees, or are rejected by supervision. In the case
of both Quality Circles and Scanlon Committees, managers
may be called upon to provide information to a group work
ing on a problem.
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Productivity-Sharing Formulas
The three gainsharing programs have elaborate and varied
formulas for the calculation of productivity improvement.
The Scanlon and Rucker formulas relate bonus earnings to
financial performance, while Improshare is more a true
measure of labor productivity. Scanlon Plans measure the
relationship between sales value of production and total
labor costs. Rucker Plans are based on the concept of pro
duction value (gross sales minus materials, supplies, and ser
vices) and its relationship to bargaining unit payroll. Im
proshare Plans are premised on the calculation of a base pro
ductivity factor involving engineered time standards and ac
tual hours worked.
In the other three interventions there are no gainsharing
provisions. All improvements, savings, and cost reductions
are retained by the company, although they may be used to
enlarge the "economic pie" in contract negotiations, thereby
becoming part of distributive or wage bargaining. It should
be noted, however, that it would be possible to implement
the other interventions—Quality Circles, LaborManagement Committees, and Quality of Worklife pro
jects—and later on or, presumably, simultaneously add gainsharing. In fact, three such instances arose during this
research. In one instance, the intervention called for
autonomous work groups, followed later by gainsharing.
This strategy never came to fruition as the employees voted
in opposition to the effort. The second intervention, which is
presently operational, involved a Quality Circles program.
Eighteen months following implementation, gainsharing had
been added. In the third instance, an outgrowth of a LaborManagement Committee was the creation of a gainsharing
program. Thus, gainsharing may exist independently or in
conjunction with other efforts.
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The Scanlon Bonus Formula
The Scanlon bonus formula is based upon a relationship
between labor costs and sales value of production. One com
mon formula is:
Base ratio = (Sales - returned goods ± changes in inventory)
(Wages & vacations & insurance & pensions)

It is not uncommon to have the formula expanded to include
other items over which workers have some influence and
control, for example, materials and energy (Frost, Wakeley,
and Ruh 1974). In these instances, it assumes an important
element found in the Rucker formula. The great benefit of
the Scanlon formula is that it can be easily understood by all
members of an organization. A typical Scanlon accounting
statement is presented in table 4-2.
At the end of each bonus period, actual costs are com
pared with what would have been expected using the base
ratio. If the actual costs are less than expected costs, the dif
ference constitutes a bonus pool. A portion of the pool is
held in reserve to offset those months in which actual costs
exceed expected costs. At the end of the year, however, the
pool is distributed according to a prescribed formula.
The formula for the period distribution (usually monthly)
and the annual closing out of the reserve account differ. The
most common basis is a 75% - 25 % employee/company
split (Cummings & Molloy 1977). Less common are
50% - 50% and 100% - 0% divisions. The employee portion
of the pool is distributed on a percentage basis, the base of
which is determined by the amount of participating payroll
during the period.
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Table 4-2
Scanlon Plan Financial Data
January 1979
(SOOOs)
Gross Sales
Less: Sales Return
Net Sales
Plus: Increase in Inventory
Less: Allowance for Quantity Adjustment
Net Inventory Change
Sales Value of Production
Allowed Payroll (30.97 of $6,537)
Actual Payroll:
Factory
Salary
Total Payroll
Bonus Pool
Reserve for Deficit Months (25%)
Bonus Balance
Company Share (25%)
Employee Share (75%)
Bonus Paid as a Percent of Participating
Payroll ($97 + $1638)
The Bonus Check will be Distributed
on February 15, 1979
Status of Reserve: January 31, 1979
$198
Total Reserve

$6,035
(24)
566
(40)

99

2/12/79
$6,011
526
6,537
2,024

1,452
400
1,852
172
43
129
32
97
5.9

The reserve is established in order to safeguard the company against any
months with lower than normal output. At the end of the year (April 30,
1979), whatever is left in the reserve will be paid out with 75% going to
the employees and 25% to the company.

The Rucker Bonus Formula
The Rucker bonus formula is based on the relationship
between production value and payroll costs of production
workers. Production value is the difference between the sell
ing price of firm's products and the cost of materials, sup-
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plies, and services. Once determined, production value and
payroll costs are combined to provide a ratio. Thus,
Sales Value
- Defective Goods Returned
- Materials, Supplies, and Services (e.g., utilities)
PRODUCTION VALUE

Then,
Bargaining Unit Payroll
PRODUCTION VALUE

equals the "Plan Standard" by which improvements in pro
ductivity are measured. Table 4-3 shows the Rucker monthly
calculation.
Table 4-3
Rucker Plan Productivity-Sharing Results
February 1981
($OOOs)
Sales Value of Output
(What we will receive from customers for products
this month.)
LESS - Material and Supply Costs
(The cost of the materials and supplies used in producing
that output.)
Production Value
(The value added to those materials in converting them into
our finished products.)
Bargaining Unit Employees' Share of Production Value
at 37.74%
(What the payroll would have been if performance
was no better or worse than in the Base Period.)
Bargaining Unit Payroll
(Actual payroll for the month, including a one-month share
of fringe costs.)
TOTAL ADDED EARNINGS or (DEFICIT)
1/3 to Balancing Account
(Used to offset deficit months.)
Cash Pay-Off
(continued)

$2,571
710
1,861

702
698
4.3
1.4
3.9
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The Rucker measurement of improvement is more
sophisticated than the Scanlon formula. The Rucker formula
not only encompasses labor costs, but also materials, sup
plies, and services and permits employees to share in savings
from these items. The underlying premise is that it will
motivate employees to be more conscientious in their use.
Savings of materials, supplies, and services increases produc
tion value and the employees share in this savings in an
amount equal to the Plan Standard (in the example above
37.74 percent). All savings in labor costs are allocated to the
employees. Although improvements in employee use of
materials and more careful utilization of resources can oc
cur, spiraling costs of these factors of production adversely
affected bonus earnings in at least two instances. On the
other hand, several firms indicated that they felt that the
Rucker formula was safer because it encompassed a greater
number of factors.
Table 4-3 (continued)
Balancing Account
($OOOs)
Beginning of Month
Put in or (taken out) this month
End of Month
Eligible Hours
Cash Pay-Off Per Hour ($3900-^52136)

2.3
1.4
3.7
52,136
.075 cents

Eligible Hours is based upon total straight time and over
time hours worked. The total Eligible Hours is divided into
the total bonus to be paid, producing the hourly bonus rate,
which two sites labeled the Cash Pay-Off Per Hour. The ac
tual bonus received by each worker is determined by
multiplying his/her number of hours worked by the cents per
hour payout.

The Improshare Bonus Formula
The Improshare Plan formula is based upon engineered
time standards plus absorption of indirect hours and total
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actual hours worked. This concept is called the BASE PRO
DUCTIVITY FACTOR (BPF) and is calculated as:
gpp_

Example

Total Actual Hours Worked
Total Earned Standard Value Hours
(Standard Value x Total Number
of Units of Each Product)

BPF= 500,000 = 2777
180,000

The time standard estimates per unit produced, multiplied by
total pieces produced during the period yields the Earned
Standard Value Hours. Actual Hours Worked includes all
hours worked by production employees and nonproduction
employees involved in shipping, receiving, maintenance and
clerical operations.
Improshare productivity is calculated in the following
manner:
Improshare Productivity = Base Value Earned Hours
Total Actual Hours Worked
which is same as
Earned Standard Value Hours x BPF
Total Actual Hours Worked
Example
4321x2.777 = 12,000 =
10,000
10,000

or

Productivity Distribution
50-50 split
Base Value Earned Hours
Total Actual Hours Worked
Hours Gained
Employee Share

12,000
10.000
2,000
1,000 or
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Productivity gains are represented by hours saved or gained
and are distributed between employees and the company ac
cording to an established ratio, such as 50 percent sharing.
The employees' bonus percentage is found by dividing total
hours worked in the current period into man hours gained
allocated to employees. Each employee receives a corre
sponding percentage increase in gross pay. Table 4-4 presents
an example of Improshare bonus calculations.
Table 4-4
Improshare Productivity Calculations
Earned Standard Value Hours
Base Productivity Factor (1.48)
Base Value Earned Hours (2431 x 1.48)
Less Actual Hours Worked
Hours Saved
50% Employee Share 160
Hours Saved Actual Hours Worked
(160 - 3279)
Improshare Bonus

2431
3597
3279
319

4.88%

The Improshare measurement system has several advan
tages. First, it does not require the company to divulge pro
prietary information which might fall into the hands of a
competitor or might be used to the union's advantage in
wage bargaining. Second, the Improshare formula can be
applied to smaller groups within the plant, rather than to an
entire workforce. Third, in situations where there are shifts
in the labor content of production, the Improshare method is
a superior system for capturing these changes. Its primary
drawback is that it is more difficult for workers and
managers to fully comprehend and understand than are the
Scanlon or Rucker measures.

Produced or Shipped Dollars/Hours
The three gainsharing formulas are based upon an ac
counting of organizational production. An important issue is
when the production is to be recognized.
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Some firms credit production at the point of completion
and placement into inventory, while others do so at the point
of shipment to customers. Although this appears to be mere
ly a technical issue, it has important organizational and
psychological ramifications.
The optimal way to recognize production is at the point of
completion. This ties the bonus, and in turn worker input,
directly to the effort required at the point at which it was ex
erted. In this way the performance-reward contingency has
its strongest bridge. Unfortunately, it is often very difficult
or impossible for an organization to measure its productivity
in this manner. In other instances, a product produced
recognition system could be financially dysfunctional.
There are three important reasons why organizations can
not measure production at the time of performance. In small
organizations, the information system is not sufficiently
sophisticated to value changes in inventory each month.
Recognition of production at the point of shipment is the
easiest and frequently the only way to measure performance.
In other instances studied, the manufacturers of large
equipment found that many products required a significantly
longer production cycle than one month. Since these firms
manufacture directly to customer order, they recognize pro
duction at the point of completion, which is generally the
same as shipment. Sometimes, the large scale nature of the
production requires a moving-average formula or a quarterly
calculation and payout system. Recognition of production at
the point of shipment is also necessitated when price fluctua
tions make the precise value of the production in doubt at
the point of completion.
Financial considerations appear to play a major role in the
decision of program designers to account for production at
the point of shipment. This is a safer formula as the firm
pays its employee bonus closer to point of receipt of payment
for the product. In firms that experience periods where in-
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ventory is significantly increased, no bonus is paid until the
inventory is shipped. In a recognition at point of production
system, a bonus would be paid which could adversely affect
the firm's cash position. Although not frequently recogniz
ed, this probably represents yet another hidden cost of
building inventory.
Recognizing accomplishment at the point of shipment
rather than production breaks the tie between performance
and reward. Thus there have been instances where a large
bonus was paid during a period in which production was
low, worker efforts minimal, and even several where many
workers were laid off. This can raise the spectre of bonus
formula manipulation and can reduce employee understand
ing of the relationship between their efforts and organiza
tional effectiveness.

Benefits from the Bonus Program
Puckett (1958) has summarized the beneficial aspects that
underlie the measurement and design of the Scanlon bonus
system. Many of his ideas are applicable to Rucker, Improshare and other forms of gainsharing.
(1) The group bonus promotes cooperation rather than
competition.
(2) The calculation of the ratio has educational implica
tions for the organization; that is, it forces members
to be aware of, and understand, key variables.
(3) Labor costs are a measure closer to work force con
trols.
(4) The standard is based upon the workforce's previous
performance.
(5) There is a monthly payout, that is, results are provid
ed as close as possible to when they are earned.
(6) The bonus is paid as a percentage of wages, that is, it
approximates the contribution.
(7) The measurement process is a part of the productivity
program. This opens up many dimensions for pro-
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ductivity improvement besides working harder. It is
used to communicate results and for generating fur
ther discussion.
Among the most important aspects of the bonus is the
education of the workforce. In interviews with union officers
and hourly workers, there was, in some firms, a greater
understanding of the firms' economic position. However,
the three formulas can be complex and some firms did a far
better job of explaining to the workforce the operation and
meaning of the performance indicators. The process of
economic education is more fully addressed in chapter 6.

Bonus Formula Manipulation
One of the most sensitive issues in gainsharing plans is the
fairness and equity of the bonus formula. In unionized set
tings, all but two of the sites studied utilized external con
sultants to develop the bonus formula. This appears to be a
preferred strategy since neutrality in the development of the
bonus formula is essential. In nonunion settings, consultants
are sometimes, but not universally, used.
Through the life of a gainsharing program, the need may
arise for a revision of the bonus formula. This occurs when
there is new technology or other changes, for example, when
the price of materials or supplies rises sharply or quality
changes occur. Improshare Plans provide for a one time
buyout when the formula works too well to the employees'
advantage. Although none of the Scanlon or Rucker sites
studied had buyout provisions, presumably a similar strategy
would be available.
It is more common in Scanlon and Rucker Plans to utilize
the consultants on an annual basis to review the soundness of
the bonus formula. If changes are required, they can be im
plemented by the consultants. If management and the
employees/union are confident of the consultant's neutrali
ty, this normally goes very smoothly.
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Frequency of Payout
Most Scanlon and Rucker Plans calculate and pay a bonus
monthly, with a thirteenth payment being the end of the year
distribution of the reserve. Improshare Plans normally
calculate their bonuses monthly and payout weekly. There
were, however, several sites which made their calculations
weekly and paid a bonus on the same basis.
Some sites used a quarterly bonus calculation and distribu
tion. This is done when the product production cycle is
longer than one month, or where production or sales do not
follow a relatively even flow throughout the year. Other sites
used a weekly moving average formula with a monthly
distribution system.

Role of the Union
As the bargaining representative for the employees in all
of these situations, the role of the union cannot be ignored.
In each instance the union must either agree to the interven
tion formally, or at least give its tacit approval. Several firms
attempted to implement programs (e.g., Quality Circles)
without union approval, only to find an agitated union
leadership working against employee support for the pro
gram.
The companies and unions in this study frequently includ
ed provisions for their intervention in the collective bargain
ing agreement. In other instances a similar result was reached
through a memorandum of understanding between the par
ties. Informal union approval was given in at least two in
stances.
Union leaders serve on the Screening Committees of the
Scanlon and Rucker Plans, and Quality of Worklife pro
grams. In this role, the union leadership has a direct impact
on decisions affecting the operation of the program. The
union may aid in giving shape and direction to the effort and
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may provide support and encouragement to management to
continue its efforts. In these settings the most important task
for the union is to insure that the cooperative process does
not invade the jurisdiction of the collective bargaining agree
ment and, in particular, the grievance procedure. Union
leaders would also normally serve on an Improshare Bonus
Committee, or if there were no committee, would at least be
briefed on the operation of the bonus.
The most significant role for the union exists in the LaborManagement Committees. The focus of the L-MC interven
tion is on the attitudinal relationship between the key union
actors and the key managers. The L-MC process exposes the
parties' entire relationship, historical, present, and future,
for review and analysis. The success of the L-MC process is
determined by the degree of direct company and union com
mitment to the process. With gainsharing and QWL projects
the union can be a passive observer. However, the L-MC
process requires active participation and may require
changes in union organization and leadership roles.

Impact on Management Style
Scanlon Plans, Quality Circles, and some forms of Quality
of Worklife projects require substantial changes in manage
ment style. Management must truly want employee par
ticipation and must be ready to listen to employee ideas and
accept employee criticisms. The experience of many of the
research sites studied indicates that once the process of
employee participation begins, it is very difficult to return to
the old style of traditional management.
Rucker Plans require only minimal changes in manage
ment style, while it is clear that Improshare fits very well into
a traditional, authoritarian organization.
Labor-Management Committees require that management
change its approach to union-management relations and its
methods of operations. An effective L-MC process requires
management to be open with the union in discussing prob-
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lems, that it trust the union to be responsible in processing
solutions, and that it be willing to listen to the union when it
raises sensitive and embarrassing issues.

Conclusions
Each of these interventions can produce positive results.
The key factor is to find an intervention that is most ap
propriate for a particular organizational situation. Listed
below are four issues of overriding importance.
1. What problems confront the organization? Im
mediate improvements in productivity can sometimes
be made with gainsharing. Quality improvements and
cost reductions can be achieved with QCs, unionmanagement relations can be positively affected by
L-MCs, and QWL projects can improve job satisfac
tion and lead to longer term improvements in perfor
mance.
2. Which intervention best fits the state of the organiza
tion and the values of its members? A poor labor rela
tions environment is no place for a Scanlon Plan, 3
Quality Circles, or many QWL projects. Nor do these
programs seem appropriate for an authoritarian
management style. Ruh, Wallace, and Frost (1973)
have shown that favorable management attitudes
toward employee participation can influence the suc
cess of the Scanlon Plan. Do employees want greater
involvement? Gilson and Lefcowitz (1957) have
shown that lack of interest by employees can cause
workplace involvement strategies to fail.
3. Is the management sufficiently competent to manage
employee involvement? Some managements are not
sufficiently competent to evaluate employee ideas and
suggestions. In other cases, management is too
threatened to accept change.
4. Is the union leadership politically stable and secure?
Does the leadership view cooperation as an avenue
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for improving the well-being of the union's members?
A cooperative strategy can become a political issue in
a union with an unstable leadership situation. The
union's leaders must view cooperation as capable of
producing results that could not otherwise be achiev
ed through collective bargaining.

NOTES
1. A major union-management intervention that was not part of this
research in a substantial way was profit-sharing. It is hoped that this will
be corrected in subsequent studies. Persons interested in profit-sharing
should consider the work of B.L. Metzger (1981 and 1975).
2. There are reports of at least one or two companies with Improshare
Plans that have highly developed structures for employee participation.
3. An exception to this might be where closing is imminent.

Chapter 5
The Process of Change
and Cooperation
in Unionized Settings
Introduction
In this chapter the questionnaire data on the process
leading to cooperation and union-management perceptions
of cooperation are presented. Completed questionnaires
were available from all of the management interviews (33)
and from 19 union representatives. There were 18 usable
matched questionnaires. 1 The five questionnaires from the
nonunion sites were omitted from this portion of the
analysis.
The theoretical models discussed in chapter 2 served to
guide this segment of the research. In particular, the
Kochan-Dyer model of organizational change in unionized
settings and the Schuster model of labor-management pro
ductivity program effectiveness prompted many of the ques
tions which were posed to union and management officials.
This section examines the following process issues: (1) the
stimulus for change; (2) the process leading up to the initial
commitment to the change program; and (3) the operational
issues in the design of the interventions. Following that
discussion is a presentation of the perceptual data on the im
pact of the union-management programs. Tables 5-1
111
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through 5-4 summarize the data. Each table contains both
the union and management responses, with the union
response in parentheses.

The Stimulus for Change
An effort was made to identify and assess the factors that
caused companies and unions to enter into cooperative
strategies. Union and management respondents were posed a
single open-ended question which asked them to rank order
the three primary reasons for discussions leading to the
cooperative labor-management program. These responses
were later summarized into 16 categories. Table 5-1
demonstrates the wide variation in reasons for union and
company participation in cooperative ventures. There were
13 different reasons given for company involvement, and 14
distinct explanations for union participation in cooperative
programs.
Two major stimuli for company participation stand out:
the need to improve productivity and the need to improve
labor-management relations. Across all 33 firms the need to
improve productivity was cited 26 times, while improving
labor relations was indicated 16 times. Yet another common
reason for the interventions was as a new compensation
system (11 firms). Union participation in cooperative ven
tures appears to be motivated by a desire to improve wages (5
sites) and in recognition of the need to raise productivity (5
sites).
When the management responses for the need to improve
productivity are combined with the responses of economic
survival (5 responses) and foreign and domestic competition
(6 responses), there is clear evidence that economic dif
ficulties of the 1970s and 80s have forced a reassessment of
company policy toward collaboration with their employees
and unions. That 11 firms cited a need to improve labormanagement relations as the most important stimulus for
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cooperation, 16 overall, highlights the growing recognition
among managers that this aspect of their company's opera
tions may have been neglected for too long. Since LaborManagement Committees, Scanlon Plans, and to a lesser ex
tent the other interventions require active participation by
the chief operating officers of the plant or company, these
groups of managers appear willing to commit themselves to
working with employees and unions toward improvements in
labor-management relations and increased organizational ef
fectiveness.
Table 5-1
Management and Union Responses
to the Stimulus for Change and Cooperation
Stimulus
Economic Survival
Improve Productivity
For/Dom Competition
Corporate Pressure
Improve L-M Relations
Improve Communications
Motivational Technique
Problemsolving Technique
New Compensation System
Improve Wages
Reduce Turnover
Company Proposal
Job Security
Improve Working
Conditions
Improve Quality
Improve Relationship
Between Direct/Indirect
Employees
No response/NA

Rank Order
123
3
6
3
11
2
1
2
4
~
~
-

1

1

Total
5
26
6
2
16
7
6
2
11
5
1
~
-

(5)
(1)

7
1
~
- (1)
-- (2)

3
2
2
5 0)
3 (2)
3
2 (1)
2
1
—
~

-- (1)
1 (1)

-~

- (2)
1

~ (3)
2 (1)

0 (15)

-2 (20)

1 (4)
7 (23)

1 (4)

(2)
(1)
(3)
(7)
(1)
(2)

17 (5)
1 (1)
-~ (1)

2
2 (1)
- (2)

(4)
(2)
(2)
(3)
(3)
(7)
(2)
(3)
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The number of managers who cited as a stimulus the need
to develop a new compensation (incentive) system raises a
note of concern. An observation from this research, sup
ported by several interviewees, was that too many companies
rely on incentive programs to manage employee work ef
forts, rather than on competent supervision. More impor
tant, overemphasis on the incentive aspects of the gainsharing plans is contrary to the full thrust of these programs. The
participation, involvement, sharing of ideas and informa
tion, and building of trust in the organization, all integral
aspects of gainsharing plans, may not be fully realized when
the primary reason for the change is to replace an out-ofdate incentive system or to create one where none existed
before.
Several union respondents failed to fully answer this ques
tion, but of those who did, a sizable proportion saw improv
ing wages (7 responses) as the stimulus to enter into the
cooperative program. A sizable proportion of union
respondents (5 responses) also recognized the need to im
prove productivity.
Thus both from the management and labor point of view,
the stimulus for change and cooperation is based almost ex
clusively upon pragmatic concerns, such as the need to im
prove productivity, increase wages, strengthen the economic
well-being of the company, improve labor-management rela
tions, address payment systems difficulties, and solve other
organizational problems. There was no discussion in any of
the interviews of the need to increase worker control or to
give cooperation and change of a more political emphasis, as
might be found in Western Europe. The stimulus for
American union-management cooperation and employee
participation is entirely consistent with the ideology of the
American industrial relations system. Cooperation is based
upon a series of pragmatic responses to environmental prob
lems impacting upon the employment relationship.
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The Process of Change
Table 5-2 presents the management and union responses to
a series of forced-choice questions related to the process of
change. Open-ended questions were used to supplement this
analysis. The questions focused on: (1) whether efforts had
been made to resolve the stimulus issues in collective
bargaining; (2) the existence of coalitions to block the pro
grams; (3) the use of neutrals and consultants; and (4) the
degree to which the program was viewed as instrumental in
resolving the stimulus issues.
The limited data in table 5-2 substantiate several
theoretical propositions concerning union-management
change and cooperation. Seventy-three percent of the
management and 72 percent of the union respondents in
dicated that they had unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the
stimulus issues in collective bargaining. Thus, as predicted in
the Kochan-Dyer model, change in union-management set
tings is only likely to occur when the parties' traditional
method of interaction (collective bargaining) is ineffective in
resolving the stimulus issues. This finding has important
practical and policy implications.
The existence of political opposition to a change program
was also suggested by Kochan and Dyer as an obstacle to im
plementation. As expected, the data in table 5-2 show this to
be a more significant problem for the union (33 percent) than
for management (19 percent). Companies will need to be sen
sitive to internal union politics when collaborating on change
programs.
Political pressures within the union can pose serious dif
ficulties for even the most secure union leadership. Although
this opposition oftentimes only represents a vocal minority,
it can constrict the maneuverability of the leadership. Op
position coalitions are a potential obstacle to cooperation in
both the initial stages of discussion and once the cooperative
program has been implemented.
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Table 5-2
Management and Union Responses
to the Process of Change
No
Yes

Resolution via Collective Bargaining
Percent
Opposition Coalitions
Percent
Use of Neutrals/Consultants3
Percent
Instrumentality of the Program
not very useful
questioned usefulness
might have been useful
somewhat useful
very useful

8 (5)
24 (13)
24 (28)
73 (72)
24 (12)
6 (6)
75 (66)
19 (33)
4
28
13
88
Frequency Percent
(1)
(5)
(2)
10 (6)
19 (5)
1
1
1

NA
1(15)
3
2(15)
6
1

3 (5)
3(26)
3(11)
31 (32)
59 (26)

a. Includes only management responses.

In the sample of relationships studied, several ways were
used to reduce the likelihood of this occurring. First, realistic
understandings of what the cooperative process meant were
achieved at the outset. This can defuse the initial assumption
that the leadership has been co-opted or has sold out to
management. Second, vocal skeptics were brought into the
process as visiting attendees at meetings or by giving them
committee responsibilities. Third, union members were kept
informed through the posting of committee minutes and
other union and company communications efforts. Fourth,
and most important of all, management representatives were
sensitive to this problem and in several instances avoided
creating situations which might compromise the union
leadership. Finally, some union leaders chose to play an
oversight role rather than direct role in the operation of the
program.
A very common problem is the lack of skill possessed by
the parties in devising and implementing cooperative
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strategies. Several theoretical models suggest the necessity
for qualified consultants. There is presently no shortage of
consultants available to assist the parties. However, many of
these consultants are not qualified to work in unionized set
tings. There are inherent differences between union and
nonunion settings which must be recognized when devising
change strategies. There appears to be a limited supply of
neutrals and consultants who possess both a wide array of
behavioral science training and a thorough background in
the mechanics and implications of the collective bargaining
agreement.
The data in table 5-2 show that in 88 percent of the in
terventions neutrals or consultants were utilized. In most
cases the consultants appeared reasonably well-qualified in
the labor relations area. In one instance involving a LaborManagement Committee which eventually recommended an
elaborate Quality of Worklife program, interview data
strongly suggested that the consultants did not fully under
stand the labor relations environment. In this instance the in
tervention failed. The Labor-Management Committees
which were guided by the expertise of an Area LaborManagement Committee appeared to be more effective than
those L-MCs which operated independently.
The item measuring instrumentality produced one of the
most interesting findings. It is apparent that union leaders do
not perceive labor-management cooperation efforts as being
as likely to succeed as their management counterparts. Only
26 percent of the union leaders viewed the effort as being
"very useful," as compared to 59 percent for the manage
ment respondents. Thirty-one percent of the union represen
tatives were skeptical of the intervention as compared to only
6 percent for the management respondents. Perhaps the
management respondents believed that their organization
and careers could derive greater benefits from cooperation
than did their union counterparts. Moreover, since most
change programs were first proposed by the company,
management representatives would be more likely to view
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the effort as having a greater potential in solving organiza
tional problems. Union leaders, being on the receiving end of
a long stream of management proposals to improve an
assortment of employee and performance difficulties would
be more likely to be skeptical.

Operational Issues
The focus of this section is on the relationship between the
intervention and the grievance procedure, guarantees of
employment security, and opportunities for employee par
ticipation, changes in training programs, and the structure of
the bonus sharing formula.Table 5-3 presents the manage
ment responses to the questionnaire items on the structural
aspects of the change program. Only the management
responses have been used because they constitute the larger
sample and the data provided could be verified by other
documents and records. On the gainsharing and training
variables, the union sample was combined with the nonunion
sample to equal 38 sites. Once again, there are several in
teresting and important findings.
The theoretical (Kochan and Dyer 1976) and conventional
(Ahern 1978) wisdom has been that the cooperative process
should be kept separate from the negotiations process and
grievance procedure. This principle is frequently raised as a
means of reducing resistance to initial participation in a
cooperative venture. Seventy-three percent of the
cooperative efforts prohibit the program from overlapping
the grievance procedure. This is considered an important ele
ment in maintaining the proper relationship between the
traditional collective bargaining process and the cooperative
endeavor. However, at eight sites, the program did overlap
the grievance procedure. As a practical matter, the
cooperative process can only be kept separate from the
negotiations and grievance procedures when the parties are
addressing relatively minor problems. As the parties begin to
discuss significant issues affecting their relationship, they
will oftentimes find that it is difficult to achieve and main-
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tain this separation, as the cooperative and traditional pro
cesses are frequently intertwined. An example of this would
be the case of the Labor-Management Committee which ex
amined the issue of limited promotion and job mobility op
portunities within the bargaining unit—a meaningful and ap
propriate issue for the cooperative process. Because parties'
collective bargaining agreement clearly specified both man
ning and job assignment rules, a potential conflict was thus
created. The critical issue in these cases is how to maintain
the integrity of the traditional process, while at the same time
utilizing the cooperative process to the fullest extent. Three
distinct problem areas were identified.
Table 5-3
_____Design of Union-Management Interventions_______
NA
No
Yes
Overlap Grievance Procedure
Percent
Job Security Guarantees
Percent
Job Guarantees in Contract
Percent
Employee Participation
Percent
Training Supervisors/Stewards
Percent
Changed Skill Traininga
Percent
Bonus Sharing Program3
Percent
Basis of Bonus Distribution3
Group
Plantwide
Other/NA
Frequency of Bonus Distribution3
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Other/NA
a. Includes both union and nonunion firms.

8
24
3
9
2
67
27
81
20
61
10
29
28
74
Frequency

24
73
29
88
1
33
5
15
13
39
24
71
10
26

1
3
1
3
30
1
3
4

Percentage

9
19
10

32
68

9
14
4
11

33
52
15
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The first problem area arises when a matter that is the sub
ject of an active grievance is raised in the cooperative pro
cess. An often-used strategy is for an active grievance to be
treated as solely within the jurisdiction of the grievance pro
cedure, whereas issues which cause or have caused grievances
are appropriate issues for the cooperative process.
A second problem area occurs when change, particularly
meaningful change, requires modification of, or additions
to, the collective bargaining agreement. This occurs when the
participants to the cooperative process determine that their
relationship would be best served by incorporating their ac
complishments into the "web of rules" of the collective
agreement. A question often arises as to when and how this
is to be accomplished. In some instances, a memorandum of
understanding is executed and appended to an existing agree
ment. In other cases, however, the parties delay change until
the next round of negotiations and incorporate it into a new
agreement.
The third problem area is whether the cooperative process
should be suspended during negotiations. The fear expressed
in these situations is that aggressive tactics at the bargaining
table in the pursuit of distributive goals will upset the ten
tative trust and good faith established in the cooperative pro
cess. No clear solution has emerged, and situations could be
found where either strategy has been successful. There is no
doubt, however, that when the cooperative process is effec
tive, it reduces the conflict inherent in the traditional collec
tive bargaining process.
Although a great deal has been written about Japanese
management systems and their provisions for guaranteed
employment, the presence of meaningful job security
guarantees on the American labor relations scene has yet to
occur. Just three (9 percent) of the firms provided any form
of employment security guarantees. Of these, one was a pre
existing supplemental unemployment benefits plan, another
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was a "best efforts to maintain employment" provision, and
in only one case was there a contract clause providing for
"no loss of employment" as a result of the intervention.
Twenty-eight sites (88 percent) had no provision for employ
ment security. It should be noted, however, that job security
was an often discussed issue by both union and management
respondents. Yet, there does not seem to be very much in
terest in attempting to institutionalize job protections.
One of the most dramatic changes taking place in the
American industrial relations system is the increase in
employee participation at the workplace ("The New In
dustrial Relations" 1981). In this research, 27 (84 percent)
firms provided for some structure for employee involve
ment. Although this is only a general finding, it does indicate
that a significant shift is taking place in management and
union attitudes about the proper role for employee participa
tion. Through the qualitative data collection, other questions
such as the amount and quality of employee participation
were addressed. Some of these findings will be discussed in
the next chapter.
As was discussed in chapter 3 several of the interventions
require changes in management style and an expanded role
for the union. It would be expected that these changes could
not be instituted without properly preparing the organiza
tion. At 20 firms (61 percent), training programs for super
visors and/or union stewards were part of the institution and
maintenance of the change effort.
In addition, as employee involvement increased, employee
skill training requirements were found to change. Two
primary reasons surfaced in the qualitative data collected.
First, employee involvement permitted workers to bring to
the attention of company decisionmakers the need for addi
tional training to adequately perform existing jobs. Second,
one result of employee involvement at several sites was an ex
pression of worker interest in job restructuring. For exam
ple, at least one firm added inspection functions to produc-
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tion jobs which necessitated training on computer measure
ment machinery.
To examine the gainsharing aspects of the interventions,
the nonunion sample was combined with the union sample.
Twenty-nine (74 percent) of the 38 sites had a bonus sharing
program. Of these, 18 (67 percent) paid a bonus on a plantwide basis and 9 (33 percent) on a group bonus system. Over
half the gainsharing plans (14 sites) paid a bonus on a
monthly basis, while nine paid a weekly bonus, and four
paid quarterly.

Perceptions of the Impact of Change
Effective union-management cooperation should have a
positive impact on labor-management relations and on the
process of improving productivity. Respondents were given
an eight-item, forced-choice instrument which asked: "To
what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the follow
ing statements relating to union involvement on productivity
issues?" Four other items dealt with perceptions of hostility
and cooperation in the overall union-management relation
ship, on the specific issue of productivity, on top manage
ment commitment to productivity improvement, and on the
role the union should play in the area of plant productivity
improvement. The results are provided in table 5-4. Once
again union responses are in parentheses.
The responses to Item 9 seemed to indicate that company
and union respondents believed their relationships were
somewhat to very cooperative (81 percent for management,
83 percent for the union). More important, the parties
agreed on the state of their relationship, as the correlation
between management and union responses was .62 (p< .01).
Similarly, the respondents seemed to believe that there was a
good deal of cooperation on the specific issue of productivi
ty. Seventy-three percent of the management respondents

Table 5-4
Management and Union Perceptions of the Impact of Change

(1) The union involvement has reduced
friction between the union
and the company.
(2) The union involvement has
provided important information
for making decisions.
(3) The union involvement has resulted
in some major improvements in the
productivity of the plant.
(4) The union involvement has
resulted in higher productivity
in the plant.
(5) The union involvement has resulted
in a better understanding of other
labor-management issues.
(6) The union has harassed
the company without
any benefit.

Strongly
disagree
—

Disagree

Agree

Strongly
agree

7/22%

15/47%

10/31%

-~

(9/50%)
8/24%

(6/33%)
21/64%

(3/17%)
4/12%

1/3%

(3/17%)
14/44%

(12/67%)
(15/47%

(3/17%)
2/6%

-3/9%

(4/22%)
10/31%

(8/44%)
18/56%

(6/33%)
1/3%

-~

(5/28%)
3/10%

(7/39%)
19/61%

(6/33%)
9/29%

-8/25%

(4/22%)
21/66%

(11/61%)
2/6%

(3/17%)
1/3%

(7/38%)

(9/50%)

(2/11%)

--

Correlation
union/mgt.
response
.13
-.34
NA
.56**

.20
.34
(continued)

Table 5-4 (continued)

Strongly
disagree
(7) The union has aided in bringing

productivity issues to the attention
of higher management officials.
(8) The union involvement has aided
in getting the workers to accept
the suggested changes.
Very
hostile
(9 ) Overall, how would y<ou
rate the degree of hos
tility or cooperation that
exists in the unionmanagement relationship
in your plant?

Somewhat
hostile
3/9%

Disagree

Agree

Strongly
agree

11/33%

19/58%

3/9%

(3/17%)
9/27%

(8/44%)
20/61%

(7/39%)
4/12%

(4/22%)

(11/61%)

(3/17%)

Largely
indifferent
3/9%

Somewhat
cooperative

Very
cooperative

16/48%

11/33%

Correlation
union/mgt.
response
.48*

-.01

Corr.

.62*'
(1/6%)

(2/11%)

(11/61%)

(4/22%)

(10) In terms of your rela
tionship with the union
(mgt.) on the specific
matters relating to
productivity, how would
you rate the degree of
hostility or cooperation
that occurs?

1/3%

3/9%

5/15%

18/55%

.54*

(2/11%)

Not

Weakly

(2/11%)

Generally

6/19%
3/10%
(11) To what extent do you
feel top management is
committed to improving
productivity in this
(8/44%)
(1/6%)
(1/6%)
plant?
(12) Which of the following best describes the role you feel the union .
productivity?

(12/67%)

(2/11%)
Very
strongly

Strongly
8/26%

Corr.

14/45%

.38
(1/6%)
(7/39%)
should play in the area of plant

The union should not be involved in any way in making major
productivity decisions.
The union should be consulted before management makes major productivity
decisions, but management makes the final decision.
The union should have about equal say in making major productivity decisions.
*p<.05, **p<.01

6/18%

Management

Union

33/33%

12/67%
6/33%
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and 78 percent of the union respondents believed that their
relationship on productivity issues was at least somewhat
cooperative. Here again, there was significant agreement
between respondents with the same organization (r=.54,
p<.05).
One general area where there was less agreement was on
the commitment of top management to improving plant pro
ductivity. Fifty-six percent of the union respondents did not
believe management was strongly committed to productivity
improvement. Only 6 percent believed that management was
very strongly committed to productivity improvement, in
contrast to 45 percent of the company respondents. Perhaps
even more interesting, 29 percent of the management
respondents did not believe that their superiors were strongly
committed to productivity improvement.
There was universal agreement among managers on the
role of the union on productivity issues with all 33 indicating
that consultation was appropriate. Most union respondents
agreed, however a substantial minority (33 percent) of the
union respondents suggested that somewhat more involve
ment in productivity issues was appropriate.
On the individual perception items, union respondents
tended to claim greater credit for improvements than
management respondents were willing to recognize. This was
particularly true on the specific issue of bringing productivi
ty issues to the attention of higher management (Item 7) and
on raising plant productivity (Item 9). These two issues,
however, were the only two where there was general agree
ment between paired responses, r= .48 (p<.05) and r= .56
(p< .01), respectively. In addition, union respondents believ
ed their organization deserved more credit for making major
productivity improvements (Item 3).
Although both union and management respondents felt
that unions did provide important information for making
productivity decisions (Item 2), there was significant
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disagreement among the paired respondents, r = -.34, (n.s.).
Also, on general issues related to labor-management rela
tions, there was disagreement and low correlation between
the management and union respondents. In Item 1, more
union respondents (50 percent to 22 percent) did not believe
the cooperative effort had reduced friction between the
union and the company, and fewer (17 percent to 31 percent)
did believe it had reduced friction. The correlation between
the paired respondents was also low, r=.13, (n.s.). On
" reaching a better understanding of other labormanagement issues" (Item 5), a similar pattern of responses
was evident, with management perceiving more benefit from
the effort than the union.
This supports a proposition which has rarely been argued:
that union-management cooperation works more to the ad
vantage of management than the union and the workers
(Peterson, Leitko & Miles 1981). Such a continued finding
would have very significant policy implications for the prac
tice of industrial relations. On the other hand, it may be that,
as Kochan, Dyer, and Lipsky (1977) found in their study of
safety committees, there is a tendency for management
respondents to give a more socially acceptable response. If
that were the case, it would certainly diminish the value of
these findings. However, since both successful and unsuc
cessful programs were studied and there is reasonable
variability in management responses, this probably did not
occur in this research. In addition, on at least four key items
there were significant correlations between the management
and union responses.

Conclusions
There is wide variation in the stimulus or reasons for
union-management cooperation. But clearly, improving pro
ductivity, labor-management relations and wages are among
the most important. In spite of this fact, cooperation will not
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occur if the stimulus issues can be resolved in collective
bargaining. When the parties actually begin to move to a
cooperative mode, neutrals or consultants facilitate the pro
cess.
One outcome of the upswing in cooperation has been an
increase in employee participation at the workplace.
Although employers are more willing to encourage this in
volvement, providing guarantees of employment security to
workers appears to be as alien a concept as it has been
historically. Consistent with this finding are two others on
the potential and actual impact of cooperation. In both in
stances, management respondents perceived that coopera
tion was more instrumental in attaining program goals and
believed there were more benefits from the cooperative ef
fort than did the union respondents. In the next chapter, the
impact of cooperation on organizational performance is
discussed.

NOTES
1. Two other local union presidents were interviewed, but these question
naires were not usable.

Chapter 6
The Impact of
Union-Management Cooperation
This chapter presents the results of the impact assessments
of union-management cooperation programs. The chapter is
divided into two parts. First is an overall summary of the
performance of the entire sample of 38 plants. Although not
all the sites provided data on all of the variables, the
assembled data constitute one of the most in-depth evalua
tions available on this subject. In addition to the impact
assessments, it was possible to consider some of the deter
minants of success. Readers are referred to the Schuster
model, presented in chapter 2, that guided this research.
In Part Two, individual case histories are presented to il
lustrate the diversity of patterns in the practice of
cooperative union-management relations. In this section,
both successful and unsuccessful cases are included. Each
case demonstrates why a plant effort was successful or some
of the factors that contributed to its failure and demise. In
addition to presenting statistical data of plant performances,
visual data are utilized to further illustrate the impact of
cooperative strategies.

Summary of Performance Changes

Impact Assessments
This section summarizes the performance changes at all 38
research sites. Ten measures of performance were calculated.
129
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These were time-series level and drift changes for productivi
ty, quality, employment, turnover, absenteeism, tardiness,
and grievances, plus data on the frequency of productivity
bonus payments, program survival after two and five years,
and rater effectiveness.
Two notes of caution must be made concerning the sum
marization of data. First, not all the sites provided data on
all the variables. This was primarily the case on variables
such as tardiness and grievances. Most firms do not keep
records of this information, and many of those that could
provide the information refused to do so because of the staff
time needed to summarize it in a reasonable fashion. Second,
as was discussed in chapter 4, some variables were not ex
pected outcomes of the programs. Thus it would have been
expected that productivity did not increase for some LaborManagement Committees since improving labormanagement relations was the goal of the intervention and
productivity improvement only a desired by-product.
Table 6-1 presents the summary of the level and drift
changes. It should be recalled that a level change is an abrupt
change in performance when the post-cooperation observa
tions are compared with the pre-cooperation observations,
while a drift change is a gradual change over time. Table 6-1
categorizes the performance variables into three categories:
Positive Impact, No Impact, and Negative Impact. 1
Of the 23 sites providing productivity data 11 (49 percent)
had a positive level change, 10 (43 percent) had no change,
and 2 (9 percent) were negative. On trend, 4 had positive
changes, 12 had no change, and 7 a negative impact. Many in
this latter group of 7 represent situations where there was a
positive level change, followed by a decline. For the most
part quality improved or was unchanged in both level and
drift, although data were provided by only 4 sites.
A more interesting finding comes from the employment
data. Historically, cooperation and productivity improve-

Table 6-1
Summary of Intervention Impact on Performance
Positive
impact

Trend change
No
impact

Negative
impact

Not
available

2
(9%)

4
(17%)

12
(52%)

7
(30%)

15

2
(50%)

1
(25%)

2
(50%)

2
(50%)

0
(0%)

34

6
(22%)
—

17
(63%)

4
(15%)

7
(26%)

14
(52%)

6
(22%)

11

6
(75%)

1
(12.5%)

5
(63%)

2
(25%)

30

2
(29%)
--

5
(71%)
--

2
(25%)
—

2
(29%)
~

4
(57%)

1
(14%)
--

31

1
(25%)

2
(50%)

1
(25%)

29

Positive
impact

Level change
No
impact

Negative
impact

Productivity

11
(49%)

10
(43%)

Quality

1
(25%)

Employment

Performance
measure

Turnover
Absenteeism
Tardiness
Grievances*

—

a. Only includes the unionized sample.

4
(100%)

1
~

1

37
TJ
£
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ment have been feared by unions and workers as leading to a
reduction in employment. Just the opposite was found in this
case. In 23 of 27 firms, employment either increased or was
unchanged following the intervention. Moreover, the long
term effect was positive or unchanged in 21 situations. The
analysis of this variable at each site was then compared with
industry employment data. The result was that employment
at the firm closely follows industry patterns and is probably
most influenced by industry conditions. There were,
however, several sites where the industry declined and the
firm remained stable or increased. Interview data from
management respondents suggest two reasons for this. First,
that the cooperative effort, particularly gainsharing, had
aided the plant in reducing unit costs, thus increasing its
ability to compete and enabling it to acquire a larger market
share. A second reason was a hesitancy to lay off workers
because the benefits of cooperation might be lost. Union and
worker militancy might increase as a result of the bitterness
of a layoff.
The level of turnover declined in two instances and was
unchanged in five. Tardiness declined in the one instance in
which it was measured. Grievance rates were only improved
in one of four sites studied, yet there were consistent reports
of improved union-management relations. One interesting
finding was that absenteeism was largely unchanged (71 per
cent) in level but did improve in two of seven instances. 2
Table 6-2 summarizes the bonus payout frequency, sur
vival (after two and five years), and rater effectiveness. Pay
ment of a bonus is one measure of organizational productivi
ty improvement. Of the 23 sites providing bonus data, 16 (70
percent) paid a bonus more than 50 percent of the time.
Thirty-two (84 percent) cooperative programs survived the
first two years, but four (11 percent) failed and two had not
yet reached the two-year anniversary. Cooperation con
tinued for five years in 14 of 16 sites where it had passed the
two-year mark. Finally, rater effectiveness, defined as the
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extent to which the program was meeting its stated goals and
objectives, was categorized by a single rater as being "very
or somewhat successful," "not much effect," or "somewhat
or very negative." Twenty-two (59 percent) cooperative ex
periments were characterized as having had a positive effect,
11 (29 percent) had not much effect, and 5 (13 percent) were
rated as having had a negative effect.
Table 6-2
Bonus, Survival, and Rater Effectiveness Summary
Bonus frequency

Survival
two years
five years

Rater effectiveness

NA

High

Low

16
(10%)

7
(30%)

Yes

No

NA

32
(84%)
14
(31%)

4
(37%)
2
(5%)

2
(5%)
22
(58%)

Positive
effect

No
effect

Negative
effect

22
(59%)

11
(29%)

5
(13%)

6

Determinants of the Effectiveness of Cooperative
Union-Management Programs
In chapter 2, five factors thought to influence cooperative
union-management program success were slated for em
pirical investigation and were also utilized in the descriptive
analysis later on in this chapter. These were guarantees of
employment security; a structure for employee participation;
the method, frequency, and amount of compensation pro
vided by the program; an effective acceptance strategy; and
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an appropriate workplace technology. Some of these issues
were also discussed in chapter 4 in the section on operational
issues.
Because of the small sample size, it is not possible to con
clusively report findings on the determinants of success.
Although cross-tabulations were performed, and Chi-square
statistics calculated, in many cases there were too many cells
with too few observations to provide a meaningful analysis.
However, the descriptive statistics do point to at least several
variables that might be possible determinants of success.
Each of these is briefly discussed as it relates only to produc
tivity improvement, since sample size for most of the other
variables is insufficient even for this level of analysis.
Readers are cautioned that these results must be treated as
preliminary.
Employment security
Guarantees of employment security were believed to in
fluence program success because of historic worker fears
that productivity improvement would reduce employment
opportunities. The widespread reporting of Japanese
management practices with their limited forms of lifetime
employment have been suggested as a model for the
American scene.
Contrary to the hypothesis, only three firms provided any
type of employment security guarantees. One Scanlon Plan
firm had a provision stating that no employees would lose
their jobs with the company as a result of a Scanlon sugges
tion. Another firm provided supplemental unemployment
benefits as part of a national agreement, but this was
unrelated to the cooperative program. A third site had provi
sions for a "best efforts" clause which would have
guaranteed very little job security. No additional firms pro
vided any other guarantees of employment security. This is
not to suggest that the subject was never discussed. It was a
topic that both union and management respondents in
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sizable numbers raised. Many firms told their employees that
increasing the economic performance of the company would
have a positive effect upon their future employment pros
pects. Many union leaders entered into cooperative ventures
with a strong hope and expectation that just such a result
would occur.
Nevertheless, the evidence points to an absence of formal
or informal provisions dealing with employment security
issues.
The structure for employee participation
It was hypothesized that opportunities for employee par
ticipation would influence cooperative program success.
Moreover, the greater the degree of employee participation,
the more successful the program would be. Because of small
cell sizes, this variable was combined into two factors:
departmental committees and plantwide/no opportunities
for employee participation.
Twenty-seven organizations permitted some form of
employee participation. However, the results for this prop
osition were largely inclusive. Of the 17 sites with some form
of employee involvement in which productivity data were
available, 8 had realized a position change in productivity
level, seven had no change, and two were down.
Examining the relationship between participation and pro
ductivity may be too narrow in focus. Many of the firms
with elaborate structures for worker involvement realized
many nonproductivity improvements (such as quality and
product design changes) through employee suggestions and
projects. In many situations, simply providing employees the
opportunity to be involved can produce a changed workplace
environment. On the other hand, because LaborManagement Committees provide for limited forms of
employee involvement, they were treated in the same manner
as those sites with departmental committees. Unless L-MCs

136

Impact

evolve to the stage of establishing departmental or sector
subcommittees, they provide very little meaningful employee
involvement. Thus, great care must be taken in interpreting
these inconclusive findings.
It must be noted that of all the interventions studied, the
Scanlon Plan seemed to have the strongest staying power.
Whether this had to do with the bonus formula, the high
level of employee participation, or some other factor is not
known. What can be said, however, is that other
productivity-sharing plans provided bonuses and had many
other features similar to the Scanlon Plan. What appears to
make the Scanlon Plan different is the commitment to, and
institutionalization of, a high level of employee involvement.
The method, frequency, and amount of compensation
Since many cooperative union-management programs
provided employees with an opportunity to share in produc
tivity improvements, it was suggested that the manner in
which employees were compensated would influence pro
gram success. It was hypothesized that large group (or plantwide) sharing mechanisms, distributions of payouts, and, if
available, large bonuses, would lead to program success.
Of the 38 firms (combined sample) studied, 28 contained
some financial sharing provisions. There were 19 sites with
plantwide distribution of productivity bonuses in which pro
ductivity data were available. Of these 19, 9 experienced an
upward movement in productivity level, 8 were classified as
unchanged, and 2 were down. Of the 4 sites with no sharing
provisions, 2 experienced a productivity gain and 2 did not.
There were 18 sites with plantwide sharing provisions.
Productivity data was available for 11. Of these 11, produc
tivity increased in 7, was unchanged in 3, and was lower in 1.
There were 9 sites with group distribution of bonuses. Of the
7 where productivity data were available, productivity was
higher at 1 site, unchanged at 5 sites and lower at 1.
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Thus, it would appear, subject to sample limitations, that
cooperative programs with plantwide sharing provisions are
preferable to those with group sharing provisions. The ra
tionale for a plantwide distribution strategy is to encourage
teamwork, cooperation, and ease of bonus administration.
Plantwide sharing of bonus earnings eliminates a major
problem that was detected at those plants with group-based
distributions. The group-based plans generally provide dif
ferential bonus earnings and this can create a problem of in
ternal equity and a high level of dissension regarding the pro
gram. This is particularly true when there is skepticism as to
the accuracy of the bonus sharing formula or standards of
performance.
An effective acceptance strategy
An effective acceptance strategy was defined as one that
included an active training program for first-level supervi
sion and union stewards, use of external consultants, and an
effective mechanism to communicate the activities of the
cooperative program.
Twenty sites (61 percent) had training programs for super
visors and stewards to facilitate the implementation of the
cooperative program. This is very important since such train
ing programs tend to produce a better understanding of the
goals and implications of the cooperative programs. Train
ing programs at this level of the organization can also work
to dismantle some of the hostility that often exists between
supervisors and stewards.
Productivity data were available at 12 of the 20 sites with
training efforts. Of these 12, productivity increased at 8 sites
and was unchanged in 4. Of those 13 sites where no training
was utilized, productivity data were available for 10. Of
those, productivity increased at 2, was unchanged at 6, and
was lower at 2. Thus, it would appear that training programs
should be conducted as part of any cooperative labormanagement intervention.
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Neutrals or consultants were involved in 28 of the 33 in
terventions (85 percent). Productivity data were available for
20 sites. Of these, 10 experienced a productivity gain, 8 were
unchanged, and 2 were lower. Third parties play an impor
tant role because companies and unions often do not fully
understand how to organize the cooperative processes. Ex
pert consultants are almost always essential in designing
productivity-sharing formulas. Not only do they provide
financial expertise, but they also enhance the fairness and
equity of the bonus.
There was a great deal of variability in how each of the
sites communicated the activities of their program and it was
decided not to attempt to categorize them. It is possible,
however, to note some of the more effective approaches. The
successful productivity-sharing plans took the employees
away from their work stations on company time to explain
the mechanics of their plans. These sites also printed
booklets describing their plans in detail and including many
commonly asked questions and answers. Many firms with
productivity-sharing plans stop work to publicly announce
the bonus each month and thereafter spend considerable
time explaining to their employees in plant and departmental
meetings why a bonus was earned or why the company and
employees failed to perform at a level to earn a bonus.
Most firms, regardless of type of cooperative program,
utilize bulletin boards and circulation of minutes of meetings
to keep participants informed of activities in other areas.
Elected members of employee committees are often permit
ted to bring visitors (other workers) to committee meetings
to increase their understanding of the cooperative process.
One large innovative firm has made the agendas of its labormanagement subcommittees part of its management infor
mation system. Thus, the plant manager receives a periodic
update of activities. When a project has failed to receive a
management response after 30 or 60 days, the plant manager
begins to ask questions.
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Technology
Technology was hypothesized to influence the success of
cooperative union-management programs for two reasons.
First, although these interventions change the structure of
the organization, it was believed that the structure and
technology should be congruent. Second, and most impor
tant, it was believed that in more capital intensive or
mechanized operations, workers would have fewer oppor
tunities to provide inputs into the production processes. This
would reduce the effectiveness of the cooperative effort, par
ticularly where a significant degree of employee participation
was expected.
The technology variable was measured using a Woodward
scale and later recast into more mechanized (mass produc
tion industries—production runs of over one week) and less
mechanized (more customized operations and those with
production runs of less than one week).
Productivity data were available for 10 sites that were less
mechanized and 12 that were more mechanized. The results
were contrary to what was expected. Of the less mechanized
sites, 3 had productivity gains and 7 were unchanged. Of the
more mechanized sites, 7 had productivity gains, 3 were un
changed, and 2 were lower. One interpretation of this find
ing may be that cooperative interventions can be effective in
a variety of situations; however, when workers increase their
efforts, the impact on productivity is greater in more
automated assembly situations.
Other factors related to success
Type of ownership appeared to influence success, with the
subsidiaries of large corporations more likely to achieve in
creases in productivity than family owned or corporate
enterprises. Perhaps these firms have more resources and
more capable management to facilitate the implementation
of the interventions. In addition, productivity level changes
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were more likely to occur with older work forces, but trend
changes were more likely to result with younger work
populations.

Case Studies of Cooperation
Ten case studies are presented in this section. 3 Each case
study was chosen because it offers some lesson or set of con
ditions to foster cooperation. Several cases were selected
because they highlight the difficulties and pitfalls that caused
the interventions to fail.
Case study 1 is the classic case of cooperation to save the
plant and the jobs of the workforce. Case study 2
demonstrates that a cooperative strategy can be used to
motivate the workforce and improve the quality of worklife.
Case study 3 provides evidence that it may take time for the
full benefits of cooperation to be realized. Case study 4
demonstrates the successful implementation of a labormanagement committee. Case study 5 combines three unionmanagement relationships that have been in existence for
more than ten years.
Cases 6-10 highlight the difficulties and problems of
cooperation. Case study 6 shows how a successful effort can
lose its effectiveness when fairness and equity in the bonus
formula are lost. Case study 7 demonstrates that not all in
terventions may be appropriate to all organizational settings
and union-management relationships. Case study 8 outlines
the failure of a labor-management committee to adequately
address the organization's problems, while 9 shows how
traditional labor-management issues can interfere with the
implementation and acceptance of QWL concepts. Finally,
case study 10 is a warning of the potential misuse of gainsharing.
Each case study contains a brief description of the plant
and its cooperative effort. For each case there is a statistical
summary table which includes point estimates of the level
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and drift of time-series at time t = 0 with associated
t-statistics. Estimation of post-intervention change in level
and drift with associated t-statistic permits an assessment of
the impact of the cooperative union-management efforts.
The numbers identifying each firm correspond to the site
numbers in table 3-2 and 3-3, thus enabling readers to fur
ther examine the characteristics of each plant.

Case Study 1: Cooperation to Save the Plant
Site 8 was a manufacturer of abrasive cut-off wheels for
cutting steel and other metals. The plant employed 140 pro
duction workers. In the late 1960s, the plant began to suffer
financial difficulties. During the period 1968-71 there were
four wildcat strikes and several work slowdowns. The plant
had operated with negotiated production standards which
were the source of considerable tension between manage
ment and the union. In 1971, after contract negotiations fail
ed, the corporation announced plans to close the plant for
economic reasons.
As a result of the decision to close the plant, the state
government and the international union district director
became involved. Through a series of hastily arranged tripar
tite negotiations, conditions were reached under which the
plant could remain open. Prior to the decision to close, the
Scanlon Plan had been under consideration but was rejected
by the corporation. Plant management was able to convince
corporate officials of the viability of the Plan as an alter
native to closing. The union also offered its full cooperation
to improve productivity and an end to negotiated work stan
dards. In return, management agreed to contractual
language which would preclude the layoff of workers as a
result of suggestions from the Scanlon committees.
The philosophy of the Scanlon Plan was expressed in the
program handbook:
The SPIP recognizes each employee as an in
dividual—each able to contribute to the group
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something more than just day-to-day work. The
plan provides a way to communicate ideas and sug
gestions to management, and to share in the
benefits of the improvements. Under the SPIP, the
Opportunity is provided for people to say how their
own jobs might best be done. It means all
employees thinking a little bit more about who gets
the job after his or her operation and how the job
might be made easier for them. The plan means
that the older, more experienced employee gives his
ideas on how the job should be done to the new
employee. It means that the younger employee may
be more physically able to help or make his con
tribution to the older employee. It means that
management makes decisions on what is good for
the company and not on what is good for any in
dividual.
Site 8's experience was analyzed for the period January
1969-December 1973, with the intervention point being
March 1971, the start of the Scanlon Plan. As table 6-3 in
dicates, there was an abrupt rise in productivity to a higher
and statistically significant level (t= 8.14, p< .001) following
introduction of the Scanlon Plan. This change is shown even
more dramatically in figure 6-1. Readers may notice that the
sharp increase in productivity began in the month prior to
the formal installation of the plan. This can be explained by
the threat posed by the shutdown and the decision of the
company to pay a bonus for the prior month's productivity
performance. For the first three years of the Plan, bonuses
averaged 4.0 percent, 4.4 percent, and 9.3 percent. The firm
was unable to provide monthly employment data. Instead,
annual data were provided. There was a layoff of 20 percent
of the bargaining units' employees in the six months prior to
the institution of the Plan. Following the introduction of the
Scanlon Plan employment stabilized.

Figure 6-1
Site 8 Productivity
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Table 6-3
Site 8 Summary
(Case 1)

Productivity
(N = 58, df=54)

Level

T-Stat

Lev Chg

T-Stat

19.94

30.97

6.89

8.14 +

Drift

T-Stat

Dft Chg

T-Stat

0.07

1.70

-0.05

-0.97

+ p<.001

This is a classic case of union-management cooperation to
save the business and in turn save the jobs of union
members. Scanlon enthusiasts have claimed that productivi
ty can "go through the roof." Although that is unlikely to be
a universal result, this firm certainly experienced a marked
increase in productivity, along with no reduction in employ
ment following the Plan's introduction. In subsequent years,
the Scanlon Plan continued to be successful and ten years
following its installation remained active.

Case Study 2: Cooperation to Motivate the Workforce
and Improve the Quality of Worklife
Site 4 is a plant of a large multinational corporation. The
plant housed two separate operating divisions. The larger
division manufactured original equipment for jet aircraft
engines, while the smaller division rehabilitated service-run
turbine parts to provide additional flying hours for the air
craft. From an organizational perspective, the two divisions
were distinct units. Each had a separate division manager
with key operating personnel reporting to one of these
managers, and both were independent profit centers.
However, the divisions shared common staff departments,
for example, accounting and personnel. More important,
there was only one union representing all the employees at
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the site and they were covered by a common collective
bargaining agreement. There was one Scanlon Plan encom
passing all employees of both divisions.
In two other situations in this study in which the manage
ment structure was similar, both companies opted to utilize
separate plans. Thus one company had two Rucker Plans in
nearby plants, while another company utilized four Improshare Plans with four operating divisions on the same
site. In both instances, the employees constituted one
bargaining unit with a single collective agreement and
separation into distinct plans caused friction, particularly
when differential bonuses were earned. The single-plan
strategy utilized at this site would seem to be the preferred
one.
The plant had 900-1000 nonsupervisory production
employees who had organized an independent union in 1952.
The history of labor relations at the plant had been relatively
peaceful. Strikes had been rare and of a short duration.
Although the union was an independent one, it had
negotiated continuous improvements in its contracts. Wages
and benefits were among the highest in the community.
The stimulus for the Plan stemmed from corporate en
couragement for workplace innovation and the desire of
local management to motivate a somewhat older workforce
and to improve productivity. The plant's top management
was strongly committed to the Scanlon philosophy. The
union leadership also saw benefits (greater role in the opera
tion of the plant, increased wages) for its members. This led
to the development, implementation and continued
strengthening of the structure for employee participation.
This site permits a detailed examination of the Scanlon Plan
in operation.
All Scanlon Plans have a two-level committee struc
ture—Production Committees designed along departmental
lines and a higher level Screening Committee. There were 26
Production Committees: 14 first shift, 10 second shift, and 2
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third shift committees. There were also committees of
salaried and clerical workers. The Production Committees
ranged in size from two to five employees elected (one-year
term) to serve on each committee and one managerial
employee appointed as chairperson by the company. The
committees met at least once a month on company time. To
increase employee participation, each elected member was
permitted to invite an employee from his/her area to attend
Production Committee meetings. The Production Commit
tees were responsible for discussing problems and respond
ing to suggestions within their jurisdictions. There were five
possible dispositions for employee suggestions:
(1) Accept and implement a suggestion. This can be done
when the cost does not exceed $225. When a sugges
tion is accepted, it is the responsibility of the commit
tee to inform the suggestor.
(2) Reject the suggestion. The Production Committee is
responsible for informing the suggestor of the reasons
for the rejection.
(3) Accept the suggestion and put it under investigation.
This is done when there is not enough information to
determine whether the savings involved would offset
the costs of putting it into effect.
(4) Accept the suggestion and refer it to the Screening
Committee. This occurs when the implementation
costs exceed $225.
(5) Reject the suggestion and refer it to the Screening
Committee. These are situations in which there is a
difference of opinion between the chairperson of a
Production Committee and an employee member
over the merits of a suggestion. It should be noted
that the chairpersons of the Production Committees
are appointed by management and maintain veto
power over decisions reached.
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In most Scanlon Plans, when a suggestion falls within the
jurisdiction of another Production Committee, it is normally
referred to the Screening Committee for a decision. At this
plant the approach differed. Where there was a potential
jurisdictional conflict concerning a suggestion, it was the
responsibility of the chairperson to obtain approval from
other Production Committees. Only when there was an ac
tual conflict was the suggestion referred to the Screening
Committee. Thus an attempt was made to maintain decisionmaking at the lowest level of the organization.
Selection of employee members for the Screening Com
mittee was also a function of the Production Committees.
The Production Committees selected an hourly represen
tative to attend an organizational meeting of the Screening
Committee. The first and second shifts had 14 and 10 Pro
duction Committees, respectively. At the Screening Commit
tee organizational meeting the 11 representatives from the
first shift must select five persons from their group to serve
on the Screening Committee. The second shift had four
seats. The third shift and office each had one seat. Those
Production Committees with no active members on the
Screening Committee are permitted to send a guest each
month.
The Screening Committee (organizational chart below)
had 21 members. The 21 included 11 elected employee
members, 9 managerial employees, and the union president
and a union representative appointed by him. The Screening
Committee meets at least once a month also on company
time. Its responsibilities include assisting the Production
Committees, reviewing the monthly bonus calculations with
a view toward identifying problems and opportunities, and
considering potential business problems. As with the Pro
duction Committees, management maintains decisionmaking authority on the Screening Committee.
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Two General Managers to Serve as Committee Chairpersons
Manufacturing Manager
Union President
Industrial Engineering Manager
Union Board Member
Engineering Manager
1st Shift Production Committee
Production Control Manager
Representatives (5)
Quality Control Manager
2nd Shift Production Committee
Personnel
Representatives (4)
Maintenance Superintendent
3rd Shift Production Committee
Representatives (1)
Office Departments
Representatives (1)

Through the first 45 months of meetings, employees had
made 1884 suggestions. Seventy percent had been accepted
and 7 percent were under review. In the first three years of
the Plan, bonuses averaged 5.9 percent, 6.5 percent, and 7.1
percent, respectively.
Productivity and employment data for Site 4 were analyz
ed for the periods January 1973-December 1977, and
December 1972-December 1977, respectively, with the in
tervention occurring in May 1975. This analysis is summariz
ed in table 6-4. Productivity was measured separately for
each division. For the manufacturing division there was a
significant upward shift in the level of the time-series follow
ing introduction of the Plan (t = 2.09, p<.05). Over time
there was a positive, although not statistically significant,
upward trend in the series (t= .60). The productivity analysis
for the repair division revealed that the productivity increase
was more gradual, as indicated by the change in drift
(t = 3.38, p<.001). Employment remained stable, with
almost no change in the level (t=.31, n.s.) or the drift
(t = -.06, n.s.).
This Scanlon Plan demonstrates that internal,
noneconomic factors can be a sufficiently powerful stimulus
to induce effective union-management cooperation. A
critical factor in the success of this Scanlon Plan is the com-

Table 6-4
Site 4 Summary
(Case 2)

Productivity
manufacturing
(N = 65, df=61)
Productivity repair
(N = 65, df=61)
Employment
(N = 61, df=57)

Level

T-Stat

.92

4.81

.40

3.59

15.88

105.81

26.84

Lev Chg

T-Stat

Drift

T-Stat

Dft Chg

T-Stat

2.09*

0.03

.81

0.02

0.66

0.49

1.56

-0.06

-5.15

0.06

3.38 +

1.21

0.31

-0.08

-0.06

-0.09

-0.05

*p<.05, + p<.001
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mitment of top management toward employee involvement
in the daily and long range operation of the company. This
commitment has manifested itself in the creation of an en
vironment and structure to produce the desired outcome.
Also important has been the maintenance of a sense of equi
ty by virtue of the payment of bonuses stemming from pro
ductivity increases.

Case Study 3: Evidence of a Delayed Effect
Site 16 (100 bargaining unit employees) designs and
manufactures automated, continuous roll-to-roll processing
machinery systems for converting the physical composition
of paper, boards, film, foil, plastics and textiles into finished
products. In recent years, labor relations had not been good.
In 1973, there was a 12-day strike, and in the subsequent
round of negotiations (1976) a 17-week strike occurred. Both
company and union representatives agreed that problems
and inequities in the plant's individual incentive system were
the cause. During the strike, employees, mostly skilled
machinists, took jobs elsewhere. After the strike, turnover
continued at a high rate when a large company opened near
by offering similar employment at much higher rates of pay.
As the 1979 negotiations neared, both sides prepared for
another strike. In addition, the company argued that under
the existing incentive program, workers were earning too
high a premium for "below standard" performance, while
the union reported that the existing payment system (base
plus incentive) did not permit employees to realize sufficient
earnings.
During the 1979 negotiations, the company proposed the
introduction of the Rucker Plan. The union, which had vast
experience at the national level with productivity-sharing
plans, agreed to the Plan subject to the establishment of a
new hourly pay rate. An agreement was reached to establish
a six-month average of individual earnings under the old in
centive system, plus an 8 percent pay increase.
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The Rucker Plan did not deviate from the traditional
Rucker form as discussed elsewhere. There was a suggestion
program, a committee system, and the productivity-sharing
bonus formula. Employee suggestions are the responsibility
of the Idea Coordinator, the manager of industrial engineer
ing, who assigns the suggestion to an appropriate manager or
professional employee for study, analysis, and a recommen
dation.
There was a single employee committee, the Group Incen
tive Committee (GIC), with 10 employees chosen by manage
ment serving four-month rotating terms. Initially three
criteria were used for selection: geographic dispersion, status
among the hourly workforce, and in some cases initial op
position to the Plan. The union president is a permanent
committee member. The GIC meets twice a month on com
pany time. At the first meeting each month, the committee
discusses ideas that have been submitted and at least one ma
jor subject, for example, a scrap or turnover. The second
monthly meeting reviews actions taken as a result of the first
meeting and discusses the most recent bonus.
The productivity bonus formula was based upon a fiveyear analysis of the plant's financial performance. The
Rucker formula is based upon the relationship between
bargaining unit payroll and production value. The following
calculations are made to achieve a base:
Production Value = Sales Value of Output - Materials and Supplies
Rucker Base=

Pay and Benefits of Bargaining Unit Personnel
Production Value

The relationship was 22.09 percent. The productivity bonus
is then measured by
Production Value x Base - Actual Pay and Benefits.

One third of an earned bonus is set aside for deficit account
ing periods. Because the plant produces large equipment in
stages, the bonus is calculated and paid on a quarterly basis,
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in a separate check. The only nonbargaining unit employees
in the Plan are supervisors, but they are paid from company,
rather than bargaining unit, earnings. Under the Rucker for
mula, improvements in quality increase production value
which is shared with the employees. The results showed that
there was a modest increase in productivity. 4 More in
teresting was the impact on employee absenteeism and quali
ty, which are reported in table 6-5.
Employment was analyzed for the period January
1977 - May 1982. There was a sharp increase in employment
following introduction of the Plan (t = 3.40, p< .001), with a
slight downturn thereafter (t=.97, n.s.). The industry also
experienced a corresponding but smaller increase in employ
ment (t= 1.23, n.s.), but then a substantial deterioration in
trend over time (t = -2.83, p< .01). Thus the plan had greater
employment stability than did the industry.
Absenteeism (unexcused absences-=-workforce size) was
analyzed for the period January 1977 - May 1982. There was
no change in the level of absenteeism and only a modest im
provement in the trend. Quality (the percentage of rework
hours to direct labor hours) was analyzed for the period
April 1978 - May 1982. Once again, there was no change in
the level of quality following the intervention, and a limited
improvement in the trend. In both instances, interesting and
potentially important findings occurred from the threemonth delayed analysis. Absenteeism declined significantly
(t = 2.07, p<.05) and continued a negative trend (t = -.85,
n.s.). The improvement in quality was also very significant
with a substantial improvement in the trend (t = -2.37,
p< .01). These results are shown visually in figures 2 and 3.
Cook and Campbell (1979) have suggested that the impact
of an intervention into a complex organizational situation
might not be immediately felt. When considering change in
unionized settings there may be a delayed effect on employee
work attitudes, behavior, and performance during an in-

Table 6-5
Site 16 Summary
(Case 3)
Level

T-Stat

Lev Chg

Employment
(N = 65, df=61)

105.38

25.34

14.15

Employment control
(N = 64, df=60)

118.97

95.02

3.47

Absenteeism
(N = 64, df=60)
Absenteeism
delayed effect
Quality
(N-50, df=46)
Quality
delayed effect
*p<.05, **p<.01, +p<.001

T-Stat

Drift

T-Stat

Dft Chg

T-Stat

3.40 +

-0.14

-0.16

-1.23

-0.97

1.55

1.23

0.41

1.39

-1.06

-2.83**

9.11

-0.09

-0.22

-0.00

-0.19

-0.04

-1.54

3.48

10.39

-0.78

-2.07*

-0.00

-0.16

-0.02

-0.85

9.20

6.20

0.42

0.29

0.04

0.20

-0.28

-1.13

10.18

8.24

1.79

1.38

-0.03

-0.32

-0.30

-2.37**
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Figure 6-2
Site 16 Quality
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Site 16 Absenteeism
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terim period in which employees become fully aware and
educated, and a delay required for a high level of acceptance,
trust and expertise to develop. This demonstrates that it may
take time for productivity and Quality of Worklife programs
to mature and realize their full capacity for improved
employee performance.
Although it was not possible to directly measure the quali
ty of the labor-management relationship, the last two rounds
of contract negotiations (1979 and 1982) were concluded
peacefully. Because the two previous experiences (1973 and
1976) resulted in strikes over issues which the Plan was
designed to address, it may be concluded that the Plan at
least partially contributed to improved lab or-management
relations.
Since the inception of the Plan, there have been over 400
suggestions processed with 70 percent having been accepted.
Quarterly bonuses have been paid less than 50 percent of the
time but have been very large (in excess of 20 percent three
times).
The success of this intervention was influenced by several
factors. First, there was a strong stimulus for change. The
two preceding rounds of contract negotiations had resulted
in labor disputes, one of which lasted 17 weeks. There was
also a concern about high labor turnover and low wages.
Second, both the company and the union were committed to
a jointly approved solution to the problem. Third, the par
ties utilized competent consultants for the development and
implementation of the Plan. The consultants helped to main
tain equity in the bonus formula. Fourth, the level of
employee participation, although not as great as with other
interventions, for example, Scanlon Plans and Quality
Circles, appeared to be congruent with the preferences of
both the employees and the management. Finally, the union
was directly involved in the supervision of the Plan through
membership on the Group Incentive Committee.
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Case Study 4: The Successful Use
of a Labor-Management Committee
Site 23 is a tire manufacturer with 800 bargaining unit
employees. During 1976, the industry suffered from over
capacity, and in 1977, the plant was threatened with a loss of
jobs due to industry competition.
In 1977 the Union's Bargaining Committee and the top
plant management met to discuss ways and means to im
prove productivity. As a result of these discussions, the
union agreed to renegotiate work rules through the formal
collective bargaining process. After the 1977 negotiations
were concluded, the union and the company continued to
maintain monthly meetings to discuss problems and to avoid
personality conflicts. These meetings continued until
mid-1978 when top management stopped attending the
meetings and instead, was represented by middle managers.
Thereafter, regular meetings were discontinued.
In March 1980, economic conditions forced the layoff of
250 employees. Meetings were begun to discuss ongoing dif
ficulties. Plant management projected a loss of more than
$11 million. The company told the union that approximately
$5 million of the projected loss was due to labor costs, pro
ductivity, and operating difficulties, while over $6 million
was due to difficulties in sales, marketing and distribution.
In November 1980, the Union agreed to $1.05 an hour
wage reduction, by virtue of an immediate curtailment in the
cost-of-living adjustment of $.55 and a $.50 deferment in
future cost-of-living payments. To offset this decrease, the
company and union agreed to a gainsharing program which
would compensate the employees for their loss. In addition,
the parties requested that the community's Area LaborManagement Committee (A L-MC) begin working with them
to fully develop the Labor-Management Committee (L-MC)
concept. This case offers the opportunity to view the L-MC
process in action.
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The Labor-Management Committee is an extension of the
collective bargaining process and is composed of top
management members, including the plant manager and
members of his operating staff and the local union president
and other key elected officials of the local. The top manage
ment official and the local union president act as the L-MC
co-chairpersons. There are also departmental and ad hoc
subcommittees. The L-MC is designed to bring these actors
together to improve the working relationship between the
company and the union by fostering attitudinal change.
Once this has been achieved, other significant issues can be
addressed and the L-MC becomes a vehicle for organiza
tional change.
The role of the A L-MC is to provide technical assistance
to aid the parties in implementing and making effective the
in-plant L-MC. The A L-MC provided, at no cost to the
company or union, an expert third-party consultant. This in
dividual helped guide the parties through the initial stages of
gaining commitment and acceptance of the concept and,
thereafter, helped them to develop a process for addressing
substantive problems. The eventual goal of the A L-MC is to
educate the principals so that they are able to function in
dependently, that is without the assistance of the third party.
At the outset, the L-MC process is designed to get each
side to understand the opponents role and the difficulties
each faces. The goal is to reach a stage where the adversary
process is de-emphasized and the parties are able to jointly
address problems facing the company, the union, and the
workforce. It is expected that the parties will acknowledge
this change, as was the case at Site 23.
The initial process forces the parties to work together. The
L-MC begins modestly by developing the local mechanics of
the process (meeting times, places, participants, etc.); getting
the individual actors to agree to meet; setting a flexible agen
da; and informing everyone, management and union, of the
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activities taking place. Most L-MCs initially focus on minor
irritants such as physical improvements to work and nonwork areas. Because there had been a short-lived L-MC ef
fort three years before at Site 23, many of these issues were
easier to resolve. The important point, however, is that the
L-MC process teaches both sides to behave in a more
sophisticated manner. Although either side can always revert
to its existing rights under the collective bargaining agree
ment (e.g., the company could assert its right to manage the
business), the process requires that the parties be more atten
tive to their counterpart's problems, concerns, and point of
view.
At Site 23, the parties moved more quickly into substan
tive issues of productivity, attendance, quality, management
control systems, scheduling, and implementing departmental
committees.
There are six departmental subcommittees consisting of
two to four employees and two to four managers. Stewards
and rank-and-file members represent the union on these
committees. Ad hoc committees are created to examine
specific problems.
The L-MC and departmental subcommittees have the ef
fect of collapsing the organizational structure. The union
leadership and its members have direct and frequent contact
with top management decisionmakers. Information and
problems are allowed to surface and potential solutions can
not be ignored. At this site, an effort is made to force the
subcommittees to make decisions rather than sending them
to the main committee. The main L-MC also consults the
subcommittees on issues with plantwide implications. Thus
communication and involvement are increased.
An example of the change and innovation at Site 23 is the
manner in which employee attendance was addressed. To
complement the existing negotiated disciplinary procedure
for absenteeism, the parties established an Attendance
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Review Council. The Council consisted of three rank-andfile volunteers and three supervisors who counseled
employees with irregular attendance. Where needed, correc
tive services were provided. The Council could not discipline
employees but did replace a contractually negotiated absence
point system for employee discipline. The Council in no way
abrogates management's right to discipline or discharge
employees under the collective bargaining agreement.
At this site, the L-MCs departmental subcommittees and
ad hoc committees closely resemble the structure of the
Scanlon Committees and Quality Circles. There is, however,
a very significant and important distinction. With Scanlon
Plans, Quality Circles, and Rucker Plans, the union primari
ly has an oversight responsibility. The local union president
serves on the Screening Committees with perhaps another
union official, but for the most part, this is the extent of
direct union involvement. In most Scanlon and Rucker Plans
and Quality Circles, there is a conscious effort to keep union
stewards off the committees. The rationale is to separate the
cooperative process from the traditional adversary processes
of the grievance procedure and negotiations machinery. In
this regard, L-MCs are very different; the union is an equal
partner in the operation of the entire process. An effort is
made to immerse stewards along with rank-and-file workers
into the process. Organizational change conies as a direct
result of this involvement and the union, as the co-partner in
the L-MC, is both responsible for failures, as well as entitled
to claim credit for success. In short, both sides have owner
ship of the effort. This should be contrasted with many of
the other interventions studied which were in large part
management directed with union oversight responsibility.
The L-MC process at Site 23 helped the parties overcome
several difficult issues which might have caused the demise
of other cooperative efforts. An example was the gainsharing program. The bonus formula was based on equivalent
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pounds per man hour augmented by savings on waste. This
formula was the most accurate measure of productivity of all
the sites investigated in this research. However, the formula
required the plant, which had been performing at about 80
percent of standard, to be above 100 percent of standard for
a two-month period, and three six-month periods,
thereafter. Employees would receive 50 percent of the cost
reductions that resulted from increased productivity above
the 100 percent.
Thus there was to be a biannual bonus with no reward for
incremental improvement and poor weeks and months dur
ing this period offsetting good performance in other months.
No bonus was earned for any period during the first 12
months. Productivity during this period initially improved,
but performance never reached the point at which a bonus
could be achieved.
This caused disenchantment and led much of the
workforce to abandon hopes of earning a bonus. After a
period of four to six months, productivity, which had in
creased to approximately 90 percent, declined to previous
levels. The cause of this problem was the construction of the
formula. Rather than rewarding and reinforcing incremental
improvement, only the excess above the 100 percent goal
would entitle the employees to receive a bonus. The period of
time for measurement of performance, six months, was
unusually long. This combination had the effect of creating a
disincentive when no bonus was earned. At several other
sites studied, this might have caused cooperation to be ter
minated. However, because the relationship between the
company and the union had improved—in particular, the
personal relationship between the key actors had been
strengthened—the parties were able to discuss their problem
and arrive at a mutually successful solution. That solution
was to reward incremental improvement using a four-week
moving average payout system. In the second year of the
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gainsharing, bonuses ranged from $.09-$.46 per hour, with
an average of $.30 per hour.
Table 6-6 sumarizes the plant's performance. Productivity
measured as equivalent pounds per hour, was analyzed for
the period January 1979 - July 1982. Productivity increased
slightly following the intervention (t= .93, n.s.), but increas
ed significantly over time (t = 4.12, p<.001).
Employment and turnover were measured for the period
January 1978 - June 1981. Employment, after remaining un
changed following the program's introduction (t = -.48,
n.s.), showed a positive gain over time (t= 1.43, n.s.). At the
same time, industry employment remained unchanged
(t= .23 and .44, both n.s.). Both plant turnover (t= .37 and
-.29, both n.s.) and industry turnover (t = -.96 and .19, both
n.s.) remained unchanged.
Quality for both the major and minor products at the
plant was measured by a ratio of scrap dollar value to output
dollar value. The major product's quality was analyzed for
the period January 1978 - December 1981. Scrap for the ma
jor product was unchanged following the program's start-up
(t = -.78, n.s.). Over time, though, the decrease in scrap ap
proached statistical significance (t = -1.53, n.s.). The amount
of scrap for the minor product decreased to a similar degree
initially (t= -1.52, n.s.), while the trend remained unchanged
over time (t =. 11, n.s.).
Absenteeism was measured for the period January
1978 - June 1982. Absenteeism remained unchanged
throughout the time-series analysis (t=.82 and -.50, both
n.s.).
This site is a very good example of a L-MC being used to
change the organization. First, attitudinal change took
place, along with the development of a structure for change.
Thereafter, the parties began to address obstacles to
organizational effectiveness. In contrast to most other

Table 6-6
Site 23 Summary
(Case 4)
Lev Chg T-Stat

T-Stat

Dft Chg

T-Stat

Level

T-Stat

58.56

44.93

1.37

0.93

-0.19

-1.96

0.55

4.12 +

Employment

158.82

56.81

-1.42

-0.48

-0.99

-1.73

1.93

1.43

Employment control
(N = 42, df=38)

128.92

63.75

0.23

0.10

-0.55

-1.38

0.37

0.44

Turnover

0.72

7.72

0.08

0.37

-0.00

-0.76

-0.01

-0.29

Turnover control
(N = 42, df=38)

0.40

2.00

-0.20

-0.96

-0.00

-0.00

0.01

0.19

Quality-major
(N = 48, df=44)

2.03

5.54

-0.03

-0.78

0.04

0.99

-0.11

-1.53

Quality-minor
(N = 43, df=39)

2.67

1.26

-7.38

-1.52

0.31

2.97

0.09

0.11

Absenteeism
(N = 56, df=52)

0.08

Productivity
(N = 43, df=39)

+ p<.001

Drift

•—H
•o
o

7.11

0.01

0.82

-0.00

-0.01

-0.00

-0.50
u>
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change efforts studied, the union shares ownership of the
process with the company.
There has been an improvement in organizational perfor
mance, but this gives rise to the "black box" issue. Was it
the gainsharing or the L-MC that produced the im
provements? The answer is probably both. Certainly the
gainsharing rewarded improved performance, but the L-MC
process facilitated and created an environment in which
organizational efficiency could be fostered. Moreover, many
of the improvements in productivity were the result of the
work done by the departmental and ad hoc subcommittees.
Finally, the Area Labor-Management Committee provided
much of the expertise to help the parties make the L-MC pro
cess work.

Case Study 5: Three Cases of Long Term Success
This segment combines the experiences of three companies
with long term cooperative efforts. All three have Scanlon
Plans. The Plans are 15, 12 and 29 years in length, respec
tively. All three Plans operate in the traditional Scanlon for
mat.
Site 28 employs 370 hourly workers and produces
automated assembly systems, special balancing machines,
and vertical automatic production lathes. The Scanlon Plan
was an outgrowth of a 13-week strike over union demands
for a wage increase and a group incentive system.
Both the company and the union were familiar with the
Scanlon Plan. The plant was at one time owned by a local
manufacturer who had a "successful" Scanlon Plan in
another location. No serious consideration was given to
alternative systems. The Scanlon Plan was seen as a
mechanism for tying increased earnings to productivity.
Since the union proposed the concept, gaining employee ac
ceptance was not difficult.
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The Plan began in January 1968 and has eight Production
Committees and one Screening Committee. Even though the
Plan has matured, it continues to process 100-150 sugges
tions per year with an annual acceptance rate from 50-70 per
cent. Ideas that do not exceed $300 can be implemented by
the Production Committees. Suggestions that will cost more
than $300 require Screening Committee approval. Aside
from this situation, the plant manager actively discourages
any suggestions going beyond the Production Committee
level.
The committee system has developed into the most effec
tive line of communication between management and the
employees. Through the committees, management makes a
determined effort to keep the employees aware of the finan
cial position, including profitability, of the company.
Management officials felt that the committee system has
made the employees "... much more aware of what it takes
to run the company," and that the employees see a relation
ship between productivity and profitability, this helping to
create an atmosphere of trust and understanding. Both
management officials and the union chairperson agreed that
the opportunity for employee participation had played a key
role in what they felt had been the considerable success of the
Plan. They also claimed that the Plan was responsible for
improving union-management and employee relations. The
Plan has paid frequent bonuses.
Site 28 demonstrates the contribution of the Plan over the
long term and how interest is maintained. The committee
system has reinforced work-skill training, as well as training
employees in solving production problems and increased
leadership skills. In addition, since the Plan had aided in put
ting management and labor in touch with each other's goals,
objectives and feelings, it serves as an excellent vehicle for in
troducing change into the plant and increasing the probabili
ty of acceptance. Employee participation makes employees
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sensitive to the problems faced by management, as well as
making management more aware of employee concerns. The
parties maintain a high level of commitment to the Plan's
philosophy. Biannual Scanlon Plan "brainstorming" ses
sions are held to maintain enthusiasm for the Plan.
Because of the date of the start-up of this Scanlon Plan,
and the nature of production, productivity data were not
available. However, the Scanlon bonus, which may be used
as a proxy for productivity, was paid in 103 of the 156
months of the plan. Table 6-7 presents the average monthly
bonus.
Table 6-7
Site 28 Bonus Summary
1968
Average
Monthly
Bonus

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

5.21% 7.03% 17.85% 1.23% 12.33% 8.62% 17.89%

________1975
Average
Monthly
Bonus

1969

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980_____

23.32% 2.28% 20.97% 23.23% 29.12% 34.21%

As can be seen from these results, the plan has survived
two initial years of modest bonuses (5.21 percent, 7.03 per
cent), as well as years in which the bonus has been very
meager (1.23 percent in 1971 and 2.28 percent in 1976).
Employment was analyzed for the period January
1966 - December 1981. Employment was found to be stable
(t=.46, n.s.) following introduction of the Plan, with the
trend unchanged (t=.15, n.s.), as well. Industry employ
ment had a markedly downward trend. Thus employment
was more stable. The grievance rate (grievances •*• average
workforce size) has declined. There have been no strikes
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since the Plan was introduced. Table 6-8 summarizes the per
formance data for all three sites.
Site 30 is a subsidiary of a large, multinational corpora
tion. The company manufactures high-nickel alloys in two
nearby plants and employs 2000 hourly and salaried
employees. It is significant not only because its Scanlon Plan
is 12 years old, but also because it is one of the largest
Scanlon Plan firms.
The development of cooperation at both plants was largely
due to union pressure. The company had for many years
operated a Bedeaux individual incentive plan, covering all
hourly workers. The union could contest a standard through
the grievance procedure or at the next contract negotiation.
However, the company made the final determination on any
standard, since incentive issues were nonarbitrable.
Organized opposition to the Bedeaux Plan surfaced as ear
ly as 1957, when the union pressured management into re
nouncing the use of disciplinary measures against employees
for failure to meet the incentive standards. They blamed it
for infecting labor-management relations, claiming that it
wasn't related to effort and skill, and that it had the effect of
pitting worker against worker. The union leadership claimed
Bedeaux led to dishonesty among the workers, as well as en
couraging them to disregard quality, which often caused
more work for other employees.
In 1968, the union suggested that the Bedeaux system be
dropped in favor of a profit-sharing plan. The company re
jected the idea, but did spend the next two years investigating
a number of plantwide incentives. At that time, management
found the Scanlon Plan the most suitable. The installation of
a Scanlon Plan seemed even more attractive in light of a 1967
opinion survey of the company's salaried employees. These
employees criticized the company's internal communica
tions, its unresponsiveness to suggestions, and the tenuous
relation between performance and incentive earnings.

Level
Site 28
Employment

Os
00

Table 6-8
Sites 28, 30, and 9 Summary
(Case 5)
Drift
T-Stat Lev Chg T-Stat

T-Stat

Dft Chg

T-Stat

262.96

21.75

5.51

0.46

0.37

0.07

0.86

0.15

568.28

82.12

-1.67

-0.25

2.51

1.36

-2.59

-1.39

3.44

2.79

0.78

0.68

-0.13

-0.80

0.12

0.74

27.64

19.82

1.88

1.35

-0.21

-1.09

0.04

0.22

1786.40

103.20

-4.08

-2.36**

-0.29

-0.38

3.16

4.24 +

56.63

35.08

-0.50

-0.32

-0.23

-0.78

0.23

0.70

Site 9
Productivity

3.80

19.25

-0.39

-1.50

0.00

0.34

0.01

0.65

Employment

122.81

14.22

-6.79

-0.76

1.21

1.68

-0.74

-0.62

Employment control
(N=192, df=188)
Grievances
(N = 79, df=75)
Site 30
Productivity
(N=143, df=139)
Employment
Employment control
(N=144, df=140)

*p<.05, **p<.01, +p<.001
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The union also conducted its own investigation of possible
alternatives to Bedeaux, and concluded independently that
Scanlon could meet their criteria of equity, good bonus
payments for all employees, improved labor-management
relations, and an opportunity for workers to make sugges
tions and be sure that management would listen.
In late 1970, the Plan was begun at the smaller plant which
had no incentive system and was generally a much simpler
operation. The company also provided the union with a let
ter of commitment to develop a jointly acceptable plan for
the large plant. In August 1972, the Plan was adopted for a
two-year trial period, with 74 percent of the hourly workers
and 90 percent of the salaried employees voting in favor.
Thereafter, the employees at the smaller plant voted to tie
their Scanlon Plan into that of the larger plant.
This Scanlon Plan is unusual because of its large number
of production committees and its three-tiered committee
system.
Presently, there are 30 Production Committees, 11 Screen
ing Committees, and a Planning and Review Committee.
The Production Committees offer the greatest opportunity
for employee participation. These committees, developed
along departmental lines, are composed of management and
employee representatives, with a management representative
acting as chairperson; average membership numbers six per
sons. The employee representatives are elected by fellow
employees in each department for staggered one-year terms,
with successive terms permitted.
The Production Committees seek ways to improve their
department's efficiency. The committees meet at least once a
month, and are responsible for soliciting, receiving and
disposing of suggestions within a reasonable time. The Pro
duction Committees can either accept or reject suggestions,
or refer them to the appropriate Screening Committee. If a
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suggestion is accepted, the committee can institute it if the
cost does not exceed $200. However, if the suggestion re
quires a capital purchase, the suggestion must be referred to
the Engineering Screening Committee for further investiga
tion.
When a suggestion requires an expenditure in excess of
$200, or there is disagreement over it at the Production Com
mittee level, the suggestion can be referred to the appropriate
Screening Committee. Each Screening Committee represents
a "group" in the plant, e.g., manufacturing, accounting, ad
ministration, etc. Every Screening Committee is chaired by a
manager, with at least one employee representative for each
Production Committee within a group. These committees
are responsible for disposing of those suggestions referred to
them. The Screening Committees can usually take action on
suggestions costing more than $200 unless a capital purchase
is required. These committees, which meet monthly after the
bonus results are announced, also discuss the results and
ways of improving bonuses, as well as ways to solve prob
lems raised through employee participation.
The Planning and Review Committee discusses the events
surrounding the monthly bonus before it is announced. The
Planning and Review Committee's monthly agenda also in
cludes comments on what helped or hurt production,
business competition, monthly billings, production
backlogs, and sales prospects. This committee consists of the
executive vice-president (representing the president), 11
other management officials representing each group (in
cluding four from the largest group, manufacturing), the
two local union presidents and eight hourly representatives
from the production Screening Committees. Due to the size
of the Planning and Review Committee, the employee
representatives must alternate attendance in order to keep
the meeting manageable. However, if a particular Produc
tion Committee is not represented at the Planning and
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Review meeting, they can attend a meeting immediately
following the monthly Planning and Review meeting, where
the company's comptroller explains the bonus results. Final
ly, although the Planning and Review Committee does not
normally handle suggestions, it will dispose of those which
may entail great expense or effort across group lines. The
Planning and Review Committee, with the approval of the
vice-president of manufacturing, can authorize any non
capital expenditure up to $5,000.
Employee understanding and acceptance of the Plan was
facilitated and maintained by several strategies. The com
pany exhibited its good faith by meeting the union on its own
ground before and during the Plan's operation. Manage
ment officials would travel to the union hall to answer ques
tions and discuss problems that arose in early stages of the
Plan's operation. Along with distribution of Scanlon infor
mation pamphlets, there were general meetings where union
and management officials would exhibit their cohesiveness
on the merits of the Plan. To maintain acceptance of the
Plan, efforts are made to keep the workforce informed of
the Plan's operations. Minutes are kept and made available
for all Production Committee meetings. Suggestions made
through these meetings receive written responses as quickly
as possible. The company newsletter is utilized to maintain
an awareness of the Scanlon Plan. Many articles attempt to
inform the employees on the inter-relationships of the Plan
and the business environment and how the Plan's perfor
mance affects the company's financial situation.
Productivity was measured by pounds per man hour for
the period January 1970 - December 1981. The productivity
time-series exhibited a positive upward level change (t= 1.35,
n.s.). Over time, productivity has remained stable (t=.22,
n.s.). Employment at Site 30 showed a statistically signifi
cant decrease in level following the intervention (t = -2.36,
p<.01), while industry employment remained stable
(t = -.32, n.s.). Over time, however, the plant experienced a
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highly significant upward trend in employment (t = 4.24,
p<.001), while industry employment remained unchanged
(t=.70, n.s.).
The annual number of employee suggestions has ranged
from a high of 1,086 in 1973 to 227 in 1980. The employees
have earned a bonus 83 percent of the time.
Site 9 is a family-owned manufacturer of steel lockers and
shelves. The company employs 150 bargaining unit
employees and has one of the oldest cooperative efforts in
the United States.
The Scanlon Plan was first suggested by the union in 1952
during collective bargaining. No agreement could be reached
and it subsequently took two years for agreement on the
Plan's implementation because the company chose to move
cautiously. When the Scanlon Plan was finally instituted it
was to improve the relationship between the company and
the union and the company and its employees; as a method
for resolving problems that existed at the time; and as a
financial incentive. In contrast to other Scanlon Plans of its
era, this Plan was not begun because of economic solvency
problems.
The history and philosophy of the Plan are highlighted in
the employee handbook:
While we have not earned a bonus every month
since 1954, the overall record of the Scanlon Plan
has been exceptional. It was originally introduced
to promote further cooperation between Manage
ment and Union employees, by allowing all
employees a "voice in the business." By cooper
ating effectively through the Scanlon Plan
the . . .Company has been able to improve produc
tivity and remain competitive with much larger pro
ducers of our type of product. Every suggestion is
valuable because every employee including yourself
will benefit to some degree.

Impact

173

Since the program at Site 9 had been in operation for 24
years, analysis of its program under the format chosen for
this research would have been inappropriate. It was decided
to analyze the Plan in terms of its operation and continued
effectiveness. This in some respects poses interesting ques
tions with regard to identifying the factors or variables which
permit long term institutionalization of the programs. This is
an important issue since it is commonly believed that
cooperative programs, like the Scanlon Plan, decline over
time.
There are five Production Committees organized on a
departmental basis, including one each for the office and
engineering, the night shift and a small facility a short
distance from the main plant.
The five committees are:
1. Fabrication department
2. Painting and shipping
3. Office and engineering
4. Essex Street (small facility two blocks from main plant)
5. Night shift
Each committee has four members, three union members ap
pointed for a term of two years and the foreman. Appoint
ments to the Production Committee are made jointly by the
union president and the personnel director on the basis of
previously expressed interest as evidenced by the offering of
suggestions. The Production Committees meet monthly on
company time to generate and evaluate ideas. The commit
tees have the authority to implement suggestions up to a
dollar value limit of $100, as long as there is no overlap be
tween committees. Although the Plan was more than 20
years old, during the period January 1976 - May 1979
employees made 868 suggestions and 654 (75 percent) were
implemented. The annual suggestion rate was 1.5-3 sugges
tions per employee each year. This demonstrates that
employee participation need not dissipate over time. Major
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areas of suggestions have come in the areas of machine die
and tooling, painting methods, and paper work systems.
The Screening Committee meets twice a month also on
company time. In contrast to other Scanlon Plans which
tend to hold only one Screening Committee meeting per
month, this firm breaks its Screening Committee functions
into a short monthly meeting to discuss and evaluate the
bonus and a longer meeting to review operations and
business conditions. There are nine employees and four
management representatives on the Screening Committee.
Eight employees are selected jointly by the union president
and the personnel director.
The Screening Committee tends to operate in three areas.
The first is to oversee the operation of the Production Com
mittees and to resolve any jurisdictional or cost conflicts
which arise. The second is the responsibility for the manage
ment of the bonus and its allocation. Finally, the third area
of operation is as a device for improved communication be
tween the company and the union. Screening Committee
discussions have centered on resolving or explaining prob
lems and planning for potential opportunities. The company
uses the Screening Committee to provide advance notice to
the employees of the onset of slow periods. Also discussed
are the reasons why the company may have lost a contract,
areas of current production problems, and long range prob
lems the company expects to encounter. The Screening Com
mittee is also used as a vehicle for seizing upon oppor
tunities. Examples of this type of usage include the explora
tion of better work methods and the preparation for busy
periods.
The traditional Scanlon bonus formula is utilized. In a
Plan that has been in place for a long period of time,
periodically there is a need to review the historical relation
ship between labor costs and sales value of production.
Technological change or a shift in the relationship between
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materials costs and labor costs may alter the financial basis
of the Plan. The bonus is reviewed by an experienced
Scanlon consultant. The consultant's neutrality, credibility
and financial expertise in Plan accounting helps insure that
equity is maintained.
The employees are kept informed about the Plan through
several devices. All bonus reports are posted on company
bulletin boards. Committee representatives provide
employees with information, both through formal feedback
on suggestions and ideas and informally. In addition,
departmental meetings are conducted by the foremen; sug
gestions are interchanged across committees and are made
available to anyone who is interested; and finally there is an
annual dinner to honor employees who have served on the
Production and Screening Committees. Because of the long
term nature of the Plan, the company has developed a
reputation in the community as a good place to work. This,
combined with the relatively good wages paid, has enabled
the company to attract better quality employees. Over the
years, the company has had few hiring problems and low
labor turnover. As well, the Scanlon Plan has resulted in a
monthly bonus over 90 percent of the time. This stability has
aided in effectuating the operation of the Plan.
Productivity and employment were analyzed for the
period January 1975 - April 1979, and March 1975 - May
1979. The intervention point was the reaffirmation of the
Plan by virtue of its continuation following the close of col
lective bargaining in Jaunary 1977. In examining Plans of
long duration, it would not be expected that abrupt level
changes in performance would take place. That was the case
with Site 9. Productivity and employment tended to be
stable, although the direction of the t-statistics for both level
changes were negative. This can be explained by the severe
drop in economic activity experienced by the firm through
the first five months of 1977. The trend in productivity was
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modestly positive (t = -.65, n.s.) while the trend in employ
ment was slightly downward (t = -.62, n.s.).
These three sites demonstrate that long term cooperation
is possible. Site 30 shows that it can occur in a large,
multiplant environment. Site 28 shows that the Scanlon Plan
has the capability of serving as the centerpiece of an
organization's human resource management efforts. Site 9
proves that the plan has the capability of enduring very long
periods of time (30 years).
What conditions were present? First, the Scanlon Plan was
suggested by the trade unions, indicating the support that the
Plan, originally developed by the United Steel Workers, en
joys among some unionists. Management also investigated
and determined that the Plan would fit into the culture of the
organization. The Plans have been successful in moving decisionmaking down to the shop floor and the commitment to
employee involvement has not been breached. In all three
sites, extensive efforts are made to keep workers and
managers informed. Finally, all three plans, while not paying
bonuses every month, have consistently done so.

Case Study 6: The Failure to Maintain Equity
Sites 5 (450 hourly employees) and 7 (250 hourly
employees) are plants within the same division of a large in
dustrial conglomerate. The plants manufacture different
types of chain, are geographically separated by 45 miles,
have distinct sets of managers, and are represented by dif
ferent locals of the same international union who bargain
separate collective bargaining agreements. At the same time,
however, there were some common features associated with
the initiation and operation of the Plans which can be
presented simultaneously.
Eight years prior to the institution of the Rucker Plan, the
company and the unions had agreed to eliminate the plants'
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incentive systems. During the 1970s, both plants were being
adversely affected by foreign competition. The Rucker Plan
was introduced to improve productivity (and the firm's com
petitive position), to provide additional earnings for
employees' efforts (the company had taken a firm stance in
bargaining with the union on wages), and to improve com
munications.
The overall structure of the two Rucker Plans was the
same. Each had a suggestion system, two employee commit
tees, and a bonus formula. In the Rucker Plan setting,
employees submit suggestions to an Idea Coordinator. The
Idea Coordinator pursues the suggestion with appropriate
managerial personnel and feeds back a response to the
employee.
The employee committees are divided into Production and
Steering. The Production Committees primarily consist of
rank-and-file workers; they review all suggestions (accepted
and rejected) and discuss such problem areas in the plant as
quality, materials and pricing. At Site 5 employees were
elected to serve on the committee for three-month periods,
whereas at Site 7, employees were chosen by management
with the approval of the union for six-month intervals. The
Screening Committees, composed of top union and company
officials, addressed questions similar to those above, but
also considered more significant matters. Some of these in
volved marketplace and general economic considerations,
pricing decisions, product design, the introduction of new
products, and the bonus calculations.
The bonus formula is based on the relationship between
bargaining unit payroll costs and production value. Produc
tion value is calculated by subtracting defective goods
returned and the costs of materials, supplies, and services
from the sale value of goods sold. At Site 5 this relationship
was determined to be 37.74 percent while at Site 7 it was
40.91 percent. Although there were substantial increases in
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productivity, at both sites few bonuses were paid. This was
due to a divisional management decision not to raise prices.
At a time of rapidly rising costs for materials, supplies, and
services, this decision eliminated most of the potential
bonus. Table 6-9 summarizes the performance for both sites.
The productivity (output per hour) and employment data
for Site 5 were analyzed for the periods January
1975 - October 1978 and January 1974 - December 1978,
respectively. The intervention point was July 1976, the in
troduction of the Rucker Plan. The results indicate that
employment was unchanged (t= .58, n.s.) while the industry
was slightly downward. The more interesting finding is that
the level of productivity increased (t = 2.30, p< .05), but that
the trend was negative (t = -2.53, p<.01). This would in
dicate that the plan had had an initial positive effect, which
had dissipated rather quickly. In 1976, there were three
bonus months (13.2, 28.6, and 37.4 cents per hour). For
three years (1977-79), only one monthly bonus was paid
(2.56 cents per hour).
At Site 7, productivity (output per hour) and employment
were analyzed for the period January 1974 - October 1978
and January 1974 - March 1979, respectively, with the in
tervention point being July 1976. The productivity improve
ment that occurred was quite pronounced. There was an
abrupt upward shift in the level of productivity (t = 4.99,
p<.001) followed by a stable trend (t = 0.14, n.s.). This is
shown in figure 6-4. Employment was unchanged following
introduction of the Rucker Plan, but a downward trend
prior to the intervention was reversed, following a pattern
similar to the industry.
At this site bonuses were larger, but were not paid regular
ly. In 1976, no bonuses were paid; in 1977, there were two
bonus months of 14.8 cents and 56.8 cents per hour; in 1978,
two bonuses of 46.8 cents and 33.4 cents per hour with a 2.79
cents per hour end-of-the-year bonus were paid.

Table 6-9
Sites 5 and 7 Summary
(Case 6)

SiteS
Productivity
(N = 46, df=42)
Employment
(N = 60, df=56)
Site?
Productivity
(N = 58, df=54)
Employment
(N = 55, df=51)

Dft Chg

T-Stat

Drift

T-Stat

2.30*

0.05

0.85

-0.18

-2.53**

0.58

-6.21

-1.35

8.52

1.31

0.98

4.99+

0.01

0.66

0.00

0.14

8.46

0.96

-3.91

-1.91

2.43

0.98

Lev Chg

Level

T-Stat

12.91

18.74

1.94

624.72

28.97

12.58

3.37

24.16

413.67

46.74

T-Stat

**p<.01, +p<.001
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Figure 6-4
Site 7 Productivity
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At both sites, the suggestion programs, which had initially
been quite active, experienced steady decline and became
mostly inactive. Finally, just prior to the three-year anniver
sary of the Rucker Plan, a four-month strike took place dur
ing the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement.
The failure of the Plan to pay consistent bonuses was a key
factor in this prolonged strike.

Impact

181

A question arises as to why productivity increased, but a
bonus was not paid. In order to understand this, the Rucker
bonus formula must be re-examined. The formula is
Sales Value of Production
Costs of Goods Sold (materials, supplies)
PRODUCTION VALUE
x Labor Ratio
Allowed Payroll

to establish the existence and size of the bonus pool. Ideally,
the price of the product, as well as the prices paid for
materials and supplies, and labor costs should move in the
same pattern as they had in the base period, normally twofive years prior to the plan. Any deviation in this pattern can
lessen a bonus earned or possibly create a bonus when one
was not deserved. In the case of the two plants, there was an
increase in volume of production, thus raising the sales value
of production. However, because the price of the product re
mained constant, the growth was not as large as it would
have been with a price increase. More important, there were
sharp increases in material costs, energy, and other items us
ed in production. Payroll also increased due to negotiated
wage increases, the quarterly cost of living adjustment,
health care cost increases, and other "roll-up costs." All of
these cost factors combined to offset productivity and
volume gains to eliminate much of the potential bonus.
This result is not unique to the Rucker measurement
system. It is theoretically possible with the Scanlon Plan as
well. With an Improshare Plan, the bonus is based on
engineered time standards and actual hours of work.
Therefore, shifts in the price of production, costs of goods
sold, and labor costs have no bearing on the bonus.
In the Kochan-Dyer model of organizational change in
unionized settings, an important factor in institutionalizing
union-management cooperation over time is the equitable
distribution of benefits stemming from the endeavor. Equity

182

Impact

was not present in this situation. At the outset, the Rucker
Plan was strongly supported by the employees at both sites.
However, as a result of the failure to pay a bonus, interest
had lessened. A good indication of this was the decline in the
suggestion program. At Site 5, the decline in productivity
which occurred, after an initial significant improvement
would appear to lend support to the Kochan-Dyer theory.
Of greater concern, however, is the lack of control
workers have concerning their earnings in these group
productivity-sharing plans. This problem is not limited solely
to Rucker Plans. Herein are two cases in which worker pro
ductivity has increased, yet additional earnings have not
been forthcoming. Management's ability to affect the bonus
in a nonmanipulative manner highlights the fact that
workers may not be in control of their destinies in these
situations.

Case Study 7: A Failure to Match the
Labor-Management Relationship
With the Intervention
Site 6 manufactured steel casters and wheels and employed
129 hourly personnel. The Scanlon Plan resulted from com
promises made by the company in collective bargaining with
the union. The company had proposed the institution of an
individual inceptive system. The union rejected this proposal
and alternately proposed the development of a Scanlon Plan.
Although the company preferred a different group incentive
plan, at the union's insistence it agreed to the Scanlon Plan.
The Plan followed the traditional Scanlon design with a
suggestion system, four Production Committees, and one
Screening Committee. The bonus formula included both
hourly, clerical, and salaried employees. An analysis of the
minutes of Screening Committee meetings indicated that
most of its deliberations involved discussing suggestions sent
to it by the Production Committees. In contrast to other
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Scanlon Plans studied, there was almost no discussion of
long range and environmental issues.
A bonus was paid in 9 (4.8 percent), 10 (3.4 percent), and 2
(0.02 percent) of the 13 (annual) possible bonus periods in
the three years of the Plan's existence. Only in the first year
was there an end-of-the-year surplus in the reserve (5.5 per
cent). In the last year (1979), the Plan paid only one bonus of
2.5 percent (February).
In July 1979 management unilaterally withdrew the office
and salaried groups from the calculation of the bonus claim
ing that any bonus that was being earned was the result of ef
forts by those groups. This raised the specter of bonus for
mula manipulation, and following six more bonus periods
without positive results, the union exercised its right to ter
minate upon 30 days notice, thus ending the Plan.
The productivity and employment experience for Site 6
was analyzed for the period January 1975 - December 1979
and January 1974 - December 1979, respectively, with the
intervention occurring in December 1976. There was a
positive, although not statistically significant increase in pro
ductivity (t=1.47, n.s.) following the introduction of the
Plan. Over time, a downward drift in productivity was
reversed and shifted upward (t = 2.35, p< .05). Employment
remained unchanged (t = -0.59, n.s.) and tended to follow an
upward industry pattern. These results are summarized in
table 6-10.
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Table 6-10
Site 6 Summary
(Case 7)
Level
Productivity
(N = 54, df=50)

64.25

Drift
-0.35
Level
Employment
(N = 50, df=46)

96.95

Drift
2.97

T-Stat
19.28

T-Stat
-1.43
T-Stat
15.69

Lev Chg
6.20

T-Stat
1.47

.68

T-Stat
2.35*

Lev Chg

T-Stat

Dft Chg

-3.61

T-Stat

Dft Chg

2.40

-0.52

-0.59

T-Stat
-0.31

*p<.05

The Scanlon Plan at Site 6 appears to have been moderate
ly successful in improving productivity. The demise of the
Plan after three years exemplifies the effects of deviation
from Scanlon Plan theory. First, the Scanlon Plan is much
more than an incentive system. It is a different philosophy of
conducting an organization's operations. This aspect of the
Plan was missing here. Decisionmaking authority was never
truly placed in the hands of the Production Committees. Ap
proximately 40 percent of the Production Committee sugges
tions were referred to the Screening Committee. The Screen
ing Committee never became a vehicle for higher level com
munication between the company and the union. Contrary
to the Scanlon philosophy that the entire organization works
together, the separation of the office and salaried workforce
from the bonus formula is additional evidence that this
management had not completely accepted the full basis of
the Plan. Finally, adjustment of the bonus in midyear, for
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factors other than extensive technological or financial
reasons, seriously imperiled the requisite sense of organiza
tional equity needed to facilitate the cooperative process.
The Scanlon Plan is not an appropriate intervention when
the motives of the partisans are solely to replace an out-ofdate individual incentive system with a plantwide bonus
plan. Nor is the Plan likely to be successful when used as a
mechanism to replace lost earnings resulting from a conces
sion bargaining agreement or wage moratorium. This
Scanlon Plan was installed into a labor-management rela
tionship in which the philosophy of management did not fit
the values inherent in the Scanlon philosophy.

Case Study 8: The Failure of Cooperation
to Take Hold
Site 2 manufactures carburetors for automobiles and farm
machinery and electromagnetic clutches for business
machines, mail sorting equipment and for farm and in
dustrial machinery. In 1966, the plant employed 1700 people
and was the major employer in the community. Shortly
thereafter, the company lost its tariff protection and began
to be adversely affected by foreign competition in its major
product line. This pressure caused the company to move pro
duction of that product line out of the country. The move
resulted in a 25 percent reduction in the plant's business and
a loss of 700 jobs.
The major loss of jobs and further potential economic
threats in the highly competitive automotive components in
dustry led the parties to begin a series of informal discussions
concerning future economic conditions and what solutions
might be possible. As a result of top management pressure, a
special meeting between the company and union's ninemember bargaining committee was held in June 1972.
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The union asked the company what was needed to insure
the plant's economic viability. The company responded that
it needed a wage cut. From June 1972 - November 1972
negotiations began on a company proposal for a wage reduc
tion. In November 1972, agreement was reached on a
moratorium on all wage increases. This lasted for one year.
In addition, the company and the union agreed to create a
Joint Management-Labor Study Committee (JM-LSC). The
Study Committee's mission was incorporated into the collec
tive bargaining agreement as a memorandum of understand
ing. The agreement stated that the goal of the JM-LSC was
... to investigate solutions to productivity and
employee utilization problems. The responsibility
of the Committee is to study and evaluate such
problems and recommend solutions (emphasis add
ed by editor). 5
The JM-LSC consisted of six members (three union and
three management) and would meet on an as-needed basis.
The Committee participants were:
Union
1. union president
2. union committeeman
3. hourly employee

Management
1. manager of industrial relations
2. director of manufacturing
3. manager of manufacturing engineering

The parties stated that the philosophy of the cooperative
effort was
. . . that only through a constructive new approach
to productivity and employee utilization problems
can they (the parties) achieve a competitive opera
tion, offering good employment opportunity with a
reasonable expectation of job security. 6
Although a part of the plant's difficulty stemmed from an
antiquated incentive system, a far more serious problem oc
curred when corporate management provided a wage in-
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crease for the salaried staff shortly after plant management
and the union had agreed to the wage moratorium. In spite
of strong objections by the plant manager, the corporation
instituted a 5 percent wage increase for the salaried
employees. According to the personnel manager, the action
by the corporation clouded the developing cooperative rela
tionship between the company and the union. He further
stated that it was his belief that the subsequent ineffec
tiveness of the JM-LSC, was in large part the result of the
distrust generated by this action.
Analysis of the minutes of the JM-LSC meetings and in
terview data indicate that the committee operated in several
areas. The JM-LSC considered matters related to work
scheduling, overall staffing requirements, job classifications,
full utilization of employees, and general business condi
tions. At the committee's initial meeting (January 10, 1973)
eight areas of productivity improvement were identified.
Minutes of the meeting indicate that some of the areas were
employee centered items while others dealt with more effi
cient management of operations. The employee centered
areas appear to demonstrate a general belief on the part of
management that some of the firm's economic problems
were related to employee attitudes and behavior. Manage
ment referred to the problems of late starts and early quits,
absenteeism, and abuses of breaks and rest periods. The
areas identified for managerial improvement were: utiliza
tion of manpower and equipment, utilization of service and
skill trades manpower, creation of new incentives, and pro
duction procedures including methods to reduce downtime.
During the initial meetings, the company and the union
worked to improve communication between the parties and
with the employees. The minutes indicated that the parties
held a "broad and general discussion" on the areas iden
tified for productivity improvement. At the union's sugges
tion, management sent letters to its employees which outlin-
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ed the current business prospects and made reference to pro
ductivity needs. This was followed two months later by an
additional letter which discussed the introduction of a new
product line.
The JM-LSC identified difficulties related to poor
management. For example, in a discussion of excessive
downtime it was pointed out that this was the result of short
ages of purchased parts, lack of tooling, and removal of pro
duced parts. These shortages made it most difficult to keep
work ahead of the employees or to permit them to be kept
active for an entire shift. This according to the committee
resulted in overtime work at the end of the month.
The union also made several suggestions which manage
ment rejected. The first was a union proposal to put
nonincentive jobs in a key section on to the incentive system.
This was put under investigation, and after a detailed study
no decision was made to make the change. In another in
stance, the union suggested, but the corporation opposed, a
large capital expenditure to permit the purchase of
machinery, equipment and tooling to permit expansion into
a recently developed market.
From the initial meeting, one of the goals of the plant's
management was to change work habits and patterns. In this
regard, the union leadership appeared willing at the outset to
assist. In a discussion of absuse of the rest period the com
mittee concluded that "the most logical solution to the prob
lem is a more conscious awareness in enforcing it on the
floor."
Thereafter, the parties addressed the issue of "pegged per
formance" on incentive jobs. They agreed to a joint pro
gram of supervisory and employee meetings to explain the
nature of the problems besetting the plant and to request
employee cooperation in doing away with pegged produc
tion.
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Shortly thereafter, the union's cooperative attitude seems
to have lessened as a result of major layoff. On June 20,
1973, the union informed the company that it should not ex
pect improved productivity when "disturbances are created
by a removal of the majority of the third shift. . . ."At the
same time, the union complained that several other areas of
the plant were working regular overtime which they claimed
caused absenteeism and a decline in individual productivity.
The union further stated that there were limited oppor
tunities for increased production due to employees being on
short work weeks. Finally, the union pointed to management
ineffectiveness, e.g., the delay in getting tools and stock and
the movement of completed stock. Thereafter, when the
company raised the absenteeism problem and a sudden
decline in productivity, the union stressed the short term
recall and layoff, short work weeks, lack of materials or
parts, and excessive tool problems.
At one point, the company committeemen proposed a
reclassification of a position from one department to
another at the same rate of pay. The company claimed the
proposed change was needed because of its inability to pro
vide a full day's work due to the variance in set-up times.
The union committeemen took the position that the subject
was an inappropriate one for the Productivity Committee
and one better suited for the Bargaining Committee. They
further stated that in principle they saw no need for change.
At this point of the committee's experience, a crucial stage
was reached. The corporation had authorized the purchase
of new cost savings equipment. The company reminded the
union of the need for normal work effort by operators dur
ing time studies to establish production standards, and the
need for a proper attitude by the operators in order to pro
tect operators from loss of normal earnings. In addition, this
would have permitted the division to demonstrate its ability
to meet its goals and targets. However, within a month
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thereafter, the union was to complain of a lack of employee
confidence in the setting of new rates for the newly purchas
ed machinery.
As the JM-LSC progressed through the summer of 1974, it
became apparent that there was a great deal of redundancy
in the issues discussed. The company continued to discuss its
problems with absenteeism, while at the same time, the
union continued to stress difficulties caused by management
personnel. There is no doubt that the initial meetings of the
JM-LSC were helpful in highlighting issues for future
development. However, the level of action taken to develop
ideas and programs for the resolution of productivity prob
lems never occurred.
The parties at this plant were never able to reach a truly
cooperative stage. In addition to the problems created by the
salaried employees' pay increase and third shift layoff,
several other factors may help explain the absence of
cooperation. First, the members of the JM-LSC were for the
most part the same individuals who regularly negotiated con
tracts and settled grievances. The tone and conduct of the
meetings were reported to be representative of that which
took place at the bargaining table. In contrast to most labormanagement committees the plant manager never took part
in the committee's deliberations.
A second factor appears to be the inability of the parties to
reach a stage beyond that of the union placing the blame for
productivity difficulties on management, and vice-versa. If
the parties had been able to resolve or show progress on even
a minor problem, perhaps a more cooperative shift would
have been engendered. Related to this seems to be the
animosity toward hourly employees held by the manage
ment. In other companies investigated for this study, more
progressive management policies tended to produce more
responsible behavior on the part of the employees. In this
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particular case, the management response to dysfunctional
employee attitudes and behaviors was a "hard-nosed" desire
to "enforce the rules."
Finally, job security became an over-riding issue for the
union and its members. There were recurrent rumors that ad
ditional production would be moved overseas. Management
was never successful in dispelling these rumors.
During 1973, the JM-LSC met 12 times. In 1974 the
number of meetings totaled only six. In the minutes of the
last several meetings it is clear that very little was being ac
complished due to one side or the other rejecting its counter
part's proposals. Following the last meeting, both the com
pany and the union mutually agreed to allow the committee
to die out with the caveat that they would meet again if either
side felt that there was something to discuss. Although the
JM-LSC continues to be part of the collective bargaining
agreement, neither side has called a meeting in nearly 10
years.
Site 2 was only willing to provide employment data. The
employment experience does demonstrate the severity of the
problems faced by this plant and the strength of the stimulus
for cooperation. The employment data were analyzed for the
period November 1970 - October 1974 with the intervention
point being the start of the JM-LSC, November 1972. As
shown in table 6-11, there was a statistically significant
reduction in employment following the start-up of the com
mittee (t = -8.59, p<.001). Moreover, in contrast to other
sites in the study, Site 2's experience was dramatically dif
ferent from the industry at large. Figure 6-5 demonstrates
that as the plant's employment was falling sharply, there was
an industry-wide steady upward trend.
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Table 6-11
Site 2 Summary
(Case 8)

Employment
(N = 48, df=44)

Level

T-Stat

Lev Chg

T-Stat

576.08

37.65

-170.97

-8.59 +

Drift

T-Stat

Dft Chg

T-Stat

9.65

9.44

-17.59

-12.15 +

+ p<.001

This site demonstrates that a strong stimulus for change,
i.e., loss of jobs and a further potential reduction in employ
ment was not enough for cooperation to be successful.
Moreover, creating a cooperative structure without a change
of attitude among the principals will not result in meaningful
labor-management cooperation. It is clear that neither labor
nor management demonstrated a sufficient degree of trust or
candor to permit the type of problemsolving interaction to
truly resolve the significant problems facing the company.
The behavior of the participants seemed to closely parallel
that which would be expected in actual collective bargaining.
An expanded committee membership might have alleviated
this.
The JM-LSC might have been more effective had a neutral
been involved. Other plant committees have benefitted from
third party involvement, particularly when provided by an
Area Labor-Management Committee. The neutral might
have been able to set up a more problemsolving oriented
commitee structure and procedure. The presence of a neutral
might have permitted a more open exchange of views and the
neutral might have offered his/her own ideas to improve the
parties' relationship.

Figure 6-5
Site 2 Employment
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Finally, it was not possible to buffer the cooperative pro
cess from other workplace issues. The pay raise for salaried
employees, the layoffs of additional workers, and the reduc
tion in hours for others made commitment by the union
leadership difficult and led the union participants to take
hard-line positions on many issues.

Case Study 9: Mixing QWL Concepts
with Traditional Union-Management Issues
Site 3 manufactures ball bearings and at the time of this
research had 699 production employees. Labor relations at
this plant have been mixed. Prior to 1969, there were several
small walkouts. From 1969-1974, relations were quite
peaceful. The 1974 contract negotiations resulted in a twoweek strike, while the 1977 contract was settled peacefully.
In 1973, the division's business declined and 200 jobs were
moved from the plant to a facility in the South. At that
point, the union agreed to the creation of a joint in-plant
committee, but only assigned lesser ranking officials to it.
The company assigned the works manager (plant manager)
and the personnel director. The committee had met for three
months when an in-plant dispute occurred which resulted in
an end to the cooperative relationship.
In 1975, the plant needed to make changes in order to in
sure its economic survival. There had been a severe layoff
and 300 of the plant's 800 jobs were moved to the southern
plant. The union president who was said to be committed to
the quality of worklife concept raised the idea of a
cooperative labor-management program with his consti
tuents. In December 1975, at a general membership meeting,
the rank-and-file voted to approve the creation of a sixmember (three union/three management) UnionManagement Study Group on Productivity and Quality of
Worklife. One proviso was that any agreement that was

Impact

195

reached had to be brought back to the membership for their
approval.
The company chose the works manager, manufacturing
manager, and personnel and industrial relations manager to
serve on the committee, while representing the union were
the local president, chairman of the office bargaining unit,
and one committeeman from the factory. The Study Group
was defined as
... a joint effort by the Union and Company to
explore new ideas and better ways of doing things
for the benefit of both the employees and the com
pany by using the natural resources of the plant
employees, both Union and Management in a
voluntary way sharing gains jointly. 7
The Study Group had no decisionmaking authority, but
could make recommendations compatible with the Group's
mission, which covered four areas:
(1) Productivity Improvement
(2) Quality of Worklife
(3) Reward/Pay Systems
(4) Human Relations
To develop relations that encourage teamwork and
understanding between people ... to provide an
honest, open communication system that promotes
a sense of responsibility, pride, satisfaction, and
recognition for achievement.
The Study Group's first meeting was held on January 29,
1976. At that time, agreement was reached that the group
should not focus on union-management distinctions, but in
stead each committee member should be free to discuss ideas
freely and openly.
The Group also decided to utilize outside consultants. The
consultants offered several ideas including the elimination of
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status symbols, the use of people to generate "on the floor
ideas" and the creation of a formalized system of com
munication.
From the beginning, the Study Group decided to formally
communicate with the rank-and-file. The Study Group met
with groups of 40 employees (management and union) for
one hour on company time. Each member of the Study
Group was assigned a specific QWL issue to discuss, with
sufficient time permitted to allow employees to ask ques
tions. At the end of the meetings, each employee was asked
to write down what they liked or disliked about each area of
discussion. The Study Group concluded that the biggest fear
the employees had was job security. Finally, the Study
Group met with the foremen and stewards, since the Group
believed they were an important communications link to the
employees.
Minutes of the Study Group's meeting of March 4, 1976,
indicate that an experimental work redesign project was re
jected by the employees involved. The department had voted
to reject a team approach. The minutes of the Study Group
offer a valuable lesson.
Everyone agreed that the issue was one of security
and not with the team concept itself . . . everyone
agreed it was necessary to let the responsibility and
the vote rest with the turning teams as responsible
adults.
Thereafter the Study Group formed seven plant subcom
mittees of 6-12 persons, all volunteers. These committees
met for one hour, two times per week, for three weeks to
develop ideas for their immediate work areas. The subcom
mittee chairpersons received in-house team building training
while the subcomittee members, stewards, and supervisors
were briefed on the expected operation of the subcommit
tees.
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Problems arose in the subcommittees. Several chairper
sons resigned because of pressures brought by the people in
their areas. In addition, the skilled trades group dropped out
and soon thereafter, the first member of the Study Group
resigned, also as the result of pressures from shop floor.
The Joint Study Group visited other firms, at company ex
pense, to gain ideas and exposure to other cooperative ven
tures.
After six months the efforts of the Joint Study Group
resulted in the following changes:
(1) Elimination of assigned parking
(2) Addition of piped-in music on the shop floor
(3) Installation of clocks on the walls
These minimal changes upset office and staff personnel who
felt that their status had been reduced in the process. As a
result, the office bargaining unit successfully negotiated for
the reinstitution of assigned parking. It was reported that the
supervisory staff were also sympathetic to the issues raised
by the office unit.
The Study Group completed its work in early 1977. The
final product of the group's efforts, dated March 8, 1977,
was an agreement known as the Experimental Quality of
Work Life Program (EQWLP).
The Experimental Quality of Work Life Program pledged
the company and the union to work towards the following
goals:
(1) To make jobs more meaningful and work more satis
fying for employees, salaried and hourly, by en
couraging concepts which allow for direct input by
employees, thus promoting teamwork, responsibility,
trust, pride, satisfaction and recognition of achieve
ment.
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(2) The development of a program that will work
towards improved productivity, and if increased pro
ductivity results ways of rewarding employees by
sharing the benefits of increased productivity will
become legitimate matters for inclusion in the pro
gram.
Thus, in spite of previous opposition, the Study Group
recommended a program that would contain elements such
as shop floor committees, job redesign, autonomous work
groups and gainsharing. Employee participation in the pro
gram was to be voluntary. The decision to participate was to
be made within designed work groups, with the final decision
determined by majority rule. After "a fair trial period" any
group would have been permitted to terminate its program,
once again by a vote. It should be pointed out that the com
pany would have been permitted to terminate a group with
30 days notice.
The EQWLP provided for significant job protection and
income security provisions. The job protection language was
explicit.
No worker or groups of workers will lose pay or
seniority or be laid off from the plant as a direct
result of this quality of work life experiment con
ducted in the plant whether they are a participant
or not.
The company and the union also agreed that an equitable
means would be found to adjust for employees whose jobs
would have been made unnecessary or "surplused" as a
result of the program. An exception to the employment
security provisions was made for jobs lost as a result of
adverse business conditions or technological change.
The parties agreed that for each work group that im
plemented the EQWLP, a method of wage payment be
found that would provide for ". . . earnings equivalent to
those previously enjoyed or greater." The provisions of the
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collective bargaining agreement were protected. No activities
under the program would have been permitted to "con
travene, change, or otherwise affect any provisions of the
current collective bargaining agreements ..." without prior
approval of each party. Each party was given the right to ter
minate the EQWLP program upon 60 days notice. If this oc
curred, any provisions previously agreed to would have been
"contravened," and the pre-program and status quo
reestablished. Any workplace changes that might have been
made unilaterally by the company under the collective
bargaining agreement would be permitted to remain in force
at the discretion of the management.
The company agreed to pay the principal costs of the pro
gram. These included (1) provisions for group meetings;
(2) the services of expert consultants (jointly chosen); (3) the
conduct of employee meetings on company time; (4) the
costs of new training programs; and (5) the costs of pro
viding company information deemed necessary by the Joint
Study Group.
The Joint Study Group was to oversee the operation of the
EQWLP. It was to have been a ten-member panel (five union
and five management members). The union members were
specified under the agreement as being the
(1) union president;
(2) chairman of the office bargaining committee;
(3) chairman of the factor bargaining committee; and
(4) two other elected union officials selected by the union
president.
The Joint Study Group was empowered to designate other
working committees to develop methods for problem resolu
tion, and to develop additional communication programs to
further the objectives of the EQWLP. Finally, provisions
were made to amend the program by mutual agreement.
The EQWLP was defeated by a vote of the union's
membership—129 in favor, 540 opposed. Three factors help
to explain the outcome. First, there was a split on the union
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negotiating committee. The local president and several
members of the bargaining committee were not in agreement
on the merits of the program. Negotiating committee
members were not directly involved in the development of
the EQWLP and there was on-going opposition by various
groups of workers which tended to influence some commit
tee members. Second, the EQWLP became intertwined in in
ternal union politics. The vote on the program came shortly
before a union election and the opposition used the program
as a political issue against people who had worked to develop
the EQWLP. Third, the union reported that many super
visors, roughly 50 percent of whom had come from the
bargaining unit, had opposed the program. Supervisors
feared their jobs would be threatened, and it may be that
their subtle opposition convinced many employees to oppose
the program.
The management reported that it had done a poor job sell
ing the program to supervision, office employees, and the
rank-and-file. Convincing arguments on the need for this
type of change were lacking. It was never made clear why
this particular strategy was selected. It should also be noted
that the stimulus for change, a difficult economic recession,
had begun to subside. The job security provisions may not
have convinced a skeptical workforce that had already seen a
sizable number of employees lose their jobs to a nonunion
southern plant that the remaining jobs would be preserved.
Finally, both sides placed considerable responsibility for
the program's failure on the consultants. According to com
mittee minutes, both sides seemed to feel that the corporate
consultant and one of the academic consultants were pushing
them too fast and that this was causing a great deal of stress.
It was felt that the consultants were not sufficiently ex
perienced in labor relations, nor did they fully understand
the internal operations of unions. Evidence that the process
was moving too fast and was facing demise included: the in-
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itial defeats of an experimental project, the resignation of a
union steering committee member, and other indicators of
shop floor opposition that the change process was moving
faster than political support within the union.
The operation of the program had the potential of offset
ting hard won contract rights. A majority vote of a work
group would be needed to implement a change effort. This
created uncertainty. For example, the collective bargaining
agreement provided for job assignments based on seniority.
There was no guarantee that individual worker job rights
would be preserved if a majority of a work group voted for
change. There was a fear that people at different pay grades
would be doing the same job. Other workers feared a loss of
earnings if the individual incentive system were eliminated,
in spite of guarantees to the contrary.
This cooperative effort failed for several reasons. There
was a dispute among the union's leadership as to the merits
of the program, one leader having resigned from the com
mittee. Kochan and Dyer have suggested that if coalitions
develop to block the cooperative venture, gaining an initial
commitment will be less likely. The evidence from this case
strongly supports this contention as opposition surfaced
from several groups including union members of the com
mittee, supervision, and the office bargaining unit. Second,
workers were very sensitive to job security issues and will be
very resistant to change unless this important issue is ad
dressed in a meaningful way. Third, the process of change
may have moved too quickly, particularly in view of the op
position. It may take more than a well-meaning committee to
reduce years of distrust. Finally, the stimulus for change (the
recession) subsided with improved economic conditions.
Again, Kochan and Dyer posit that if the stimulus for change
lessens, so will the party's desire for change.
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Case Study 10: The Misuse of Gainsharing
This case represents the misuse of gainsharing. The plant
was composed of four separate operating divisions of a large
multinational manufacturing corporation. Site 12 (250 in
direct employees)8 manufactured gas compressors; Site 13
(95 indirect employees) manufactured air compressors; Site
14 (20 indirect employees) manufactured small compressors;
and Site 15 (23 indirect employees) manufactured valves and
regulators. Each division was an independent profit center,
with the division managers reporting to different corporate
vice-presidents. In spite of the management structure, there
was only one union representing all the employees and a
single collective bargaining agreement. There was a centraliz
ed industrial relations function. In contrast to other com
panies in this situation, however, there was no single actor
on site with the authority to settle differences of opinion
among the division managers.
As a very traditional manufacturing firm, the company
was highly committed to individual incentive systems. Most
of the direct labor employees were on Halsey, Rowan, or
other individual incentives. Indirect workers were paid hour
ly wages and thus had significantly lower earnings than in
centive employees. In contract negotiations, the union made
a strong case for upgrading the pay of indirect employees,
and management made a commitment to raise the wages of
this group. Rather than a direct pay increase, management
proposed, and the union agreed to an Improshare Plan. The
expectation of the company was that the Improshare Plan
would help increase employee performance to offset the pay
increase.
Because of differences in the nature of production, style of
management, and management preferences in the four
operating divisions, there were four Improshare Plans. Each
Plan was composed solely of indirect employees, but the
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Plans were similar in that they were composed of the same
types of employees (e.g., material handlers) who had pre
viously received the same wages. The Plans differed in their
accounting procedures and plan standard (called Base Pro
ductivity Factor). In most incentive plans, individual, group,
or plantwide, there is a fairly direct relationship between per
formance and reward. However, for these groups of indirect
employees the relationship between effort and reward was
very tenuous. The individual worker was never able to see
how his/her efforts related to the earning of a bonus. Fac
tors such as the level of business activity and the efforts by
the direct labor force were more likely to influence the earn
ing of a bonus.
The site utilized two operating committees. The most ac
tive was the Division Committee, which met on a monthly
basis. This committee was comprised of the following
members: the personnel manager; the operations manager
and the manufacturing manager; one financial analyst and
one industrial engineer from each division; the union time
study observer; two bargaining unit members; and the union
president. There were no provisions in the plans which stated
the committee's purpose, scope, or authoritative power.
The committee meetings were generally used to discuss
operational problems. For example, when work was subcon
tracted between groups, the committee had to decide how to
account for the effected group's earned hours. The Commit
tee also monitored the bonus percentages of the groups. This
might involve comparing the current bonuses with previous
figures or evaluating various factors that impacted on the
bonuses.
The union president stated that the meetings were basically
a "gripe session." Methods, ideas, and/or suggestions
relating to productivity improvement were never discussed.
There was general agreement between all of the interviewees
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that the sessions were generally "facts and figures"
meetings; there was never any constructive discussion of pro
ductivity issues.
The other operating committee, designed to handle large
group matters and major problems was the Ad Hoc Commit
tee. The membership of this committee included: the group
operations managers, an internal consultant manufacturing
engineer manager, the director of industrial relations, the
union president, and the Grievance Committee. The Ad Hoc
Committee was very active in the developmental stages of the
plans. Thereafter, it would only convene if a major revision
was required, such as a change in the time standard, or
possibly the Base Productivity Factor.
Thus, the Improshare Plan did not provide for employee
participation. There was no orientation program to acquaint
employees with the operation of the Plan, nor were there
Plan documents or an employee handbook to explain the
operation of the bonus formula. This was unfortunate since
of the three gainsharing plans—Scanlon, Rucker, and Im
proshare—the Improshare bonus formula is the most com
plex and difficult for employees (as well as managers) to
understand.
Productivity at Site 12 was measured as the ratio of ad
justed (constant) labor dollars shipped9 and indirect hours
charged during the period July 1976 - June 1982. Productivi
ty at Sites 13, 14 and 15 was measured by establishing a rela
tionship between direct employee labor hours -5- indirect
employee labor hours worked for the period January
1977 - July 1982. It was not possible to utilize an output per
hour measure due to the nature of production and limitation
in the management information system.
This second measure, while not optimal, was an attempt to
estimate the productivity of only the indirect employees. If
productivity of the indirect workers increased, it would re-
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quire fewer hours to service the direct employees. The in
tervention point was the introduction of the Improshare
Plan in August 1979.
Employment at Site 12 was measured for the period
January 1976 - June 1982, while at the other three it was
analyzed for the period January 1979 - June 1982. The rela
tionship between the number of indirect employees and
direct employees at Site 12 was also measured as a ratio for
the period January 1976 - June 1982. Table 6-12 summarizes
the statistical analysis of this data and figure 6-6 provides a
visual examination of the productivity data.
Productivity at Site 12 was unchanged throughout the pro
ductivity time-series for both level and drift (t = -.41 and
-.32, respectively, both n.s.). Employment was unchanged
following the Plan's introduction (t=.18, n.s.). Over time,
the division's employment was stable (t = -.38, n.s.), while
the industry showed a downward trend (t = -1.33, n.s.). The
relationship between the employment levels of indirect and
direct workers remained unchanged throughout the timeseries (t= .10 and -.68, n.s.).
Productivity at Site 13 remained initially stable following
the intervention (t= .32, n.s.). Over time, however, produc
tivity showed a statistically significant downward trend
(t = -3.39, p<.001) (see figure 6-7). There was a statistically
significant increase in the level of employment (t = 2.12,
p<.05), while the industry suffered a downturn (t = -1.00,
n.s.). The trend for both the division (t = -.56, n.s.) and in
dustry employment (t = -.85, n.s.) remained stable.
Site 14's productivity time-series exhibited a downward
level change following the Plan's introduction (t=-l.ll,
n.s.) and was generally stable over time (t = -.88, n.s.). The
division's employment level and trend were stable over the
time-series (t= .77 and t= .79, both n.s.). Industry employ
ment, however, decreased following the intervention

Figure 6-6
Site 12 Productivity

K)

o

3
•o

5.00

-

4.75

-

4.50

-

Figure 6-7
Site 13 Productivity

0.8

T3
ta
o

0.6
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

Table 6-12
Sites 12,13,14 and 15 Summary
(Case 10)
Dft Chg

T-Stat

0.68

-0.02

-0.32

-1.07

-1.62

-0.37

-0.38

0.18

0.60

0.17

-5.89

-1.33

0.00

0.10

-0.00

-0.27

0.00

-0.68

22.62

0.02

0.32

0.01

2.81

-0.01

-3.39 +

97.02

57.77

3.42

2.12*

-0.03

-0.03

-0.63

-0.56

18.77

36.39

-0.46

-1.00

0.08

0.70

-0.10

-0.85

Levei

T-Stat

Lev Chg

T-Stat

Drift

T-Stat

4.70

20.83

-0.09

-0.41

0.03

Employment

315.07

72.87

5.44

1.26

Employment control
(N = 78, df=74)

166.64

8.49

3.57

Indirect/direct
(N = 78, df=74)

0.65

47.56

Site 13
Productivity
(N = 79, df=75)

1.15

Employment
Employment control
(N = 40, df=36)

Site 12
Productivity
(N = 72, df=68)

•a

Site 14

Productivity
(N = 79, df=75)

3.49

12.32

-0.39

-1.11

0.01

1.13

-0.02

-0.88

Employment

22.65

19.25

0.80

0.77

-0.27

-1.06

0.21

0.79

Employment control
(N = 40, df=36)

18.77

36.39

-0.46

-1.00

0.08

0.70

-0.10

-0.85

3.15

8.63

-0.34

-0.92

0.04

1.63

-0.09

-2.29*

Employment

22.71

97.27

-1.14

-5.55+

0.21

4.31

-0.22

-4.32 +

Employment control
(N = 40, df=36)

71.89

65.23

1.17

1.16

0.19

0.57

-0.39

-1.09

Site 15
Productivity
(N = 79, df=75)

*p<.05, + p<.001
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(t=-1.00, n.s.), remaining unchanged over time (t = -.85,
n.s.).
Productivity at Site 15 was initially unchanged (t = -.92,
n.s.). The trend, though, exhibited a statistically significant
decrease (t = -2.29, p<.05). Employment suffered a
statistically significant downturn in both the level and trend
(t = -5.55 and t = -4.32, both p<.001). At the same time, in
dustry employment showed an increase in level (t=1.16,
n.s.). Over time, industry employment experienced a
downturn (t=-1.09, n.s.), though to a much lesser degree
than that of the division.
This Improshare Plan did increase employee earnings. Site
12 paid a bonus 33 out of 35 months and Site 13 earned a
bonus 27 of 35 months; Site 14 has paid a bonus less often,
14 of 34 months, but the bonuses have been much larger, for
example, 5 have been in excess of 25 percent. The largest
bonuses were paid at Site 15, where 12 of the 28 bonuses paid
were more than 25 percent. Needless to say, the earning of
differential bonuses, particularly when it had very little to do
with indirect employee efforts, caused tension among the
employees involved.
If the Improshare measure of productivity, that is, the
bonus formula is examined, then productivity can be con
sidered to have increased. There is no reason to assume that
measure is a poor one and several managers interviewed in
dicated that Improshare provided the first real examination
of productivity the sites had made. In comparison with
Scanlon and Rucker measures, it comes closest to a pure out
put per hour ratio. Yet, because of the quality of the measure
ofproductivity at Sites 13-15, it is not possible to conclusive
ly judge the effectiveness of Improshare.
However, using the productivity data provided by the four
sites, no immediate change in indirect labor productivity
could be found. Moreover, at Sites 13 and 15, there was a
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negative trend over time. At Site 13, this can partially be ex
plained by the introduction of new capital equipment follow
ing introduction of the Improshare Plan. This reduced the
number of direct labor employees but increased the number
of indirect workers required to maintain and service the new
equipment.
One of the advantages of the Improshare Plan is that the
bonus measurement system can be adapted for a large group
of employees, yet need not apply to the entire employee com
plement as with the Rucker and Scanlon Plan. This was
demonstrated in this case. However, there were several
unintended consequences. First, there were differential earn
ings among groups of employees doing nearly the same
work. Since it was unclear from the outset what impact in
direct employees could have on productivity improvement,
both workers and the management questioned the validity of
the bonus formula. This problem was further compounded,
as shown here, by the lack of good quality data to determine
whether productivity had increased. In fact, no one ever
knew whether productivity had increased, decreased, or re
mained the same. One of the most interesting overall find
ings from this study is that many companies are very poor at
measuring their own productivity. This caused internal con
flict within management as several of the divisions put forth
proposals to modify the bonus formula. Needless to say, the
union leadership also had internal difficulties in dealing with
the differential earnings among the four groups of
employees. The problem became further compounded when
several employees working in one division were switched into
another division for bonus calculation purposes only on the
premise that their efforts primarily benefitted that division.
A strong argument can be made against the institution and
structure of gainsharing at this site. The plan was for indirect
employees only, whose efforts could not be clearly attached
to company performance. There were four plans instead of
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one which would be typical. And there were no internal
measures of productivity to evaluate the effectiveness of the
gainsharing arrangement. This should not be considered a
criticism of Improshare generally. Any form of gainsharing
would have been inappropriate in this setting. In fact, Im
proshare is the only gainsharing approach that could have
been even marginally appropriate in this situation. The
counter argument to this criticism was put forth by a
management proponent of the Plan. He took the position
that since a commitment was made to raise the wages of the
indirect workforce in negotiations, at the very least Im
proshare permitted the company to "get something for the
money."
This position was not shared universally. The labor rela
tions manager asserted a claim that was made at several
other research sites as well. He argued that there was an
over-reliance on the utilization of incentive systems (at this
company, Halsey, Rowan and Improshare) to manage the
workforce and facilitate production. Management, he alleg
ed, relied on the incentive to manage employees, rather than
supervision. Greater efforts should be made in the direction
of improved supervisory management, meaningful employee
involvement, and human resources programs to increase
employee commitment and motivation.

Conclusions
The ten cases presented serve to highlight the diversity in
patterns of union-management cooperation and the
variability of success. The stimulus for cooperation varied.
In one instance (Case 1), cooperation (Scanlon Plan) occur
red to save the plant, while in Case 8 (L-MC), it was to save
large numbers of jobs. Differential outcomes occurred—the
former was very successful and the latter a dismal failure.
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In Cases 6, 7, and 10 cooperation centered around the in
troduction of new payment or incentive systems, while in
three others—3, 4 (to win back concessions), and 5—the
stimulus was for higher earnings. Thus the traditional union
goal of higher earnings is very much present in these
cooperative schemes. It is important to note that in Cases 6
and 7, very few bonuses were paid and "cooperation" end
ed. In Case 5, three Scanlon Plans of long duration paid
large bonuses and this is an important element in their sur
vival.
At least four cases represent situations in which jobs were
immediately threatened (Cases 4, 8, and 9) or the plant was
due to close. This is the greatest threat to the local union and
its members, as well as to site management. Yet one has to
question why situations are permitted to deteriorate to crisis
proportions before adequate attention is paid to resolving
the problems. Much of this can be explained by the adver
sary process of collective bargaining which has created a very
high level of mistrust at the local level. If our industrial rela
tions institutions are to be proactive rather than reactive, the
level of mistrust must be reduced. Perhaps the current high
level of cooperation will push parties in that direction.
In Cases 2 and 9, both plants which were part of the same
multinational firm attempted to dramatically increase
employee involvement. In Case 2, involvement was readily
and overwhelmingly accepted, while in Case 9 involvement
was resoundingly rejected by a vote of the employees. Case 3
presents a situation in which the impact of cooperation as
measured by an improvement in quality and lower
absenteeism was delayed by several months.
In this research, several measures of the impact of
cooperation were utilized. They included organizational ef
fectiveness measures (productivity, as defined by output per
hour; level of employment; quality, absenteeism, turnover,
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tardiness, and grievances), program duration, and payment
of bonuses. There are, however, other measures of effec
tiveness that could have been utilized as well. These include
unit labor costs; the actual degree of employee involvement;
employee attitudes toward work; employee mental health
and safety; the impact of the cooperation on the internal af
fairs of the union and in its success in representing its
members in collective bargaining; and the impact of
cooperation on managerial decisionmaking and the quality
of those decisions.
Finally, what characteristics separate the successful cases
from the unsuccessful ones? Although the sample of firms
was too small for a statistical determination of effectiveness,
several factors were preliminarily identified. These included:
type of ownership, technology, age composition of the
workforce, program implementation strategies (i.e., training
for supervisors and shop stewards), and the frequency of
bonus payments. The cases presented in this chapter identify
other additional factors.
In one case (8), the key management decisionmaker on site
did not participate. In two others the failure of the key
manager to involve himself in the cooperative process led to
the demise of earlier efforts (4 and 9). In two cases (2 and 5),
there was a strong desire by management for employee par
ticipation, while in another a structure was put in place for
participation but very little shop floor decisionmaking was
permitted (Case 7). Managerial problems unrelated to the
unionized workforce were present and overcome in one case
(4), but continued to be a source of frustration in another
(Case 8). Hence, the attitudes, values, and competence of the
management have a great deal to do with the success of the
cooperative effort.
Where expertise is required to assist the parties, particular
ly in devising bonus formulas, most firms utilized widely
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known and respected consultants. Along the same lines, one
Labor-Management Committee (Case 4) was assisted by the
staff of an Area Committee and was very successful, while
another (Case 8) had no similar support and proved to be
very unsuccessful.
Questionable practices were associated with the calcula
tion of bonuses in two cases (6 and 7). The lack of bonus
earnings combined with the impression of manipulation led
to termination of the cooperative effort. Few bonuses were
paid in spite of the fact that there was evidence to suggest
that productivity had increased.
Several successful cases (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) paid high to
moderate bonuses, at times equalling as much as 25 percent
of pay. Yet, most of these firms experienced and survived ex
tended periods of very limited or no bonuses. Thus payment
of a bonus is not by itself a sole condition for success. For
example, in Case 10, large and frequent bonuses were con
sistently paid, yet there remains some doubt whether such a
bonus record was justified by the productivity experience in
this instance.

NOTES
1. Originally there were five categories. Very Positive or Very Negative
Impact was indicated when the t-statistic measuring the impact of the
change was significant at the p<.05, p<.01, or p<.001 levels. A
Positive or Negative Impact was indicated by a t-statistics of ± 1.00,
while t-statistics of less than ± .99 were classified as no change. The ra
tionale for doing this stemmed from the small size of the sample, the fact
that the number of observations in each time-series was roughly
equivalent, the conservative nature of the time-series test, and the desire
for preliminary identification of some of the determinants of success.
2. Note that a "Positive Impact" on absenteeism, turnover, tardiness,
grievances occurred when there was a decrease in rate.
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3. Several of the cases discussed in this section are also presented in a
recently published paper: M. Schuster, "The Impact of UnionManagement Cooperation on Productivity and Employment." In
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, 1983, Vol. 36(3), 415-430.
4. The productivity data could not be statistically analyzed due to the
manner in which they were provided. Instead, they were examined
graphically.
5. Supplemental Agreement, p. 30.
6. Ibid., p. 30.
7. All quotations are from the minutes of the meetings of the UnionManagement Study Group on Productivity and Quality of Worklife. No
further referencing is provided.
8. Shop floor employees are often classified as direct and indirect
employees. Direct employees are those who work on the machinery, for
example, lathe operators. Indirect employees provide a support function,
for example, material handling or stores.
9. This is the same as added value, that is sales value minus cost of goods
sold.

Chapter 7
Conclusions
This chapter presents some of the major findings of the
research, along with the policy implications from these find
ings. There are five sections in this chapter. Three corres
pond to chapters 4, 5, and 6, that is, they address the struc
ture, process,and impact of union-management cooperation.
The final two segments identify and discuss the
methodological findings and discuss future research issues.

The Structure of Cooperation
There were six types of interventions investigated for this
research. These included three types of gainsharing
plans—Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare Plans—as well as
Quality Circles, Labor-Management Committees, and
Quality of Worklife projects. The results of this analysis are
reported in detail in chapter 4. Several important findings
are noted below.
The six interventions vary significantly in their underlying
philosophy. Scanlon Plans and Quality Circles are based
upon a more humanistic view of workplace management,
in contrast to Improshare Plans, which are primarily
group incentive programs. Rucker Plans are also more
directly based on economic incentives, but do provide for
some limited employee participation.
None of these interventions is a substitute for competent
management, good union-management relations, or
217
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responsible union leadership. Organizations without these
ingredients may not be adequately prepared for an exten
sive organizational change. In these instances, LaborManagement Committees are particularly effective at
changing the industrial relations environment, thereby
permitting more significant interventions, for example,
Quality Circles, gainsharing or Quality of Worklife pro
jects, to be instituted.
If the management of a company is not fully committed to
employee participation, then implementing involvement
structures (for example, Quality Circles) mil not lead to
improved organizational effectiveness. Employee involve
ment requires that management be willing to relinquish
some control over workplace behavior. Employees have to
be trusted to act responsibly and managers must be willing
to listen to employee ideas.
Supervisors play a key role in improving workplace per
formance. Unfortunately, the quality of American pro
duction supervision appears to be mediocre, at best. This
problem is further compounded by the lack of resources
firms expend for supervisory training.
The bonus formulas are an excellent means of equitably
sharing organizational improvements. However, they
must be developed with great care and caution since they
are difficult to change once implemented. Consultants
serve a useful role in developing the formulas. There is one
caveat. In a workplace environment of great distrust, and
particularly when no bonus is received, the calculation of
the bonus each month can be a source of additional
animosity, as workers question the integrity of the for
mula and the honesty of management in assembling the
figures.

The Process of Cooperation
Analysis of the process of cooperation considered the
means by which the parties changed their relationship. These

Conclusions

219

findings are reported in detail in chapter 5. Several general
conclusions were drawn.
There were a number of reasons for companies and unions
to enter into a cooperative relationship. These include a
desire to increase productivity, improve labormanagement relations, increase wages, and institute a new
incentive program. In many instances, the initial stimuli
influenced the choice of intervention. Thus, gainsharing
programs are likely to be more successful at improving
productivity than Labor-Management Committees.
However, L-MCs will likely be a more effective strategy
for preparing an organization for in-depth change. Addi
tionally, where the stimulus for a cooperative effort in
cludes both improvement of productivity and improved
labor-management relations, a program such as the
Scanlon Plan can offer a beneficial result even where the
organization experiences no significant increase in produc
tivity.
There mil be no cooperation if the traditional collective
bargaining process is effective at resolving organizational
difficulties. Companies and unions still prefer to interact
with one another as they have since the inception of collec
tive bargaining. At this time, there is very little evidence
(the popular press notwithstanding) to suggest that a new
era of union-management relations based upon trust and
cooperation is on the horizon. Indeed, companies and
unions will continue to approach industrial relations
pragmatically and will cooperate only when it is in their in
terest to do so.
The cooperative process requires neutrals and consulting
expertise. The parties need the expertise of outsiders to
assist them in formulating and implementing cooperative
programs. For example, in this research, LaborManagement Committees were far more effective when
they were guided by the expertise of the staff of Area
Labor-Management Committees. Expansion of the
number of Area L-MCs and increasing their resources
would be very useful and should result in increased unionmanagement cooperation and more effective LaborManagement Committees.
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There has been an increasing interest in employee par
ticipation at the workplace. Although many companies
and unions are attempting to provide employees with an
opportunity to influence decisionmaking, there is as yet no
concrete evidence as to the actual quantity and quality of
that participation, nor what effect it has on organizational
effectiveness.
There is still no indication that guarantees of employment
security will become commonplace in American industrial
relations. Nearly all firms studied appear to be unwilling
or unable to guarantee workers a job.
Unions have less confidence in the cooperative process
than management, which tends to believe it will be likely
to produce desired organizational results. In addition,
management also believes that, in practice, there are more
benefits to be gained through cooperation.

The Impact of Cooperation
There were ten measures of program impact. These were
level and drift changes in productivity, quality, employment,
turnover, absenteeism, tardiness, grievances, plus data on
program survival after two and five years, frequency of
bonus earnings, and rater effectiveness. There were many
important results, several of which are highlighted below.
Union-management cooperation can lead to significant
improvements in productivity. Of 23 sites, productivity
improved in 11 and was unchanged in 10. Thus, it appears
that companies and unions have very little to risk and
much to gain from a cooperative venture. In 16 of 23 firms
bonuses were paid to employees more than 50 percent of
the time. This indicates that unions can supplement wage
gains from collective bargaining through unionmanagement cooperation and gainsharing.
Employment tends to be more influenced by general in
dustry conditions than by any other factor. Thus, employ
ment at firms with cooperative programs frequently tends
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to follow the industry trend. However, there were in
stances where industry employment dropped and the site
remained stable. Several companies claimed that the
cooperative effort had helped them to be more cost com
petitive. This permitted the plants to acquire a greater
share of the available business, thereby helping to stabilize
employment.
Labor-management relations can be significantly improv
ed through union-management cooperation. In the vast
majority of cases, union-management relations were im
proved. Greater trust and confidence were established,
and more frequent and substantive problemsolving in
teraction occurred. In many cases, both union and
management respondents reported that a new perspective
on their relationship had developed.
Data are still too preliminary to determine the factors
which influence success and failure in cooperative ven
tures. However, there is some support for the factors
outlined in chapter 2 (employment security, employee
involvement, plantwide compensation distributed on a
monthly basis, an effective acceptance strategy, and
technology) as well as others that were identified in the
case analysis presented in chapter 5. Further research is re
quired in order to create a sufficiently large sample to con
duct such an analysis.

Methodological Findings
Previous research on union-management cooperation has
been severely criticized on methodological grounds. One of
the major goals of this study was to further develop and
refine strategies for studying cooperation and change in
unionized settings. These observations are the result of the
field work conducted during this study and ongoing
monitoring of the cooperative union-management and quali
ty of worklife literature.
A program evaluation approach can be utilized to study
cooperative union-management strategies. Union-
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management cooperation can be studied in the same man
ner as other interventions. Thus the strategies, techniques,
and procedures utilized by evaluation researchers become
appropriate. Industrial relations researchers can adapt the
rich body of evaluation literature to study interventions
such as labor-management committees, quality of
worklife programs, and gainsharing. Well-designed case
studies are likely to provide the best method for studying
cooperative programs.
Evaluations of cooperation and change should be
longitudinal and include performance measures of effec
tiveness both before and after the introduction of the pro
gram. Studies conducted over short time frames do not ad
dress the process and impact of change when the newness
and excitement of the "experiment" have worn. There has
been too much research emphasis on attitudes toward
cooperation and descriptive studies of the cooperative pro
cess and only a small number of studies have examined the
"before and after" effects of cooperation. Thus, what is
needed are studies conducted over an extended time
frame, using measures such as output per hour, scrap
rates, unexcused absences, etc., with pre- and post-change
data being analyzed.
There is a need to study unsuccessful cases. There are very
few studies of failure in union-management cooperation.
Yet, there is general agreement that many experiments
fail. Little is known of the dynamics that result in failure.
Much could be learned and transmitted to other bargain
ing relationships from the study of unsuccessful cases. Un
fortunately, unsuccessful cases are generally more difficult
to locate and it is often difficult to get the participants to
discuss their experiences.
It is very difficult to get company and union represen
tatives to participate in field studies of the cooperative
process. There is a fear that the introduction of a resear
cher will have a destabilizing infuence on the cooperative
process.
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Future Research Issues
An outcome of this research has been to identify seven
areas for further investigation. The seven are:
(1) Investigation of additional research sites;
(2) Continued analysis of selected sites, including sites
where cooperation has ended;
(3) Study of additional forms of union-management
cooperation;
(4) Study of worker-management cooperation in non
union firms;
(5) Addition of attitudinal variables;
(6) Analysis of the calculation of the bonus formulas used
in gainsharing plans;
(7) Improving the research design and analytical tech
niques over previous research.

Investigation of Additional
Research Sites
There is a need to continue to build the size of the sample
of interventions. The current sample of 38 remains too small
to permit an in-depth evaluation of the determinants of suc
cess and failure. Increasing the sample size would permit
cross-sectional analysis of variables such as employee com
position, type of interventions, employee participation,
technology, and size, frequency and amount of bonus
payments.
Continued Analysis of Selected
Sites Including Those
Where Cooperation has Ended
The initial post-intervention time frame of two to three
years of analysis should be expanded to at least five. In this
way it will be possible to determine whether the impact was
long term rather than temporary, and whether cooperation
has survived some natural occurrences, for example,
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negotiation of a new contract, union elections, change of
plant management, and economic downturn.
Additionally, cooperation at several sites has ended. It
would be very interesting, and important, to study the per
formance of the firm and union-management relations dur
ing the post-cooperation period.

Study of Additional Forms
of Union-Management Cooperation
There has been a significant increase in the use of Quality
Circles. The Circles have become pervasive not only in the
private sector, but also in hospitals and the public sector.
Very little evaluation research of the impact of these pro
grams has occurred.
Another form of cooperation where research has been
limited has been profit-sharing plans. The popular press has
reported an increase in profit-sharing plans. These plans
closely resemble gainsharing except that they utilize a global
measure of organizational performance rather than produc
tivity. A methodology similar to the one used in this research
would be appropriate for assessing the impact of Quality
Circles and profit sharing.
Study of Worker-Management
Cooperation in Nonunion Firms
Although not a major direction of the research, five non
union firms with cooperative experiments similar to those in
unionized firms participated in this research. Further in
vestigation of these plans would make it possible to draw
some conclusions about the differences and similarities be
tween union and nonunion firms.
Addition of Attitudinal Variables
It is important to determine which attitudinal constructs
best explain employee motivation to improve productivity
and increase effectiveness in the cooperative endeavors. Ex-
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pectancy, equity, and commitment models have been offered
as possibilities. However, data to substantiate any construct
do not exist at this time. This area should be given priority
consideration in future research.

Analysis of the Calculation of Bonus
Formulas in Gainsharing Plans
One common question frequently posed by management
and union respondents dealt with the bonus formula
measurement. In essence, many respondents wanted to know
what the results would have been if another bonus formula
had been utilized. In this research there was one site with a
Rucker Plan which provided sufficient data to simulate the
Scanlon Plan bonus formula. Wide differences in payouts
occurred. At the present time this evidence is preliminary
and further investigation at more sites is needed.

Improving the Research Design
and Analytical Techniques
One goal of this research was to develop the
methodological techniques to scientifically evaluate ex
periments in productivity improvements and unionmanagement cooperation. The extensive findings from this
aspect of the study are presented in chapter 3. In particular,
better software packages for time-series impact assessment
have recently become available. Also, extending the length
of the time-series would enable investigators to better fit
time-series (ARIMA) statistical models.
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